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ABSTRACT 
President Barack Obama has convened a multi-agency 
taskforce whose remit includes considering whether the United States 
should continue to hold terrorist suspects in extra-territorial 
“preventive detention,” should develop a new system of “preventive 
detention” to hold terrorist suspects on domestic soil, or should eschew 
any use of “preventive detention.” American scholars and advocates 
who favor the use of “preventive detention” in the United States 
frequently point to the examples of other countries in support of their 
argument. At the same time, advocates and scholars opposed to the 
introduction of such a system also turn to comparative law to bolster 
their arguments against “preventive detention.” Thus far, however, the 
scholarship produced by both sides of the debate has been limited in 
two key respects. Firstly, there have been definitional inconsistencies 
in the literature—the term “preventive detention” has been used over-
broadly to describe a number of different kinds of detention with very 
little acknowledgment of the fundamental differences between these 
alternative regimes. Secondly, the debate has been narrow in scope—
focusing almost exclusively on “preventive detention” in three or four 
other (overwhelmingly Anglophone) countries. This Article seeks to 
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advance the debate about “preventive detention” by moving beyond 
each of these limitations. First, the Article defines, analyzes, and 
differentiates between the different kinds of “preventive detention.” 
Second, the Article broadens the scope of the debate by comparing the 
systems of terrorism-related “preventive detention” in use in thirty-two 
different countries. The Article constructs a taxonomy of “preventive 
detention” based on core principles of international law to distill the 
key attributes of the “preventive detention” regimes in each of the 
countries surveyed. Using the taxonomy, the Article proposes that 
there are three overarching frameworks used to detain terrorist 
suspect detainees: (1) the pre-trial detention framework; (2) the 
immigration detention framework; and (3) the national security 
detention framework. This Article proposes that U.S. policymakers 
contemplating possible future approaches to the detention of suspected 
terrorists should move beyond the inapposite and misleading question 
of whether or not to engage in “preventive detention,” and should 
instead determine which of these three frameworks offers the most 
appropriate approach to the detention of terrorist suspects. The Article 
concludes with the argument that a version of the pre-trial detention 
framework approach would be most suited for use in the United 
States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our responses to terrorism, as well as our efforts to thwart it 
and prevent it, should uphold the human rights that 
terrorists aim to destroy. Respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are essential tools 
in the effort to combat terrorism—not privileges to be 
sacrificed at a time of tension.1 
 
On January 22, 2009 President Barack Obama signed 
executive orders mandating the closure of the detention camp at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, within one year,2 ending the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s secret detention facilities,3 and holding all 
interrogations of suspected terrorists to the “noncoercive” standards 
set out in the Army Field Manual.4 At the same time, President 
Obama signed Executive Order 13493, “Review of Detention Policy 
Options,” establishing an interagency taskforce whose mission is to: 
conduct a comprehensive review of the lawful options 
available to the Federal Government with respect to the 
apprehension, detention, trial, transfer, release, or other 
disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in 
connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism 
operations, and to identify such options as are consistent 
 
1. Kofi Annan, Sec’y Gen. U.N., Remarks at a special meeting of the 
Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee with International, Regional, 
and Sub-Regional Organizations (Mar. 6, 2003). 
2. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
3. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
4. Id. The Order’s language, however, leaves open the ability to employ 
“authorized, non-coercive” techniques in addition to those detailed in the Army 
Field Manual. Id.  See also Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Helene Cooper, Obama 
Reverses Key Bush Security Policies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 2009, at A16. 
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with the national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States and the interests of justice.5 
In July 2009, the task force appointed by President Obama 
announced that it required a six-month extension to more fully 
consider the options available for the detention of terrorist suspect 
detainees.6 
This Article explores one of the options currently being 
considered by the task force: the use of “preventive detention”—i.e. 
detention without trial or charge—to hold suspected terrorists.7 The 
Guantánamo detainees are perhaps the most (in)famous prisoners 
held in “preventive detention” anywhere in the world today, and 
widespread criticism at home and abroad appears to have 
contributed to the Obama administration’s decision to close the 
detention camp by January 2010.8 Despite this criticism, however, a 
 
5. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
6. See David Johnston, Panel Misses A Deadline in Reviewing 
Guantánamo, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2009, at A14. The task force produced an 
interim report, leaving open the possibility of an indefinite detention regime, but 
their final decision has yet to issue. Id. 
7. The first recorded use of the term “preventive detention” was by Lord 
Wrenbury in the World War I English case R. v. Halliday, [1917] AC 260, (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from K.B.). Today the term “preventive detention” is typically used 
to describe a situation where a person is detained for reasons that are either 
political or connected with national security, public order, or public safety. A 
number of synonyms for “preventive detention” are used in jurisdictions 
throughout the world, including “preventative detention,” “detention without 
charge or trial,” “administrative detention,” “administrative internment,” 
“internment,” “retention administrative,” “mise aux arrets,” “detention 
administrative,” “house arrest,” “attachment,” “ministerial detention,” and “a 
disposicion del poder ejecutive nacional.” See Andrew Harding & John Hatchard, 
Preventative Detention and Security Law: A Comparative Survey 23 (1993); Int’l 
Comm’n of Jurists Memorandum on International Legal Framework on 
Administrative Detention and Counter-Terrorism 4 (December 2005), available at 
http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/Administrative_detent_78BDB.pdf [hereinafter ICJ 
Memorandum]. However, these synonyms refer overwhelmingly to pre-arrest or 
administrative immigration detention, rather than detention without charge or 
trial on purely national security grounds. See ICJ Memorandum. The discussion 
infra will demonstrate that virtually no democracy in the world has a form of 
national security detention that is untethered from immigration or criminal 
processes. 
8. See Shane & Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down 
Guantánamo, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1 (“As for closing Guantánamo, 
[Obama] said that would take time but must be done because it has become ‘a 
damaging symbol to the world.’”). The United Nations, national governments, 
international human rights organizations, and American advocates, scholars, and 
jurists called for the detention facility to be closed and the detainees to be tried 
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number of commentators in the United States continue to argue that 
that some degree of divergence from the constitutionally and 
internationally mandated practice of “speedy and public trials” for all 
those detained on suspicion of committing or conspiring to commit a 
crime9 might be justified in cases involving terrorism suspects.10 
Pointing to what they perceive to be the unprecedented danger of the 
terrorist threat and to the security concerns inherent in releasing 
classified information in open court, some scholars have argued that 
the United States should consider establishing a “National Security 
Court,”11 with different evidentiary standards and different powers of 
 
within the U.S. federal legal system. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Restoring 
America’s Human Rights Reputation, 40 Cornell Int’l L. J. 635 (2007) (arguing 
that closure of Guantánamo is an essential step in the restoration of America’s 
human rights reputation amongst the world community); Amnesty Int’l, 
Framework: End Illegal US Detentions, AI Index AMR 51/167/2007, Dec. 10, 
2007. Even former Bush administration officials have stressed the need to close 
Guantánamo and either release the detainees or bring them to trial within the 
federal justice system. See, e.g., Matthew Waxman, The Smart Way to Shut 
Gitmo Down, Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 2007, at B4. 
9. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. 
VI. International human rights law also upholds the right to fair trial, as 
discussed in more detail in Part I.B infra. 
10. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, Protecting Rights in the Age of Terrorism: 
Challenges and Opportunities, 36 Geo. J. Int’l L. 669, 677–78 (2005) (criticizing 
the Bush administration’s legal inventions as based on “fallacious reasoning” 
while noting the need to “acknowledge[e] that the Geneva Conventions were 
designed in a different era, and they do not fully reflect the unique challenges to 
both security and rights we face today”); Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Law of Armed 
Conflict in the Global War on Terror: International Lawyers Fighting the Last 
War, 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 309, 314 (2005) (“The nature of 
warfare has changed. International lawyers must not cling to the definitions of 
the past if history has rendered them obsolete.”). But see Gabor Rona, Legal 
Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 
Chi. J. Int’l L. 499, 499 (2005) (“[W]e should be skeptical of the view that the 
complementary frameworks of criminal law, human rights law, the web of 
multilateral and bilateral arrangements for interstate cooperation in police work 
and judicial assistance, and the law of armed conflict fail to provide tools 
necessary to combat terrorism.”). 
11. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists’ 
Court, N.Y. Times, July 11, 2007, at A19; Stuart Taylor Jr., The Case for a 
National Security Court, Nat’l J., Feb. 24, 2007, at 15; Ken Anderson & Elisa 
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detention, to oversee some form of American “preventive detention” 
regime. While this viewpoint has garnered criticism from human and 
civil rights organizations and prominent members of the criminal 
bar,12 it seems to be gaining popularity among academics, politicians, 
and the mainstream media.13 Indeed, on the very day that President 
Obama issued the executive order forming the interagency task force 
to consider how best to detain terror suspects, the Wall Street 
Journal published an article claiming that “the idea of a national 
security court . . . to supervise detentions”14 was “gaining political 
traction.”15 
American scholars who favor the establishment of a National 
Security Court and a “preventive detention” regime in the United 
States frequently point to comparative examples in support of their 
argument.16 At the same time, advocates engaged in Guantánamo-
related litigation often turn to international and comparative law to 
bolster their arguments that the regime of “preventive detention” 
employed by the Bush administration at Guantánamo afforded the 
detainees insufficient process.17 Consideration of other nations’ 
 
Massimino, The Cost of Confusion: Resolving Ambiguities in Detainee Treatment, 
Stanley Found., Bridging the Foreign Pol’y Divide Project, Mar. 2007, available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968177# (arguing pros and 
cons as to whether a special counterterrorism court should assume responsibility 
for the work of the federal courts and military commissions and conduct limited 
review of the continued detention of terrorist suspects). 
12. See Richard Zabel & James Benjamin, White Paper, In Pursuit of 
Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism in the Federal Courts, Human Rights First, May 
2008, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-
justice.pdf; see also John C. Coughenour, Op-Ed., How to Try a Terrorist, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 1, 2007, at A27; Kelly Anne Moore, Op-Ed., Take Al-Qaeda to Court, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 2007, at A19. 
13. Glen Sulmasy, Momentum for a National Security Court, Jurist Forum, 
July 13, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/07/momentum-for-national-
security-court.php. 
14. Editorial, Obama and Guantánamo: Fighting Terrorism is Simpler 
When You’re a Candidate, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 2009, at A16. 
15. Id. 
16. See, e.g., Amos Guiora, Where Are Terrorists To Be Tried—A 
Comparative Analysis of Rights Granted to Suspected Terrorists, 56 Cath. U. L. 
Rev. 805 (2007). 
17. See, e.g., Brief for the Commonwealth Lawyers Association as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Brief of Federal Courts and International Law 
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Geneva Enforceability), 
Brief for the Commonwealth Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
the Petitioners, Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International, et al. in Support of 
Petitioners, Brief of International Humanitarian Law Experts as Amici Curiae in 
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terrorism-related detention legislation and jurisprudence is therefore 
pertinent as President Obama’s taskforce debates whether or not the 
United States should continue with the Bush Administration’s extra-
territorial approach to “preventive detention,” develop a domestic 
system of “preventive detention,” or adopt a wholly different 
approach. 
Thus far, however, American scholars’ analysis of other 
nations’ terrorism-related detention regimes has been limited in two 
key respects. Firstly, there have been definitional inconsistencies in 
the literature, as the term “preventive detention” has been used over-
broadly to describe a number of different kinds of detention. 
“Preventive detention” has been applied to systems of pre-charge 
detention,18 pre-trial detention,19 administrative detention,20 
immigration detention21 and national security detention,22 with very 
little acknowledgment of the fundamental differences between these 
alternative detention regimes. This has led some scholars to conclude 
that U.S. allies overseas uniformly resort to detention of terrorist 
suspects by the executive for an unlimited period without charge or 
trial—a regime of detention defined in this Article as “national 
security detention”23—a conclusion that, as the discussion infra will 
show, is far from accurate.24 
Secondly, the debate has been narrow in scope, focusing 
almost exclusively on “preventive detention” in three or four other 
countries—the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel, and, occasionally, 
Australia.25 While there is obvious value in considering the use of 
 
Support of Petitioners, Amicus Curiae Brief of 383 United Kingdom and 
European Parliamentarians in Support of Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush and 
Al Odah v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195 and 06-1196) 
(arguing that detainees are entitled to the opportunity to challenge the legality 
and conditions of their detention under international humanitarian and human 
rights law).  See discussion infra Part I-A for full definitions. 





23. See id. for an explanation of the differences between “pre-trial 
detention,” “immigration detention,” and “national security detention.” 
24. “National security detention” is discussed in detail in Part IV infra. 
25. See, e.g., Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights For Security?: The Choice 
Between Smart, Harsh, or Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and 
Britain, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2151, 2194 (2006) (explaining Canada’s approach to 
deportation to torture in “exceptional circumstances” as articulated by Suresh v. 
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terrorism-related detention regimes by these American allies, there 
is also much to be gained by undertaking a broader analysis and 
situating any future U.S. policy within a truly global context. This 
Article seeks to advance the debate about “preventive detention” by 
moving beyond each of these limitations. First, the Article defines, 
analyzes, and differentiates between the different kinds of 
“preventive detention.” Second, the Article seeks to broaden the 
ongoing debate about “preventive detention” by comparing the U.S. 
approach with the systems of terrorism-related “preventive 
detention” used in thirty-one other countries. In doing so, this Article 
aims to provide an illustrative (though by no means exhaustive) 
study of the underappreciated diversity of “preventive detention” 
systems in use throughout the world today. 
The countries whose “preventive detention” regimes have 
been chosen for inclusion in this Article are all countries whose legal 
or political systems offer relevant and legitimate points of 
comparison with that of the United States, either because they share 
a common law heritage,26 are established democracies,27 have 
longstanding experience combating terrorism,28 or have developed 
new approaches to the detention of terrorist suspects in the wake of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.29 There are, obviously, 
 
Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, ¶ 78); Colin Warbrick, The European Response to 
Terrorism in an Age of Human Rights, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 989, 1007–1015 (2004) 
(discussing the United Kingdom’s detention policies post-September 11); Mark. R. 
Schulman, National Security Courts: Star Chamber or Specialized Justice?, 15 
ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. Law 533, 548 (Spring 2009) (summarizing the use of 
emergency powers by the United Kingdon and its effect on civil liberties). There 
are logical explanations for the limited scope of most scholarship on this issue, 
including the linguistic challenges of using non-English materials, and scholars’ 
desire to limit inquiries to nations that are considered to be close U.S. allies. 
26. Including: Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, India, Ireland, Kenya, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, and Zambia. 
27. Including: Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
and Norway. 
28. Including: France, Greece, India, Israel, the Russian Federation, Spain, 
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 
29. The United States Congress was not alone in passing new legislation in 
2001 that granted law enforcement officers new powers to arrest and detain 
potential terrorist suspects. See U.S.A. PATRIOT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 
115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). Following the passage 
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, many countries around the world 
adopted new anti-terrorist laws, and a considerable number of these new laws 
include special provisions for the detention of suspected terrorists. U.N.S.C. Res. 
1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (issued under Chapter VII of the 
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U.N. Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the  
Peace, and Acts of Aggression)). The resort to preventive detention on national 
security grounds is, therefore, not just the preserve of the United States and its 
key allies. Nor is it a recent phenomenon. Preventive detention has been used by 
national governments for hundreds of years during processes of colonization and 
decolonization, the Cold War, separatist conflicts, and states of emergency. See, 
e.g., South Africa: Internal Security Act 44 of 1950; Terrorism Act 83 of 1967 s. 6; 
Police Amendment 82 of 1980; Burma: The Public Order (Preservation) Act, No. 
16 of 1947, as amended by No. 28 of 1947, Burma Code (1953), v. 2. (providing 
that the president can order any person removed from the country or detained 
“with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 
public safety or to the maintenance of public order”); Chile: Decreto Ley 13, 
Clarification of the Sense and Scope of Article 73 of the Code of Military Justice 
(1973) (providing for continuance of military tribunals in peacetime); Colombia: 
Constitution of 1886, art. 28 (allowing for peacetime preventive detention when 
there are “serious reasons to fear a disturbance of public order”); Decreto 
Legislativo No. 2686 de 26 Oct. 1966, art. 7, [1966] Diario Oficial 32.074 
(authorizing detention for up to 60 days in certain regions); Greece: The Greek 
Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on Human Rights 127–8 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) 
(describing Constitutional Act “Beta” of 1967, which declared martial law); India: 
Defence of India Act, 1939, No. 35, Acts of Parliament, 1939 (providing for “the 
apprehension and detention in custody of any person reasonably suspected of 
being of hostile origin or of having acted, acting or being about to act, in a manner 
prejudicial to the public safety or interest or to the defense of British India”); 
Prevention Detention Act, No. 4 of 1950, India Code (1955) v. 3(1)(a) (providing 
the government may detain any person “to prevent him from acting in any 
manner prejudicial to the defense of India, the relations of India with foreign 
powers, or the security of India”);  Malaysia: International Security Act, 1960, 
available at http://ejp.icj.org/img/internal_security_act _1960.pdf; Paraguay: 
Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay of 1940, art. 52; Decree No.  
8313 (Dec. 31, 1959) (extending the state of siege), translated  
at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Paraguay78eng/chap.1.htm; Philippines: 
Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines, Proclamation No. 1081, 
(1972), V.L.Doc; In the New Society, Book 1, p. 7; Poland: Dekret o stanie 
wojennym [Decree on Martial Law], 154/1981, s. II, Dziennik Ustaw 29; 
Rozporzadzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnetrznych o sprawie zasad I trybu 
zatrzymywania, kontroli osobistej, przegladania zawartosci bagazy oraz 
sprawdzania ladunku osob naruszajacych lub zagraszajacych porzadkowi I 
bezpieczenstwu publicznemu [Regulation of the Ministry of Interior on Principles 
and Mode of Detention and Search of Persons who Contravene or Threaten Public 
Order and Security], 28/1984, arts. 1–18, Dziennik Ustaw 6; Singapore: 
Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, No. 25 (1955) (giving the Chief 
Secretary the power to order that a person be detained for up to two years if 
necessary to prevent acts that would be prejudicial to the Security of Malaya). In 
1985, a survey by the International Commission of Jurists identified 85 countries 
around the world with laws permitting the executive to detain, without trial, 
individuals suspected of posing a threat to national security, public order, or 
public safety. See Niall MacDermott, Sec’y General, Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Draft 
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limitations inherent in the selection of just thirty-two countries for 
this survey.  Since the Article consciously focuses on common law, 
commonwealth countries, and European democracies, civil law 
countries—particularly those in Latin America and Africa—are 
underrepresented. Although including more civil law countries would 
bolster the strength of this Article’s conclusions, the thirty-two 
nations considered in this Article constitute a good starting point for 
this conversation about global approaches to preventive detention. 
Starting with a discussion of internationally agreed-upon 
definitions of different kinds of preventive detention, Part I of this 
Article constructs a taxonomy based upon eight individual units of 
analysis drawn from clearly articulated principles of international 
law relating to detention.30 The taxonomy is used to distill the key 
attributes of the preventive detention regimes in each of the thirty-
two countries included in this study.31 By doing so, it is possible—
despite the many and significant differences between the nations 
surveyed—to identify three overarching frameworks that have been 
adopted for the detention of terrorist suspects in the different 
countries surveyed. For reasons that will be explored in detail in the 
Article, I have designated these frameworks (1) the pre-trial 
detention framework; (2) the immigration detention framework; and 
(3) the national security detention framework.32 The borders between 
these three frameworks are often blurred in practice, and countries 
whose detention regimes predominantly fit into one framework may 
also, on occasion, detain terrorist suspects under conditions more 
 
Intervention on Administrative Detention to U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 
Int’l Comm’n of Jurists Newsletter, January/March 1985, at 52–56. 
30. See discussion infra Part I-B. The taxonomy builds upon the work 
undertaken by Steven Greer in the early 1990s. See infra n. 47, 48. 
31. Appended to this Article is a table populating the taxonomy, which 
provides an overview of the legal basis for, and characteristics of, the differing 
preventive detention regimes of each country surveyed. 
32. Each of these three designations is derived from a different element of 
the power of the sovereign state—police power in the case of pre-trial detention, 
immigration power in the case of immigration detention, and national security 
power in the case of national security detention. In creating these designations, I 
am particularly indebted to the work of Monica Hakimi and John Ip. See John Ip, 
Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects, 16 Transnat’l L. 
& Contemp. Probs. 773 (2007) (analyzing and comparing the detention regimes in 
the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand); Monika Hakimi, 
International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the 
Armed-Conflict Divide, 33 Yale J. Int’l L. 369 (2008) (identifying three models for 
the detention of suspected terrorists). 
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akin to that those found in another framework.33 This complexity 
leads some scholars to miss the conceptual distinction between the 
different “preventive detention” frameworks. As Part I will show, 
though, this clear conceptual distinction between the frameworks is 
an important tool both for understanding preventive detention 
regimes in practice around the world, and for applying lessons from 
those regimes to the American experience. 
Parts II through IV of the Article undertake a detailed 
analysis of the pre-trial detention framework, immigration detention 
framework, and national security detention framework in turn, 
exploring the defining characteristics of the “preventive detention” 
regimes of the countries within these frameworks. Part II considers 
the pre-trial detention framework countries—Colombia, Brazil, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Greece, Ireland, Spain, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK). Part III considers the 
countries that have adopted an immigration detention framework—
Canada, New Zealand and South Africa—and one country that has 
rejected this framework—the UK. Part IV considers the countries 
whose “preventive detention” regimes can best be characterized as 
operating within a national security detention framework—Kenya, 
India, Mozambique, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Russian 
Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Zambia and, to a certain extent, Australia and Israel. In 
analyzing and placing the regimes of these countries within a 
particular framework, these sections explore the common threads 
between countries that have adopted similar approaches, and key 
differences between countries whose policies are divergent. Among 
the factors that have shaped these regimes are constitutional and 
statutory structures, legislative histories, experiences of the terrorist 
threat, and use of preventive detention in domestic criminal or civil 
law; moreover, common values and social mores have also, in many 
instances, played a vital role in the development of comparable 
standards for the treatment of individuals held in preventive 
detention.34 Each Part concludes with a consideration of the 
 
33. For example, a country that would ordinarily be characterized as an 
immigration detention framework nation, because it uses immigration law as its 
principal tool for detaining terrorist suspects, may also hold terrorist suspects in 
pre-trial detention when criminal charges have been filed against that individual. 
34. See infra Part II-B for a discussion of the similarities and differences 
between the pre-trial detention framework nations, infra Part III-B for a 
discussion of the similarities and differences between the immigration detention 
110 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [41:99 
advantages or disadvantages of the framework in question, and its 
potential utility for the United States. In its Conclusion, this Article 
turns to the lessons that American policymakers—particularly those 
in President Obama’s interagency taskforce—can draw from this 
comparative analysis of “preventive detention” regimes. 
I. TOWARD A TAXONOMY OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
A. Defining “Preventive Detention” 
There is no standard, internationally agreed-upon definition 
of preventive detention.35 Although there are exceptions, the term 
“administrative detention” is more frequently employed in civil law 
countries, and the term “preventive” or “preventative” detention is 
used more often in common law countries. This apparently innocuous 
distinction is nonetheless important, as the differing terms 
“administrative” and “preventive” are intrinsically value-laden, 
suggesting, in the case of the former, that detention is a tool of the 
administration or bureaucracy, and, in the case of the latter, that 
detention is necessary to “prevent” a potential threat or danger from 
occurring.36 
In international instruments, the terms “preventive 
detention,” “internment,” and “administrative detention” appear to 
be used interchangeably. The most commonly used definition of 
“preventive detention” in international (particularly United Nations) 
documents is “persons arrested or imprisoned without charge.”37 The 
 
framework nations, and infra Part IV-B for a discussion of the similarities and 
differences between the national security detention framework nations. 
35. Although there is no formal international consensus on definitions that 
shape the law of detention, a number of transnational institutional actors (both 
public and private) are engaged in the process of developing an appropriate 
lexicon. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has been particularly 
active in this respect, and this part of the Article extensively draws upon the 
findings summarized in a memorandum released by the ICJ in 2005.  See ICJ 
Memorandum, supra note 7, at 4–6. 
36. See generally Stanislaw Frankowski & Dinah Shelton eds., 
Preventative Detention: a Comparative and International Law Perspective (1992) 
(providing a comparative study of “preventive” and “administrative detention” 
practices while illustrating the problem with conflating the two). 
37. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, ECOSOC 
Res. 2076 (LXII), ¶ 95, U.N. Doc. E/RES/2076 (May 13, 1977) [hereinafter 
Standard Minimum Rules]. See also ICJ Memorandum, supra note 7 at 5 (stating 
that “Generally, international norms do not provide a definition of administrative 
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U.N. Centre for Human Rights and the U.N. Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Unit has further clarified this definition, describing 
it as applying “to a broad range of situations outside the process of 
police arresting suspects and bringing them into the criminal justice 
system.”38 The International Committee of the Red Cross favors the 
term “internment,” which it defines as “deprivation of liberty ordered 
by the executive authorities when no specific criminal charge is made 
against the individual concerned.”39 M. Louis Joinet, the special 
expert reporting to the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, uses the term 
“administrative detention.” In the Sub-Commission’s report on the 
practice of preventive detention he provides the following definition 
of administrative detention: 
[D]etention is considered as “administrative detention” if, 
de jure and/or de facto,40 it has been ordered by the 
executive and the power of decision rests solely with the 
administrative or ministerial authority, even if a remedy a 
posteriori does exist in the courts against such a decision. 
The courts are then responsible only for considering the 
lawfulness of this decision and/or its proper enforcement, 
but not for taking the decision itself.41 
However, these three descriptions of preventive detention, 
internment, and administrative detention do not encompass other 
forms of deprivation of liberty that may also be described as 
 
detention, but refer to it with expressions such as ‘persons arrested or imprisoned 
without charge’”). 
38. U.N. Centre for Human Rights, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Branch, Human Rights and Pre-Trial Detention: A Handbook of International 
Standards Relating to Pre-Trial Detention, Professional Training Series  
No. 3, ¶ 177, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/3, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.6 (1994),  
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training3_en.pdf. ICJ 
Memorandum, supra note 7 at 5. 
39. Claude Pilloud et al., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12  
August 1949, at 875 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987),  
available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/COM/470-750096?OpenDocument; ICJ 
Memorandum, supra note 7 at 5. 
40. De facto preventive detentions occur in a “legal vacuum,” often when 
martial law has been imposed. This Article deals exclusively with de jure 
preventive detention—i.e. detentions that are (at least in principle) sanctioned by 
the constitutional and legislative framework of the country in which they occur. 
41. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of 
Minorities, Report on the Practice of Administrative Detention, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/27 (July 6, 1989) (statement by M. Louis Joinet). ICJ 
Memorandum, supra note 7, 5–6. 
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preventive detention, including but not limited to: pre-trial charge 
detention; pre-trial detention; detention during immigration 
proceedings; and, with certain conditions, detention of an excessive 
length in custody pending trial. All of these forms of detention may 
also constitute “preventive detention” when they are employed in the 
context of state security.42 
This multiplicity of overlapping definitions of “preventive 
detention” is partially responsible for misconceptions that American 
scholars have about the systems that other countries use for the 
detention of terrorist suspects.43 In the interests of clarity, this essay 
therefore proposes a tripartite definition of preventive detention: 
deprivation of liberty ordered by executive authorities because of 
national security concerns44 for (i) pre-trial detention when terrorism 
or terrorism-related criminal charges are pending or will ultimately 
be brought before a court of law; (ii) immigration detention when 
measures are being taken to control immigration, asylum, 
deportation, or extradition, through court, administrative, or other 
proceedings; or (iii) national security detention when no specific 
criminal charge is made against the individual concerned, and 
judicial review is limited to review of the detention, not the 
 
42. Parts II and III infra will explore the use of pre-charge, pre-trial, and 
immigration detention as an explicitly “preventive” measure in the terrorism 
context. See also Frankowski & Shelton, supra note 35 passim (considering a 
broader definition of “preventive detention”). 
43. See, e.g., Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantánamo, Obstacles and 
Options, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 29 passim (2008) (conflating “national 
security detention” and other models of “preventive detention”); Improving 
Detainee Policy: Handling Terrorism Detainees within the American Justice 
System Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 9–10 (2008) (statement 
of Amos Guiora, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of 
Utah) (describing the mixed Israeli approach to administrative national security 
detention as a prototypical approach to “preventive detention”). 
44. This stipulation is extremely important in establishing the limits of the 
scope of this Article. There are a variety of circumstances, unrelated to national 
security or terrorism concerns, in which “preventive” detention is employed, 
including (but not limited to) drug rehabilitation programs, the treatment of 
mental illness, and the prevention of certain varieties of criminal activity 
(particularly any that are related to organized crime). Such instances are beyond 
the ambit of this Article. The term “national security” is also potentially nebulous 
and open to interpretation; for the purposes of this survey, preventive detention 
on terrorism-related or national security grounds is used to describe a situation 
where a person is detained for reasons connected with public order, safety, and 
security. 
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underlying suspected offense.45 Although under some circumstances 
pre-trial and immigration detention may be employed on security 
grounds, it is only the third category of national security detention 
that may truly be considered as purely national-security specific 
preventive detention. 
B. Interpreting International Standards to Construct a 
Taxonomy of “Preventive Detention” 
Any meaningful comparison of a number of different nations’ 
legal frameworks and practices requires both clear definition of the 
terms involved, and a solid methodology underpinning the 
comparison. A handful of scholars have sought to differentiate 
between a small number of countries’ “preventive detention” regimes 
in the aftermath of 9/11.46 To date, however, nobody has offered an 
 
45. I have included administrative detention on immigration grounds in 
this survey because of the crucial effect that a detainee’s citizenship status has 
upon the executive’s recourse to preventive detention in many of the jurisdictions 
surveyed in this Article. In many instances, detention in immigration proceedings 
is used either as a proxy for, or to enforce, preventive detention on national 
security grounds. See, e.g., El Badrawi vs. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F.Supp.2d 
249, 253 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting that immigration violater was also a national 
security threat); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, Nos. 02 CV 2307, 04 CV 1809 (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 3, 2006) (finding that plaintiffs were investigated for terrorist connections 
before being deported or leaving the country); Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21434 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 490 F.3d 143 
(2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (plaintiffs held as persons “of high 
interest” to the government’s terrorism investigation); Zaoui v. Attorney-General, 
[2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 577 (S.C.) (noting that immigration applicant was a national 
security risk); A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (finding that foreign national detainees were detained 
due to suspected terrorist ties); Charkaoui (Re), [2005] 2 F.C. 299 (Can.) 
(considering permanent resident’s residency status alongside national security 
concerns). 
46. See, e.g., Ip, supra note 32, at 808–26 (comparing the United States’ 
detention regime to those in the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand); 
Hakimi, supra note 32, at 375–89 (arguing that international law furnishes three 
models of detention). Government ministries and NGOs have also produced 
survey pieces. See, e.g., United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Practice: A Survey of Selected Countries 1–2 
(2005), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/4175218/counter-
terrorism-Oct05 (comparing various countries’ responses to terrorism); Jago 
Russell, Liberty, Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention Comparative Law Study 2–5 
(2007) [hereinafter Liberty Study] (comparing the time a suspect can be held 
without charge in various countries), http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/ 
issues/pdfs/pre-charge-detention-comparative-law-study.pdf. 
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objective taxonomy as a baseline for this differentiation.47 In the 
pages that follow, I explain how I have constructed a taxonomy upon 
which to base this comparative analysis of preventive detention 
regimes. 
The starting point for this taxonomy is settled international 
consensus (enshrined in treaties and customary international law) 
upon the standards of detention by national executives. I have chosen 
international (rather than any particular national) legal standards 
and norms, in an attempt to create a non-hierarchical approach to 
the different countries surveyed. Discussion of different nations’ legal 
regimes may be infused with normative attitudes towards those 
nations.48 By starting from an international law perspective and 
classifying each country’s preventive detention regime purely on the 
basis of how those regimes measure up against eight objective units 
of analysis, drawn from international legal standards, I seek to 
minimize the risk of normative bias infringing upon the outcome of 
the survey. 
The eight units of analysis that I use to form the taxonomy of 
“preventive detention” regimes are as follows: (i) the legal basis for 
detention; (ii) notification of charges; (iii) initial appearance before a 
judicial, administrative or other authority; (iv) period of time in 
detention without charge or trial; (v) access to legal counsel; (vi) right 
to a fair and public hearing; (vii) judicial review; and (viii) rules 
regarding interrogation.49 Each of these separate criteria has been 
 
47. Steven Greer prepared a taxonomy, similar in many respects to the one 
developed in this Article, to compare the attributes of Commonwealth countries’ 
systems of public-security oriented administrative detention. Stephen Greer, 
Preventive Detention and Public Security-Towards a General Model, in Harding & 
Hatchard, supra note 7. This Article owes a significant debt to Greer’s work, 
particularly with respect to his methodology for identifying and measuring the 
different attributes of differing detention regimes. Greer does not, however, use 
his taxonomy to identify and differentiate between different frameworks of 
“preventive detention.” Greer’s analysis is also outdated, as many of the nations 
he considered have amended their counterterrorism laws in the aftermath of 
9/11. 
48. See Anne Peters & Heine Schwenke, Comparative Law Beyond Post-
Modernism, 49 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 800, 801–02 (2000) (critiquing the post-
modernist critique of comparative law, which holds that “legal comparison is 
trapped in cultural frameworks”). 
49. These eight units of analysis build upon the work of Stephen Greer in 
the early 1990s, adapting the categories that Greer first identified, in line with 
the changes in various nations’ approaches to the detention of terrorist suspects 
post-9/11. See Greer, supra note 47. 
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addressed in international treaties, studies, and colloquia relating to 
detention, and has been seen as reflecting standards in the context of 
both administrative/preventive detention and detention within the 
regular criminal justice system, in line with the United Nations’ 
longstanding commitment to affording administrative detainees the 
same protections as prisoners within the criminal justice system.50 
The legal basis for detention is the first criterion by which 
the different detention regimes analyzed in this Article are 
compared. The importance of a legally-grounded, non-arbitrary basis 
for detention is addressed in Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,51 Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR),52 Article 6 of the African 
 
50. In 1977, the United Nations Economic and Social Council declared that 
identical standards should be used to measure the treatment of detainees, 
irrespective of whether they are subject to preventive detention or detention 
within the regular criminal justice system. Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 
37 (“Without prejudice to the provisions of article 9 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, persons arrested or imprisoned without charge shall 
be accorded the same protection as that accorded under part I [Rules of General 
Application, rules 6-55 of the Standard Minimum Rules] and part II, section C 
[Prisoners Under Arrest or Awaiting Trial, rules 84-93]. Relevant provisions of 
part II, section A [Prisoners Under Sentence, rules 56-81], shall likewise be 
applicable where their application may be conducive to the benefit of this special 
group of persons in custody, provided that no measures shall be taken implying 
that re-education or rehabilitation is in any way appropriate to persons not 
convicted of any criminal offense.”). In 2003, the United Nations reiterated this 
commitment, specifically stating that the methods employed to combat terrorism, 
including the detention of terrorist suspects, should be commensurate with 
established international legal norms. S.C. Res 1456, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 
(January 20, 2003) (“States must ensure that any measures taken to combat 
terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should 
adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular 
international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”); see also ECOSOC 
Res. 2003/37, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/37 (Mar. 4, 2003) (noting the 
importance of protecting human rights); ECOSOC Res. 2003/68, ¶ 13, 
E/CN.4.2003/68 (Dec. 17, 2002) (“no matter how wrongly, dangerously, or even 
criminally a person may act, every human being is legally and morally entitled to 
protection on the basis of internationally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”). 
51. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration] (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile.”). 
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 9(1), S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]  (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. 
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Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights,53 Article 7 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR),54 Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR),55 and 
Principles 9 and 12 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (hereinafter 
Principles on Detention).56 Since the early 1990s, comparative 
scholars have assessed the use of “preventive detention” against the 
legal basis upon which that detention rests.57 In this context, a key 
point of differentiation between alternative preventive detention 
regimes is whether the power to detain without charge or trial 
derives from a country’s penal code, immigration law, or 
constitutional and statutory provisions devolving extraordinary 
powers to the executive in crisis situations or in the interests of 
national security. Indeed, the remainder of this Article will show that 
this difference is the cornerstone of three different frameworks by 
which the “preventive detention” systems of the countries surveyed 
may be categorized. Whether or not a nation uses the existing 
provisions of its criminal code, immigration regulations, or national 
 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance was such 
procedure as are established by law.”). 
53. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 
art. 6, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African 
Charter] (“Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of 
his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and 
conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily 
arrested or detained.”). 
54. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 
1969, art. 7, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 145 (entered into force July 18, 
1978) [hereinafter IACHR] (“1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and 
security. 2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons 
and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State 
Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto. 3. No one shall be 
subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.”). 
55. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5(1), Europ. T.S. No. 5, 23 
U.N.T.S. 221, 226 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR] 
(“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with 
procedure prescribed by law . . .”). 
56. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, at 298, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 
(Dec. 9, 1988) [hereinafter Principles on Detention]. 
57. See, e.g., Frankowski & Shelton, supra note 36, at 13 (discussing why 
providing the precise legal basis for detention is necessary for a detainee to 
exercise his rights and for proper review of detention). 
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security provisions to govern the executive’s preventive detention of 
terrorist suspects influences the shape of the “preventive detention” 
regime in each country surveyed, particularly in terms of notification 
of charges, period of detention, access to counsel, and judicial 
review.58 
The second criterion by which the different detention regimes 
are contrasted is the extent and timeliness of notification of the 
grounds on which an individual is detained. International standards 
governing the notification of a detainee of the grounds on which he is 
detained are articulated in Article 9 of the ICCPR,59 Principles 10 
and 13 of the Principles on Detention,60 and Articles 5 and 6 of the 
ECHR.61 Interpreting Article 9 of the ICCPR, the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee and the U.N. Centre for Human Rights have both 
stressed the fundamental importance of sufficiently detailed notice of 
the facts and the law governing an individual’s detention.62 There is 
broad consensus in the comparative literature pertaining to the 
detention of suspected terrorists that prompt notification of the 
 
58. To a certain extent, national security and state of emergency based 
detention regimes intersect with international humanitarian law. This will be 
discussed infra, particularly with respect to Israel. The detention of combatants 
is permitted under the Third Geneva Convention, Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention III], and the 
detention of non-combatants for security reasons is permitted under the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered 
into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
59. ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 9(2) (“Anyone who is arrested shall be 
informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly 
informed of any charges against him.”). 
60. Principles on Detention, supra note 56, Principle 10 (“Anyone who is 
arrested shall be informed at the time of his arrest of the reason for his arrest 
and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.”). 
61. Under article 5(2) of the ECHR an arrestee must be “informed 
promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and 
of any charge against him.” Under article 6(3)(a) of the Convention an accused 
person is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him. 
62. See also General Comment 8, Human Rights Comm., Right to Liberty 
and Security of Persons (Article 9) (June 30, 1982), reprinted in Secretariat, 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994) 
[hereinafter General Comment 8] (asserting that Article 9 of the ICCPR requires 
states to inform administrative detainees, and not just criminal detainees, of the 
reasons for detention). 
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charges a detainee faces is a yardstick for fundamental fairness in 
proceedings.63 The amount of time that elapses between an 
individual’s arrest and his notification of the charges he faces is a 
strong indicator of a country’s alignment with a particular 
framework of preventive detention—the pre-trial detention 
framework countries overwhelmingly mandate notification of charges 
within a twenty-four to forty-eight hour period,64 and the national 
security detention framework countries frequently do not inform 
detainees of the grounds for their detention at all.65 
The third criterion compared and contrasted in this study is 
the speed and process of a detainee’s initial appearance before a 
judicial, administrative, or other authority. The importance of 
prompt appearance before a judicial or other authority is addressed 
in Article 9(3) of the ICCPR,66 Principles 4, 11, and 37 of Principles 
on Detention,67 and Article 10 of the Declaration on the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.68 The U.N. Human Rights 
Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have 
all published findings underscoring the importance of prompt 
appearance before a judicial, administrative, or other authority.69 
 
63. See Jago Russell, Liberty, Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention 
Comparative Law Study 17 (2007) [hereinafter Liberty Study],  
available at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/issues/pdfs/pre-charge-
detention-comparative-law-study.pdf. 
64. See discussion infra Part II.A and the medium gray-coded countries in 
Table I in the Appendix. 
65. See discussion infra Part IV.A and the dark gray-coded countries in 
Table I in the Appendix. 
66. ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 9(3) (“Anyone arrested or detained on a 
criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to release.”). 
67. Principles on Detention, supra note 56. 
68. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133, art. 10, U.N Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992) 
(“1. Any person deprived of liberty shall be held in an officially recognized place of 
detention, and, in conformity with the national law, be brought before a judicial 
authority promptly after detention.”). 
69. See General Comment 8, supra note 62, at ¶ 2 (“Paragraph 3 of article 
9 [of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] requires that in 
criminal cases any person arrested or detained has to be brought “promptly” 
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power.”); 
OAS, Annual Report of the Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights 1984-1985, 
at 141, OEA/Ser.L/V.II.66, doc 10 rev.1 (1985) (criticizing El Salvador’s failure to 
promptly charge prisoners or bring them before judicial authorities); Brogan and 
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Scholars who advocate for national security detention nonetheless 
acknowledge that these international treaty commitments mandate 
meaningful judicial review of the detention of all terrorist suspect 
detainees.70 The speed and type of judicial review of detention 
fundamentally affects whether a particular nation’s regime falls 
within the pre-trial detention framework, the immigration detention 
framework, or the national security detention framework. In the pre-
trial detention framework countries, for example, terrorist suspect 
detainees are brought before a judge or magistrate within a specified 
period of time (usually twenty-four to forty-eight hours).71 In 
contrast, in the immigration detention framework countries, 
individuals are entitled to review of their cases during a similar 
timeframe, but such a review is either undertaken by a judge in 
camera acting in her individual capacity or by an administrative 
authority.72 
The fourth criterion for comparison is the maximum length of 
time an individual may be detained. Length of detention in criminal 
proceedings is addressed in Article 9(3) of the ICCPR73 and Principle 
38 of the Principles on Detention.74 Both the IACtHR and ECtHR 
have stressed that indefinite pre-trial detention, or detention without 
trial, is prohibited.75 Prolonged administrative detention is also 
 
Others, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33–34 (1985) (holding that detaining a 
suspect for four days and six hours before he was brought before a judge did not 
fulfill the requirement of promptness and so violated article 5(3) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.). 
70. See, e.g., Hakimi, supra note 32, at 409–10 (arguing that in a system of 
administrative detention, terrorist suspect detainees must have an opportunity 
for prompt and meaningful judicial review of their detention). 
71. See discussion infra Part II-A and the medium gray-coded countries in 
Table I in the Appendix. 
72. See discussion infra Part III-A and the light gray-coded countries in 
Table I in the Appendix. 
73. ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 9(3) (“Anyone arrested or detained on a 
criminal charge . . . shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to 
release.”). 
74. Principles on Detention, supra note 56, Principle 38 (“A person 
detained on a criminal charge shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time 
or to release pending trial.”). 
75.  The ECtHR has construed the right “to trial within a reasonable time 
or to release pending trial” under article 5 (3) as requiring an individual’s 
provisional release once continued detention is no longer reasonable “reasonable,” 
holding that “reasonableness” “must be assessed in relation to the very fact of his 
detention.” Neumeister Case, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36–37 (1968). The 
“reasonableness” of the period of delay before trial and the “reasonableness” of 
the time period that an individual spends in detention must be assessed 
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prohibited under international law.76 Comparativist scholars have 
consistently criticized the indefinite use of administrative detention 
in post-colonial nations in Africa and Asia,77 condemning these 
nations’ divergence from the norms established by the ICCPR and 
other international instruments. The period during which a terrorist 
suspect detainee may be held in detention without trial or charge 
certainly influences the framework to which a country belongs. 
Countries, for example, that permit indefinite detention of terrorist 
suspect detainees are exclusively national security detention 
framework nations. In fact, almost all countries within the national 
security detention framework allow indefinite detention of suspected 
terrorists.78 
The fifth criterion used to contrast the different nations’ 
detention regimes is the extent to which the detainees are afforded 
access to legal counsel. Article 14(3) of the ICCPR,79 Rule 93 of the 
Standard Minimum Rules,80 Principle 17 of the Principles on 
Detention,81 and the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers82 
 
separately.  Therefore, although the period of time that elapses before a trial may 
be “reasonable” under Article 6(1) of the Convention, continuous detention of an 
individual for that same time period might not be “reasonable.” Id. at 37; see also 
Matznetter Case, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1969). 
76. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 702(e) (1990) (“A state 
violates [customary] international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, 
encourages or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary detention.”). 
77. See, e.g., C.H. Powell, Terrorism and Governance in South Africa and 
Eastern Africa, in Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy 555 (Victor V. Ramraj, 
Michael Hor & Kent Roach eds., 2005); Andrew Harding, Singapore, in Harding 
& Hatchard, supra note 7, at 200 (“[T]he seed planted in Liversidge . . . [gave] . . . 
nurture, in South East Asia, to a whole equatorial jungle of cases which say that 
in national security matters the satisfaction of the executive cannot be challenged 
in the courts.”). 
78. See discussion infra Part IV and the dark gray-coded countries in Table 
I in the Appendix. 
79. ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 14(3) (“[E]veryone shall be entitled to . . . 
communicate with counsel of his own choosing [and] . . . to be informed, if he does 
not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to 
him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment 
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it.”). 
80. Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 37, Rule 93 (“an untried prisoner 
shall be allowed to apply for free legal aid where such aid is available, and to 
receive visits from his legal adviser.”). 
81. Principles on Detention, supra note 56, Principle 17 (“A detained 
person shall be entitled to have the assistance of a legal counsel. He shall be 
informed of his right by the competent authority promptly after arrest and shall 
be provided with reasonable facilities for exercising it.”). 
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all address the vital importance of access to counsel. The U.N. 
Human Rights Committee has specifically stressed the importance of 
immediate access to legal counsel for those suspected of committing 
terrorism-related offenses, whether they are held in pre-trial or 
national security detention.83 The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights has also examined a law that prevented a detainee 
from having counsel during a period of pre-trial detention and 
investigation, noting that decisive evidence may be produced during 
the initial period of detention and holding that the lack of legal 
advice during the first few days of detention seriously impinged upon 
the right to a defense.84 In comparing different detention regimes’ 
provisions for access to counsel, this taxonomy also considers 
whether legal aid is available to fund representation for those unable 
to afford to pay for a lawyer. The right to free legal counsel for those 
who cannot afford their own representation is also guaranteed in 
international instruments.85 The ECtHR and the European 
 
82. See, e.g., Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, August 27–September 7, 1990, 
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers [hereinafter Principles on Lawyers], 
Principle 7, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ddb9f034.pdf 
(“Governments shall further ensure that all persons arrested or detained, with or 
without criminal charge, shall have prompt access to a lawyer, and in any case 
not later than 48 hours from the time of arrest or detention.”); id. Principle 8 (“All 
arrested, detained or imprisoned persons shall be provided with adequate 
opportunities, time and facilities to be visited by and to communicate and consult 
with a lawyer, without delay, interception or censorship and in full 
confidentiality.”). 
83. See Report of the Human Rights Commmittee Official Records of the 
General Assembly, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (A/46/40) ¶ 166 (Spain) (disapproving 
of a state system whereby a suspected terrorist held in pre-trial detention was 
entitled only to  a state-appointed defense attorney, as opposed to one of his own 
choosing, during the first five days of detention); Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003) (stating that human rights law requires that 
any detainee held in administrative detention be provided with access to legal 
counsel). 
84. See OAS, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, 1985-1986, OEA/Ser.L/V.II.66, doc 10 rev.1, at 154 (1985) (discussing El 
Salvador). Counsel must be permitted to be present when the accused gives a 
statement, is interrogated, or signs a statement. See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on 
the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Guatemala, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61, 
doc. 47 rev.1, at 91 (1983) (finding deprivation of an “essential requirement of due 
process” where counsel was appointed only after an interrogation had resulted in 
a signed statement). 
85. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 14(3) (“[E]veryone shall be entitled 
to . . . have legal assistance assigned to him . . . without payment by him in any 
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Commission go one step further and hold that it is not enough for a 
state to appoint defense counsel for indigent defendants, but that the 
state also has an obligation to provide effective counsel and see that 
counsel is performing her duties, and if necessary replace her or 
cause her to fulfill her duties adequately.86 The ECtHR and European 
Commission have further defined the right to counsel as including 
the right to consultations with counsel which are unsupervised by 
the authorities of places of detention,87 and have even in some cases 
found that the right to adequate facilities for preparing a defense 
implies a right of reasonable access to the prosecution’s files.88 The 
 
such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it . . . .”); Standard 
Minimum Rules, supra note 37, Rule 93 (“[A]n untried prisoner shall be allowed 
to apply for free legal aid where such aid is available . . . .”); Principles on 
Lawyers, supra note 82, Principle 3 (“Governments shall ensure the provision of 
sufficient funding and other resources for legal services to the poor and, as 
necessary, to other disadvantaged persons. Professional associations of lawyers 
shall cooperate in the organization and provision of services, facilities and other 
resources.”). 
86. See Legal assistance; nature of assistance, 2 Digest of Strasbourg Case-
Law Relating to the European Convention on Human Rights § 6.3.4.3.4, at 850–
51 (citing Eur. Comm’n. H.R., App. No. 9127/80 (1981) (unpublished) (stating that 
right to effective assistance of counsel requires state to ensure that counsel 
performs or is replaced); Artico Case, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1980) 
(“[M]ere nomination does not ensure effective assistance since the lawyer 
appointed for legal aid purposes may die, fall seriously ill, be prevented for a 
protracted period from acting or shirk his duties. If they are notified of the 
situation, the authorities must either replace him or cause him to fulfill his 
obligations.”). 
87. This right applies both to personal visits and to correspondence 
between a detained person and counsel. See, e.g., Case of Schönenberger and 
Durmaz, 137 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12–14 (1988) (finding that Swiss 
authorities’ failure to forward to a detainee a letter from his lawyer constituted a 
breach of his right to respect for his correspondence under ECHR art. 8); S. v. 
Switzerland, 220 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1991) (“The Court considers that an 
accused’s right to communicate with his advocate out of hearing of a third person 
is part of the basic requirements of a fair trial in a democratic society and follows 
from [ECHR] Article 6 § 3(c).”). 
88. See X. v. Austria, 9 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 50, 52 (1977) (“[T]he 
Commission notes that the right of access to the file is not as such guaranteed, 
although it may be implied by [Article 6] that under certain circumstances the 
person concerned or his lawyer must have reasonable access to the file.”); Access 
to files, 2 Digest of Strasbourg Case-Law Relating to the European Convention on 
Human Rights § 6.3.3.3.3, at 805 (citing Eur. Comm’n H.R., App. No. 2435/65 
(1966) (unpublished)) (stating that an accused person or counsel has a right of 
reasonable access to the relevant case file); see also Guy Jespers v. Belgium, App. 
No. 8403/78, 27 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 61, 87 (1981) (finding that, though 
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scholarly literature on the detention of terrorist suspects is replete 
with references to the vital importance of access to counsel—for 
detainees held both overseas and in the United States.89 
Interestingly, however, the right of access to counsel does not always 
determine the framework of “preventive detention” to which a 
country belongs. As might be expected, the pre-trial detention 
framework countries all provide for access to counsel, with many 
providing for access to free counsel for indigent detainees.90 As might 
also be expected, many, though not all, of the national security 
detention framework countries have no provisions guaranteeing 
detainees a right to counsel.91 
The sixth criterion used to compare and contrast the different 
countries’ detention regimes is the right to a “fair and public 
hearing.”92 This right is enshrined in Article 10 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,93 Article 14 of the ICCPR,94 Article 7 of 
the African Charter,95 and Article 6(1) of the ECHR.96 In this context, 
 
the ECHR does not expressly provide for a right of access to the prosecution’s file, 
one can be inferred from article 6(3)). 
89. See, e.g., Louise Arbour, U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, In Our 
Name and on Our Behalf, Speech at Chatham House (Feb. 15, 2006), in 55 Int'l & 
Comp. L.Q. 511, 519 (“Even in states of emergency, minimum access to legal 
counsel . . . [remains] mandatory)” (internal citations omitted). 
90. See discussion infra Part II and the medium gray-coded countries in 
Table I in the Appendix. 
91. See discussion infra Part IV and the dark gray-coded countries in Table 
I in the Appendix. National security detention framework countries that do 
recognize a right to counsel are Pakistan, the Russian Federation, and Zambia. 
The two “mixed” framework countries, Australia and Israel, also recognize a right 
to counsel. 
92. This internationally recognized right is incorporated into the American 
constitutional guarantee of procedural Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. V; 
U.S. Const. amend XIV. 
93. Universal Declaration, supra note 51, art. 10 (“Everyone is entitled in 
full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him.”). 
94. ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 14 (1) (“All persons shall be equal before the 
courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or 
of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.”). 
95. African Charter, supra note 53, art. 7(1). The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights elaborates on article 7 (1) of the African Charter and 
guarantees further rights including; notification of charges; appearance before a 
judicial officer; right to release pending trial; presumption of innocence; adequate 
preparation of the defense; speedy trial; examination of witnesses; right to an 
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the U.N. Human Rights Committee has specifically criticized the 
trial of civilians before military or special courts on the grounds that 
such courts often “do not afford the strict guarantees of the proper 
administration of justice . . . which are essential for the effective 
protection of human rights.”97 The notion of what constitutes a fair 
and public hearing varies considerably around the world. 
International legal scholars agree, however, on a basic core of rights 
to transparency of proceedings and adjudication before a neutral 
decision-maker.98 The variations between civil code countries’ and 
common law countries’ approaches to adjudication make a precise 
comparative analysis of differing degrees of fair and public hearings 
rather challenging, and so this unit of analysis has a limited impact 
on the framework to which a particular country belongs. That said, 
 
interpreter. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on 
the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (9), ACHPR Res. 4(XI)92 (March 2-9, 1992) ¶ 
2, available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../ 
resolutions/resolution09_en.html. 
96. ECHR, supra note 55, art. 6.1 (A trial must be before an “independent 
and impartial tribunal.”). The European Court and Commission on Human 
Rights have emphasized that in order to be “independent and impartial” a 
tribunal must be independent from the executive and the parties to the 
proceedings. See Leo Zand v. Austria, No. 7360/76, 15 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 70, 81 (1979) (holding that  the Salzburg Labour Court is an “independent 
tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Convention and thus able to 
hear a civil action). 
97. General Comment 13, Human Rights Comm., Equality before the 
courts and the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court 
established by law (Article 14) (April 13, 1984), ¶ 4, reprinted in Secretariat, 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994). See 
also Miguel Angel Estrella v. Uruguay, 2 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee Under the Optional Protocol 74/1980, at 93 (29 March 1983); Elena 
Beatriz Vasilskis v. Uruguay, 2 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee Under the Optional Protocol 80/1980, at 105 (31 March 1983) U.N. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Selected Decisions of the 
Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol, volume 2 (finding that a 
military court procedure violated article 14 of the Covenant). 
98. See, e.g., Nihal Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human 
Rights Law: National, Regional and International Jurisprudence 406–08 (2002); 
Arbour, supra note 89, at 524; Hakimi, supra note 32, at 372. For a thorough 
examination of judicial transparency and its continued importance in the United 
States, see Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site and Cite, 53 
Villanova L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009). 
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one recurring theme in the national security framework nations is 
that review of a detainee’s confinement is conducted in camera.99 
The seventh criterion used to evaluate the different nations’ 
approaches to detention is the availability of judicial review of a 
detainee’s confinement. The importance of judicial review is 
addressed in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,100 Article 9(4) of the ICCPR,101 Principle 32 of the Principles 
on Detention,102 U.N. Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
1992/35,103 Article 7 of the African Charter,104 and Article 43 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.105 The U.N. Human Rights Committee 
has stressed that the right to judicial review is applicable in 
instances of national security detention as well as immigration 
 
99. See discussion infra Part IV and the dark gray-coded countries in Table 
I in the Appendix. 
100. Universal Declaration, supra note 51, art. 8 (“Everyone has the right 
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”). 
101. ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 9(4) (“Anyone who is deprived of his liberty 
by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order 
that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and 
order his release if the detention is not lawful.”). 
102. Principles on Detention, supra note 56, princ. 32 (“A detained person 
or his counsel shall be entitled at any time to take proceedings according to 
domestic law before a judicial or other authority to challenge the lawfulness of his 
detention in order to obtain his release without delay, if it is unlawful.”). 
103. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n H.R., Res. 1992/35, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/1992/22 (February 28, 1992) (“[A]nyone who is deprived of his or her liberty by 
arrest or detention shall be entitled to institute proceedings before a court, in 
order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his or her 
detention and order his or her release if the detention is found to be unlawful.”). 
104. African Charter, supra note 53, art 7(1) (“Every individual shall have 
the right to have his cause heard [including] . . . the right to an appeal to 
competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as 
recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in 
force . . . .”). 
105. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 58, art. 43 (“Any protected person 
who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have 
such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or 
administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the 
internment or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or 
administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give 
consideration to his or her case with a view to the favourable amendment of the 
initial decision, if circumstances permit.”). Although this provision does not apply 
de jure in most cases of administrative detention by a national government, this 
is an example of one internationally agreed minimum standard of review, i.e., 
once every six months. 
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detention and pre-trial detention.106 The taxonomy used in this 
Article considers whether judicial review is “strong” or “weak,” using 
the definitions of the terms provided by Stephen Greer: 
‘Strong’ judicial review involves the thorough scrutiny of 
the executive decision and the determined assertion of 
detainees’ rights. ‘Weak’ judicial review . . . tends to lean in 
the other direction on the grounds that the courts have 
neither the expertise nor the right to query the judgment of 
an executive officer that detention in any given case is 
justified in the public interest.107 
This Article also adapts Greer’s criteria for adjudging whether 
judicial review is “strong” or “weak,” namely whether courts employ 
an objective test to determine whether or not detention is necessary, 
or rely upon the subjective opinion of the executive that justified the 
detention in the first place. 
The eighth and final criterion of comparison is the rules 
regarding interrogation. The U.N. Centre for Human Rights’ 
Handbook of International Standards Relating to Pre-trial Detention 
stresses that “absence of torture and ill-treatment is the guiding 
principle behind the standards on the treatment of detainees.”108 
International condemnation of the use of torture against detainees is 
articulated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration,109 Article 7 of 
the ICCPR,110 the entire text of the Convention against Torture and 
 
106. See Antti Vuolanne v. Finland (265/1987) (7 April 1989), Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, supp. No. 40 (A/44/40), 
annex X, sect. J (holding that article 9 of the Covenant applies to all cases of 
detention, including administrative or preventive detention, so that individuals 
in such detention have the right to have the decision to detain them reviewed in a 
court of law.). 
107. Greer, supra note 47, at 31. 
108. U.N. Centre for Human Rights, Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Branch, Human Rights and Pre-Trial Detention: A Handbook of 
International Standards Relating to Pre-Trial Detention, Professional Training 
Series No. 3, ¶122, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/3, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.6 (1994), 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training3_en.pdf. 
109. Universal Declaration, supra note 51, art. 5 (“No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”). 
110. ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 7 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one 
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation.”). 
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Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,111 
Article 21 of the Principles on Detention,112 the Preamble of the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,113 and many other 
international and supra-national treaties.114 This Article therefore 
considers whether or not interrogation of detainees is permitted at 
all in each country, and if so, what protections are in place to 
safeguard individual detainees’ rights. There is a vast academic and 
popular literature on the rights of detainees to humane treatment at 
the hands of their captors, as mandated by international law, that 
has been used to critique different “preventive detention” regimes—
including the regime currently in force at Guantánamo Bay.115 This 
unit of analysis is closely correlated with a country’s overall 
framework: those countries with the most stringent limitations on 
inhumane treatment or interrogation of detainees fall within the pre-
 
111. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
112. Principles on Detention, supra note 56, princ. 21 (“It shall be 
prohibited to take undue advantage of the situation of a detained or imprisoned 
person for the purpose of compelling him to confess, to incriminate himself 
otherwise or to testify against any other person . . . No detained person while 
being interrogated shall be subject to violence, threats or methods of 
interrogation which impair his capacity of decision or his judgment.”). 
113. European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, pmbl, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1987, 
Europ. T.S. No. 126 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1989) [hereinafter European 
Torture Convention]. 
114. For a general discussion of the definition of torture and other 
treatment prohibited by international standards, see Nigel S. Rodley, The 
Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law (2d ed. 1999). Again, 
international humanitarian law intersects with treaties and legislation 
prohibiting mistreatment of detainees. All detainees are entitled to the base 
protections of Common Article 3, and prisoners of war may not be questioned 
beyond name, rank, and serial number. 
115. See, e.g., Jayawickrama, supra note 98, at 296–352 (discussing the 
right to freedom from torture and interpretations of what the various prohibited 
forms of conduct may include); W. Michael Reisman, Rasul v. Bush: A Failure to 
Apply International Law, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 973 (2004) (discussing the 
procedural rights of detainees); Warren Hoge, Investigators for UN Urge U.S. to 
Close Guantánamo, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2006, at A6 (discussing a U.N. report 
that argued that many of the detention and interrogation practices used in 
Guantánamo Bay amounted to torture); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: 
Annals of Justice, New Yorker Mag., Feb. 14, 2005 (detailing the United States’ 
extraordinary rendition program). 
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trial detention or immigration detention frameworks of preventive 
detention. 116 
C. Three Alternative Frameworks of Preventive Detention 
When the “preventive detention” regimes used to detain 
terrorist suspect are measured against the eight units of analysis 
described supra—i.e. legal basis for detention, notification, 
appearance before a judicial, administrative, or other authority, 
maximum period of time in detention, access to legal counsel, right to 
a fair and public hearing, judicial review, and rules regarding 
interrogation—a number of trends and patterns emerge. Table I, in 
the Appendix to this Article, populates the taxonomy with data for 
each of the thirty-two countries included in this study. Despite 
significant differences between the nations surveyed, it is possible to 
identify three distinct frameworks that have been adopted for the 
detention of terrorist suspects, designated as (1) the pre-trial 
detention framework; (2) the immigration detention framework; and 
(3) the national security detention framework.117 These frameworks 
underpin the tripartite definition of preventive detention used in this 
Article.118 Each of the countries surveyed in this Article employs a 
scheme for the detention of terrorism suspects that may be 
characterized as fitting into one of these three frameworks. Map I, in 
the Appendix, illustrates the geographical location of the countries 
within each framework. 
There are, of course, methodological challenges implicit in 
locating any country within a particular framework. It would be 
inaccurate to suggest that there are unwavering bright line 
distinctions between the different frameworks and different countries 
 
116. See discussion infra Part II-A and III-A and the medium gray-coded 
and light gray-coded countries in Table I in the Appendix. 
117. As mentioned supra, I am particularly indebted to the work of Monica 
Hakimi and John Ip in developing these frameworks. See, Ip, supra note 32; 
Hakimi, supra note 32. 
118. The definition used is “deprivation of liberty ordered by the executive 
authorities because of national security concerns for (i) pre-trial detention when 
terrorism or terrorism-related charges are pending or will ultimately be brought 
before a court of law; (ii) immigration detention when measures are being taken 
to control immigration, asylum, deportation or extradition, through court, 
administrative or other proceedings; or (iii) national security detention when no 
specific criminal charge is made against the individual concerned, and judicial 
review is limited to review of the detention, not the underlying suspected 
offense.” See discussion supra Part I-A. 
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involved. As noted supra, the borders between the frameworks may 
be blurred in practice.119 It is this very complexity that has led some 
American scholars to treat all detention of terrorist detainees, 
whether of the pre-trial, immigration, or national security variety, as 
essentially indistinguishable forms of preventive detention.120 This 
conflation of the differing “preventive detention” frameworks has led 
to incorrect assumptions about the prevalence of national security 
detention in other nations, and inapposite arguments about its 
potential for future use in the United States.121 
In order to minimize the potential pitfalls of 
mischaracterizing and thereby misclassifying the complex detention 
regimes of the countries surveyed, this Article allocates countries to a 
detention framework on the basis of the most extreme—i.e., most 
rights-stripping—form of detention used by that country to hold 
suspected terrorists. A country is allocated to the pre-trial detention 
framework if the jurisprudential and/or legislative basis for its 
detention of terrorist suspects is anchored in its criminal law and 
penal code; to the immigration detention framework if anchored in its 
immigration law system; or the national security detention 
framework if anchored in special powers delegated to the executive at 
 
119. There may be countries whose detention practices arguably fit into 
more than one framework, or countries that predominantly fit into one 
framework but who also, on occasion, detain terrorist suspects in circumstances 
more akin to that employed by the countries found within another framework. 
For example, a country that is characterized as an immigration detention 
framework nation, because it uses immigration law as a tool for detaining 
terrorist suspects, may also hold terrorist suspects in pre-trial detention when 
criminal charges have been filed against that individual. One example is South 
Africa, which ordinarily uses the criminal justice system to detain terrorists, but 
holds non-citizen terrorist suspects in immigration detention. See discussion infra 
Part III.A (detailing South African detention laws). 
120. This is an approach taken by Amos Guiora, among others. Cf. Guiora, 
supra note 16, at 806 (describing various schemes for detaining and trying 
terrorists, but analyzing the different regimes similarly, noting that “while civil, 
democratic states are not engaged in war as defined by international law, neither 
are they confronting the common criminal as defined by the traditional criminal 
law paradigm.”). 
121. Id. at 834 (recommending an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) to permit terrorist suspects to be tried before FISA 
courts, and noting that the “[i]mplementation of methods extending beyond the 
criminal law paradigm suggests recognition that the traditional approach is 
ineffective”); see also Phillip Bobbit, Terror And Consent: The Wars For The 
Twenty-First Century 241–288 (2008) (describing how the the United States has 
shunned international and constitutional law precepts in dealing with modern-
day terrorists). 
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times of war, national emergency, or crisis. Of these three bases for 
detention, pre-trial detention is generally regarded as the least 
extreme/most rights-respecting system of detention, and national 
security detention is generally regarded as the most extreme/most 
rights-stripping system of detention.122 Therefore, a country that 
sometimes uses pre-trial detention or immigration detention to hold 
terrorist suspects, but also uses national security detention, is 
classified as a national security detention framework country in this 
Article.123 
Adopting this methodological approach, the countries 
surveyed divide as follows: (1) the pre-trial detention framework 
countries, in which the detention of terrorist suspects is wholly, or 
largely, governed by the existing provisions of the penal code, are 
Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, 
Greece, Ireland, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom;124 (2) the 
immigration detention framework countries, in which the specialized 
judicial review mechanisms of immigration law have been adapted to 
provide oversight of preventive detention of terrorist suspects are 
 
122. See Hakimi, supra note 32, at 395 (finding that the “armed conflict” 
model’s “liberty costs are prohibitive,” whereas the “criminal model is 
substantially more protective of individual liberties”). 
123. This is the situation of the United States today. The U.S. uses pre-
trial detention within the regular criminal justice system, as well as immigration 
detention to hold individuals suspected of terrorism-related activities in the 
territorial United States, and employs national security detention at 
Guantánamo Bay, Bagram Airbase, and undisclosed black sites overseas. See 
Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 
2005, at A1. 
124. Strictly speaking, the nations within this framework fall into two 
subgroups; (i) countries in which the detention of terrorist suspects is governed 
entirely by the existing provisions of the criminal code (Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Norway) and (ii) countries in which the preventive detention of 
terrorist suspects is governed by the provisions of the criminal code, augmented 
by specialized legislation (Greece, Ireland, Spain). The United Kingdom is a 
particularly interesting example; as discussed in detail infra, the UK would 
previously have been categorized as an immigration detention framework nation, 
but it explicitly rejected the immigration framework, in favor of the criminal law 
framework. Turkey is a similarly interesting case, because it previously employed 
what would be regarded as a national security framework regime, but, in 2004, 
Turkey reformed its Penal Code (a prerequisite for negotiating EU accession) and 
in the process overhauled its approach to terrorist suspect detainees. See Krista-
Ann Staley, Revised Turkish Penal Code Comes Into Force as Part of EU Deal, 
Jurist, 3 June 2005, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/06/revised-turkish-
penal-code-comes-into.php. 
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Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa;125 and (3) the national 
security detention framework countries, in which the constitution or 
relevant statutes have delegated discretion to the executive to hold 
individuals in detention are Pakistan, India, Kenya, Tanzania, Sri 
Lanka, Zambia, Mozambique, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, 
Swaziland, and Trinidad & Tobago.126 Australia and Israel are 
special cases, as both countries employ a version of national security 
detention that is extremely rights stripping and yet incorporates 
many of the procedural protections available in the pre-trial 
detention countries.127 For this reason I have designated Australia 
and Israel “mixed” countries, a subset within the national security 
framework. 
II. THE PRE-TRIAL DETENTION FRAMEWORK 
Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom are 
the twelve countries surveyed in this Article whose preventive 
detention regimes can most aptly be described as emerging from a 
pre-trial detention framework. Because the United Kingdom recently 
shifted from an immigration framework approach to a pre-trial 
detention framework approach, it will be discussed in both this Part 
and Part III.128 In all of these countries, terrorist suspects are only 
detained without charge in advance of criminal charges being 
brought, and are only detained without trial before a trial occurs, in 
accordance with the statutory provisions governing the nation’s 
criminal law.129 This does not, however, mean that terrorist suspects 
 
125. This category includes countries in which suspects may be detained 
for a limited period under the auspices of immigration law. 
126. The countries within this group fall into two distinct subgroups; (i) 
countries in which the executive’s constitutionally or statutorily-confirmed 
powers to hold individuals in preventive detention are automatically reviewed by 
the courts (Israel, Mozambique) or by an administrative body (Pakistan, India, 
Kenya, Tanzania); and (ii) countries in which the executive’s constitutionally or 
statutorily-confirmed powers to hold individuals in preventive detention are only 
reviewed by an administrative body upon application by the detainee (Sri Lanka, 
Zambia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Singapore, Swaziland, Trinidad & Tobago). 
127. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
128. The UK initially adopted an immigration framework approach to the 
detention of terrorist suspects, but the House of Lords ruled that such an 
approach was unlawful and the UK subsequently adopted a criminal law 
framework approach to ‘preventive’ detention. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
129. See, e.g., Retsplejeloven [Administration of Justice Act], ch. 70 (Den.), 
translated in The Principal Danish Criminal Acts: the Danish Criminal Code, the 
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are treated in exactly the same way as other criminal suspects by the 
criminal justice systems of these nations. In many instances, special 
statutory provisions permit deviation from established criminal 
justice practices or regulations in cases involving terrorist suspects. 
For example, in some countries, terrorist suspects may be held in 
pre-charge detention for longer periods of time than other suspects.130 
In some countries, all terrorist cases are heard by central courts, 
rather than by the local magistrates who hear all other criminal 
cases.131 The criminal justice systems of many of these states have 
evolved over time, innovating and adapting in response to national 
security concerns, particularly in the aftermath of the September 11, 
2001 attacks.132 Yet, despite these (and other) departures from 
 
Danish Corrections Act, the Administration of Justice Acts (excerpts) (Malene 
Frese Jensen et al. eds., 2006); Code pénal [C. Pén.] art. 421-1 (Fr.); Code de 
procédure pénale [C. Pr. Pén.] art. 706-23 (Fr.); Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code 
of Criminal Procedure], Apr. 7, 1987, BGBl I, at 1074, § 120–130 (F.R.G.); Codice 
penale [C.p.] art. 270 (Italy); Criminal Procedure Act (Strafeprosessloven), Act 25 
of May 22, 1981, as amended by Act 53 of June 30, 2006, ch. 14,  
available at http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19810522-025-eng.pdf.  
(Nor.); Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Act No. 22/1984) (Ir.) available  
at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1984/en/act/pub/0022/print.html (last visited 
September 19, 2009); Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous  
Provisions) Act, 1997 (Act No. 4/1997) (Ir.) available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1997/en/act/pub/0004/print.html (last visited 
September 19, 2009). 
130. In the Republic of Ireland, the maximum limit on pre-charge 
detention is ordinarily 24 hours, but for terrorist suspects it is three days. 
Offences Against the State Act, 1939 (Act No. 13/1939) (Ir.) available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1939/en/act/pub/0013/print.html (last visited Oct. 
17, 2009), amended by Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1998 (Act 
No. 39/1998) (Ir.) available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1998/en/act/ 
pub/0039/sec0010.html#zza39y1998s10 (last visted Oct. 19, 2009). 
131. In France, all terrorist cases are reviewed by the Paris Trial Court (Le 
tribunal de grande instance de Paris) and in Spain all terrorist cases appear 
before the National High Court (Audiencia Nacional). See discussion infra at II.A 
(vi). 
132. See generally Jan Wouters & Frederik Naert, Of Arrest Warrants, 
Terrorist Offences and Extradition Deals: An Appraisal of the EU’s Main 
Criminal Law Measures Against Terrorism After “11 September,” 41 Common 
Mkt. L. Rev. 909, 910 n.128 (2004) (discussing the European arrest warrant, the 
framework decision to combat terrorism, and EU-U.S. extradition agreements 
post September 11, 2001); Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, After September 11th: The Fight 
Against Terrorism in National and European Law, Substantive and Procedural 
Rules: Some Examples, 10 Eur. L. J. 235, 235 (2004) (examining the risks of 
specific procedural and substantive legal changes in European law following 
September 11, 2001); Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Rule of Law in the European 
Union-Putting the Security into the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,” 29 
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standard criminal procedures, in all of the countries within the pre-
trial detention framework the methodology underpinning the 
detention without trial or charge of terrorist suspects is firmly rooted 
in the provisions of the nation’s criminal law. 
The discussion that follows begins with an exploration of the 
attributes of the different preventive detention regimes employed by 
the pre-trial detention framework countries, measured against each 
of the individual units of analysis in the taxonomy of preventive 
detention. It then continues with a consideration of the similarities 
and differences between the pre-trial detention framework countries 
that may have led to their adoption of similar regimes of preventive 
detention, before concluding with a discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the pre-trial detention framework. 
A. Key Characteristics of Pre-trial Detention Framework 
Countries 
In each of the pre-trial detention framework countries 
surveyed in this Article,133 “preventive detention” is considered to be 
a tool of the criminal justice system that may only be employed 
during a period of pre-trial detention.134 This section examines the 
“preventive detention” regimes of pre-trial detention framework 
countries as measured against the eight characteristics described in 
Part I. 
(i) Legal basis for detention: In the pre-trial detention 
framework countries, in common with almost all of the other nations 
surveyed, there are provisions in the penal codes and in other laws 
governing the administration of criminal justice that stipulate when 
and how individuals may be held pending criminal charges and trial 
for terrorist acts. In contrast, however, with the other nations 
 
Eur. L. Rev. 219, 219 (2004) (examining the European arrest warrant, the EU 
definition for terrorism, EU measures concerning the financing of terrorism, and 
the heightened activities of Europol and Eurojust in response to September 11, 
2001). For information concerning the relationship between the legislation of 
individual member states and the European Council and Common Positions and 
Framework Decisions, see generally Chris Vincenzi & John Fairhurst, Law of the 
European Community (3d ed. 2002). 
133. Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain. 
134. Preventive detention is also used in the criminal law framework 
countries as a tool to detain individuals with mental illnesses who are deemed to 
be a danger to themselves or others. See, e.g., The General Civil Penal Code 
(Straffeloven), Act of 22 May 1902 No. 10, § 39(a) (Nor.). An analysis of this form 
of preventive detention is, as mentioned supra, beyond the scope of this Article. 
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surveyed in this Article, it is these penal code provisions alone that 
also, in practice, govern the detention of suspected terrorists. Some of 
the pre-trial detention framework countries, such as Ireland, 
Norway, Germany, and Brazil apply exactly the same pre-trial 
detention rules to all criminal suspects, including those charged with 
terrorist acts.135 Other nations, such as France, Spain, Italy, Greece, 
and Turkey, have enacted special provisions and exceptions within 
their penal codes governing the treatment—including detention—of 
terrorist suspects, what might be called a “penal code plus” 
approach.136 In all instances, though, the legal basis for pre-trial 
“preventive” detention is found in the regular criminal laws. 
 
135. Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Act No. 22/1984) (Ir.) available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1984/en/act/pub/0022/print.html (last visited 
September 19, 2009); Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions)  
Act, 1997 (Act No. 4/1997) (Ir.) available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1997/en/act/pub/0004/print.html (last visited 
September 19, 2009); Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offenses)  
Act, 2005 (Act No. 2/2005) (Ir.) available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2005/en/act/pub/0002/print.html; The General 
Civil Penal Code (Straffeloven), Act 10 of May 22, 1902, § 21–23 (Nor.), available 
at http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19020522-010-eng.pdf; Criminal 
Procedure Act (Strafeprosessloven), Act 25 of May 22, 1981, as amended  
by Act 53 of June 30, 2006, § 183–185, available at 
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19810522-025-eng.pdf; Strafprozeßord- 
nung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Apr. 7, 1987, Bundesgesetzblatt 
(Federal Law Gazette) I, 1074, § 112–130 (F.R.G.). In Brazil, terrorism is listed in 
the constitution as a “heinous crime,” and the detention of individuals suspected 
or accused of committing “heinous crimes” is governed by the same rules as for all 
other criminal suspects, but individuals who commit “heinous crimes” are “non-
bailable and not subject to grace or amnesty.” Constituição Federal art. 5, s. 
XLIII (Brazil); see also Heinous Crimes Act of 1990 (Braz.); Código de Processo 
Penal [C.P.P.] art. 288  (Braz.) (association of more than three persons to engage 
in criminal activities). 
136. France’s legal regime for countering terrorism developed through the 
terrorism laws of September 9, 1986, July 10, 1991, July 22, 1996, November 15, 
2001, and March 18, 2003, and its procedures are codified in the articles of the 
Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes relating to terrorism. See Law No. 86-1020 
of Sept. 9, 1986, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], Sept. 10, 1986, p. 10956; Law No. 91-646 of July 10, 1991, 
Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 
July 13, 1991, p. 9167; Law No. 96-647 of July 22, 1996, Journal Officiel de la 
République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 23, 1996, p. 11104; 
Law No. 2001-1062 of Nov. 15, 2001, Journal Officiel de la République Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Nov. 16, 2001, p. 18215; Law No. 2003-239 of 
Mar. 18, 2003, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette 
of France], Mar. 19, 2003, p. 4761; C. Pén. art. 421-1–422-7 (Fr.); C. Pr. Pén. art. 
706-16–706-25-1 (Fr.). See also Stephanie Dagron, Country Report on France, in 
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(ii) Notification of charges: Under these criminal laws, the 
pre-trial detention countries have substantially similar standards for 
the notification of charges against terrorist suspects. In all but one of 
the pre-trial detention framework countries, terrorist suspects held 
in pre-trial detention are afforded the same notification of the 
charges that they face as all other criminal suspects are afforded in 
regular criminal proceedings.137 In Denmark, individuals must be 
notified “as soon as possible”138 of the charges they face, and in 
Ireland, individuals must be notified “as soon as practicable” of any 
charges.139 In Brazil, Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom a 
terrorist suspect is entitled to notification of the charges he faces 
promptly, and “as soon as is reasonably practicable” in the case of 
England.140 In Colombia, a detained suspect must appear before a 
 
Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security versus 
Liberty? 267–93 (Christian Walter et al. eds., 2004). Spain’s legal regime for 
countering terrorism is articulated in the penal code. Código Penal [C.P.], art. 
571–580 (Spain). Greece’s provisions for detaining terrorist suspects are outlined 
in Law 3251/2004, amending Law 2928/2001. See Andreas G. Banoutsos, Anti-
Terror Legislation in Greece, Research Institute for European and American 
Studies, Nov. 20, 2007, available at http://www.rieas.gr/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=485&catid=21&Itemid=63 (discussing the Greek laws). 
Italy’s provisions for detaining terrorist suspects are found in the Penal Code. 
Codice Penal [C.p.] art. 270 bis, as amended by Law 438 of 2001, art. 1, Urgent 
Measures Against International Terrorism and Law 155 of 2005. Turkey’s legal 
regime for countering terrorism is articulated in Law on the Fight Against 
Terror, Act No. 3713 of 1991, as amended by Law No. 5532 of 2006; Ceza 
Muhakemeleri Usulü Kanunu [CMUK] [Criminal Procedure Code] of 2005, art. 
91, 251 (Turk.). See Liberty Study, supra note 46, at 55–56; U.N. General 
Assembly, Human Rights Working Group, Report of the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, Mission to Turkey, Addendum, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/40/Add.5, 
Feb. 7, 2007, at ¶¶ 23, 27. 
137. Spain is the exception and is discussed infra. 
138. Retsplejeloven [Administration of Justice Act], art. 758 (2) (Den.). 
139. Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Act. No. 22/1984) (Ir.) available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1984/en/act/pub/0022/index.html (last visited 
September 20, 2009). 
140. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, 
sched. 8 (Eng.). See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Madde 19 (Constitution  
of the Republic of Turkey, art. 3), available at 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/sayfa.aspx?Id=78 (“Individuals arrested or detained 
shall be promptly notified, and in all cases in writing, or orally, when the former 
is not possible, of the grounds for their arrest or detention and the charges 
against them; in cases of offenses committed collectively this notification shall be 
made, at the latest, before the individual is brought before a judge.”); Código de 
Processo Penal [C.P.P.] art. 306(2) (Braz.) (stating that within 24 hours of arrest 
a prisoner must be given a copy of the complaint, signed by an authority and 
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judge within thirty-six hours of arrest, which is the latest point at 
which he may be informed of the charges that he faces.141  Similarly, 
in France, Germany, Greece, and Norway the latest point at which a 
detained individual may be informed of the totality of the charges 
against him is at his first hearing before a judicial authority—which 
in all instances occurs within a maximum of three days after the 
individual’s initial arrest.142 In Spain, however, the doctrine of 
“secrecy of the investigation” (secreto de sumario) may limit 
notification of the charges against a terrorist defendant held in 
preventive detention to a “succinct description of the alleged act” and 
which of the goals of pre-trial detention the prosecutor seeks to 
achieve.143 Needless to say, this restriction on notification may 
significantly hamper the defense lawyers’ ability to contest the 
legitimacy of their clients’ continued detention. 
(iii) Initial appearance/review: In each of the pre-trial 
detention framework countries, similar standards of initial judicial 
review of the detainee’s confinement are enforced. In each of these 
nations, terrorist suspects held in pre-trial detention are entitled to 
prompt initial review of that detention by an officer of the regular 
criminal court, rather than by an agent of the executive or by an 
administrative appointee. In Denmark, for example, a Lower City 
Court judge must review all instances of detention of terrorist 
 
containing not only the details of the charge or charges but also the names of 
accusers and witnesses); see Liberty Study, supra note 46, at 45 (describing how 
in Italy a suspect is formally informed of the charges he faces at a hearing before 
a judge for the preliminary investigations (guidice per le indagini prelimary), 
which must take place “as soon as possible” and within 96 hours at the latest), 51 
(stating that in Norway “arrested persons must appear before the district court 
no later than the third day after their detention . . . at which point the police 
must present the charge(s) and the reason(s) for keeping the person in custody.”) 
141. Constitution of Colombia, art. 28 (“A person in preventive detention 
will be placed at the disposition of a competent judge within the subsequent 36 
hours.”) 
142. Code de procedure pénale [C. Pr. Pén.] art. 63, art. 63-1, art. 116 (Fr.); 
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (federal constitution) (Ger.) 
art. 104(3) (“Any person provisionally detained on suspicion of having committed 
a criminal offense shall be brought before a judge no later than the day following 
his arrest; the judge shall inform him of the reasons for the arrest.”); 1975 
Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] 6.1–6.2 (Greece). 
143. Ley Orgánica 13 de reforma de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal 
[L.E.C.] en materia de prisión provisional (B.O.E. 2003, 257), art. 1 modifying 
L.E.C. art. 506(2). Human Rights Watch, Setting An Example? Counter-Terrorism 
Measures in Spain 46, Jan. 26, 2005, available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/spain0105/. 
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suspects within twenty-four hours of the arrest.144 In Greece, all 
arrested persons, including terrorist suspects, must be brought 
before the public prosecutor within twenty-four hours of arrest and 
referred to an examining magistrate who deals with all types of 
crimes.145 In Norway a detainee must appear before the district court 
within three days of his initial arrest.146 In Italy, the public 
prosecutor (Pubblico Ministerio) may detain and interview a 
suspected terrorist for up to forty-eight hours, at the end of that 
forty-eight hour period the prosecutor must schedule a hearing “for 
the validation of the arrest” before a judge for the preliminary 
investigations (guidice per le indagini prelimary), which must occur 
within forty-eight hours—in other words, a suspect must appear 
before a judge within ninety-six hours.147 
In France, a judge of the special terrorist section of the Trial 
Court of Paris (Cour d’assises) must authorize any detention of 
terrorist suspects for more than forty-eight hours.148 French law 
permits the authorities to detain a person suspected of carrying out 
an “act of terrorism” for up to forty-eight hours before bringing 
charges against him. Within the initial forty-eight hour period, law 
enforcement officers may bring a detainee before a sitting judge 
(magistrat du siege) to seek permission to hold him for a period 
lasting longer than forty-eight hours.149 This additional period in 
custody, without charge, is thus a judicially authorized departure 
from ordinary criminal procedure. In Germany, any individuals 
(including terrorist suspects) who are being held without charge 
must appear before a local district court (Amtsgericht) judge “without 
delay, not later than on the day after his apprehension,”150 which, in 
 
144. Retsplejeloven [Administration of Justice Act], art. 760 (2) (Den.). 
145. See United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Counter-
Terrorism Legislation and Practice: An Overview of Selected Countries 16, Oct. 
2005, para 54, available at www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/4175218/counter-
terrorism-Oct05. 
146. See Liberty Study, supra note 46, at 51. 
147. See Liberty Study, supra note 46, at 45. 
148. Terrorism-related cases in France are generally heard before a special 
section of the Trial Court of Paris created for this purpose in 1986. In the case of 
asylum seekers suspected of having terrorist connections, the Tribunal must 
undertake a review within 4 days of their initial detention. See Code de procédure 
pénale [C. Pr. Pén.] art. 706-23 (Fr.) (authorizing the court to extend a suspect’s 
initial detention, which can last up to 48 hours under articles 63, 77, and 154, by 
an additional 48 hours). 
149. Code de procédure pénale [C. Pr. Pén.] art. 706-23 (Fr.). 
150. Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], Apr. 7, 
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practice, means that individuals are ordinarily detained for twenty-
four hours, but may be held for up to forty-eight hours.151 In Ireland, 
a District Court Judge must review all criminal pre-trial detention 
“as soon as practicable,” and terrorist suspects may be held for a 
maximum of three days without charge.152 In the United Kingdom, a 
terrorist suspect’s arrest must be reviewed by a review officer “as 
soon as is reasonably practicable after the time of the person’s 
arrest.”153 In Colombia, one of the criminal judges of the Specialized 
Circuit (los jueces penales de circuito especializados) must review the 
detention within thirty-six hours of the arrest.154 In Turkey, the 
detainee must be brought before a judge of the “serious crime courts” 
 
1987, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl. I]1074, as amended by the Act of 7 September 
1998, Sept. 7, 1998, BGBl. I at 2646, § 115 (a) (F.R.G.) (“Kann der Beschuldigte 
nicht spätestens am Tage nach der Ergreifung vor den zuständigen Richter 
gestellt werden, so ist er unverzüglich, spätestens am Tage nach der Ergreifung, 
dem Richter des nächsten Amtsgerichts vorzuführen.”) (“If the accused cannot be 
brought before the competent judge at the latest on the day after his 
apprehension, he shall be brought before the judge of the nearest Local Court 
without delay, not later than on the day after his apprehension.”). 
151. A German statute promulgated in 1977 in the wake of terrorist 
incidents involving the Baader-Meinhof Gang provides for the incommunicado 
detention for up to 30 days of terrorist suspects. The so-called 
Kontaktsperregesetz (lit. “contact blocking law”) was supposed to sunset, but in 
April 2006, when the German Introductory Act to the Judicature Act 
(Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichts verfassungsgesetz) was recodified, the provision 
remained. However, this law has never been used in practice to detain terrorist 
suspects, such detainees have consistently been held in regular pre-trial 
detention for up to forty-eight hours. See Anna Oehmichen, Incommunicado 
Detention in Germany: An Example of Reactive Anti-Terror Legislation and Long 
Term Consequences, 9 German L. J. 855, 886 (2008) (discussing the 
Kontaktsperregesetz in 1977 and its 2006 recodification and noting that German 
executive authorities have been reluctant to enforce the Kontaktsperre regime  
at all). 
152. Offences Against the State Act, 1939 (Act No. 13/1939) (Ir.) available 
at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1939/en/act/pub/0013/print.html (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2009), amended by Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1998 
(Act No. 39/1998) (Ir.) available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1998/en/act 
/pub/0039/sec0010.html#zza39y1998s10 (last visted Oct. 19, 2009). In contrast, 
the limit is seven days for “gangland-type” offenses. See Criminal  
Justice Act, 2007 (Act 29/2007), s. 50(8), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2007/en/act/pub/0029/sec0050.html#sec50 (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2009). 
153. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23 (Eng.) (amending Terrorism Act,  
2000, c. 11, sched. 8, s. 41 (Eng.)). 
154. Decreto 2001, Sept. 9, 2002, [2002] Diario Official 44.930 (Colom.); 
Constitution of Colombia, art. 28. 
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(ağır ceza mahkemeleri) within forty-eight hours of arrest.155 
However, in cases involving three or more suspects, the suspects may 
be detained for up to three days, and in cases initiated in regions of 
the country designated “emergency regions” judicial review must be 
provided within seven days.156 In Spain, an investigating magistrate 
of the National High Court (Audiencia Nacional) must review the 
grounds of detention within seventy-two hours of a terrorist suspect’s 
arrest, and upon that magistrate’s approval, the suspect may be held 
for an additional forty-eight hours before being charged.157 In Brazil, 
the police require judicial authorization to hold a terrorist suspect for 
more than five days; save in instances where they have indications 
that the suspect may leave the area, in which case the detention 
period may be extended for up to fifteen days.158 
(iv) Period of detention without charge or trial: The early use 
of judicial review, as opposed to administrative review, in each of 
these countries is an important reason for why these countries are 
classified as within the pre-trial detention framework of preventive 
detention. There is wide variation among the pre-trial framework 
countries’ time limits for pre-trial detention. In Denmark, for 
example, pre-charge detention shall not exceed three days,159 and 
pre-trial detention “shall be as short as possible and must not exceed 
four weeks,” but this time limit may be extended with a judge’s 
approval by four-week blocks.160 In France, once formal charges have 
been brought, in accordance with regular criminal procedure, 
 
155. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Madde 19 (Constitution of the 
Republic of Turkey art. 19), available at http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ 
sayfa.aspx?Id=78 (mandating an initial appearance within 48 hours of arrest); 
U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Working Group, Report of the Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Mission to Turkey, Addendum, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/4/40/Add.5, Feb. 7, 2007, at ¶¶ 7 (noting that terrorist offenses are tried 
before special chambers of the Serious Crime Courts), 20 (finding that this period 
of detention can be extended during a state of emergency or declaration of martial 
law), and 48 (finding that “cases involving terror offences are tried before the 
special chambers of the Serious Crimes Court, including where the defendant is a 
minor”). See also Liberty Study, supra note 46, at 55–56. 
156. See  Liberty Study, supra note 46, at 55–56. 
157. Human Rights Watch, Setting An Example? Counter- 
Terrorism Measures in Spain  18–19, Jan. 26, 2005, available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/spain0105/. 
158. U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, 
2008 Human Rights Report: Brazil (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119150.htm. 
159. Liberty Study, supra note 46, at 49–50. 
160. Retsplejeloven [Administration of Justice Act], art. 767 (1) (Den.). 
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terrorist suspects may be held for up to four years in pre-trial 
detention.161 In Germany an individual may be held in pre-trial 
detention for six to eighteen months, depending upon the offense 
charged.162 In Italy a detainee may be held pending trial for up to 24 
months.163 Spain permits the detention of terrorist suspects for a long 
period of time before trial—a maximum of two two-year blocks of pre-
trial detention (i.e. four years), if the punishment for the alleged 
offense would be imprisonment for more than three years.164 In 
Turkey, the maximum period of pre-trial detention is two years, but 
may be extended up to three years under “exceptional 
circumstances.”165 In Colombia, the Constitution prohibits indefinite 
detention, but provides no explicit limit for pre-trial detention—and 
prolonged pretrial detention is common.166 Similarly, in Brazil, the 
law does not provide for a maximum period for pre-trial detention, 
the length of which is determined instead on a case-by-case basis.167 
 
161. Code de procédure pénale [C. Pr. Pén.] art. 145-2 (Fr.). 
162. Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], April 7, 
1987, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] I 1074 as amended, §§ 121, 122a. 
163. See U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & 
Labor, 2004 Human Rights Report: Italy (Feb. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41688.htm. 
164. Human Rights Watch, Setting An Example? Counter-Terrorism 
Measures in Spain 51–52, Jan. 26, 2005, available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/spain0105/ (reporting, however, that the two-year 
extension is “practically automatic” in terrorism cases). 
165. Ceza Muhakemeleri Usulü Kanunu [CMUK] [Criminal Procedure 
Code] of 2005, art. 102(2) (Turk.). See U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights 
Working Group, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Mission to 
Turkey, Addendum, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/40/Add.5, Feb. 7, 2007, ¶ 75. The Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention notes that the language of this provision is 
confusing and could be read to authorize an additional three years of detention 
on top of the original two, despite the government’s statements in support of a 
total period of no more than three years. Id. Moreover, due to the double 
procedures permitted under art. 252(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, this 
detention period could extend up to either six or ten years, depending on the 
interpretation. Id. 
166. See Constitution of Colombia, art. 28 (“In no case may there be 
detention . . . not subject to limitations of time”); U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, 2001 Human Rights Report: Colombia (Mar. 
4, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2001/wha/8326.htm 
(describing “prolonged pretrial detention”); U.N. General Assembly, Human 
Rights Working Group, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Mission to Colombia, Addendum, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/21/Add.3, Feb. 16, 2009, ¶¶ 
50-55. 
167. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & 
Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Brazil (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
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(v) Access to legal counsel: In all of the pre-trial detention 
framework countries, there is a right to counsel for individuals held 
pending trial for terrorism-related activity, and, in most (but not all) 
countries, there is a right to state-funded counsel. In Brazil, 
Colombia, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland there is a right to counsel 
and a right to legal aid for those who cannot afford to pay for their 
own lawyers.168 In the United Kingdom, the same is true, and if a 
detainee cannot afford counsel, the court will appoint one to 
represent the detainee.169 In Germany, there is also a right to counsel 
and government-funded legal aid, but pre-trial detainees do not 
receive legal aid until they have been detained for three months, so 
there is less opportunity in Germany than in Norway, Ireland, or the 
United Kingdom for government funded counsel to be appointed to 
 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119150.htm. In Brazil, time in 
detention before trial is subtracted from the sentence. Id. 
168. See, e.g., Retsplejeloven [Administration of Justice Act], art. 784 
(Den.); Criminal Procedure Act (Strafeprosessloven), Act 25 of May 22, 1981, as 
amended by Act 53 of June 30, 2006, ch. 9 § 107 (Nor.) (“Official defense counsel 
shall be remunerated by the State”); Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Act No. 22/1984) 
(Ir.) available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1984/en/act/pub/0022/index.html, 
amended by Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons in Custody in 
Garda Síochána Stations) (Amendment) Regulations 2006 (Act No. 641/2006) (Ir.) 
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2006/en/si/0641.html (last visited 
October 20, 2009); Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962 (Act No. 12/1962) (Ir.) 
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1962/en/act/pub/0012/index.html, 
amended by Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) (Amendment) Regulations  
2007 (Act No. 41/2007) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2007/en/si/0041.html (last visited October 20, 
2009) (providing free legal assistance for defendants indicted on serious crimes 
when “the means of the person are insufficient to enable him to obtain legal aid”); 
Constitution of Colombia, art. 29 (“Everyone criminally charged is entitled to a 
defense and the assistance of counsel chosen by the accused or assigned during 
the investigation and trial.”); Constituição Federal art. 5, ss. LXIII, LXXIV 
(Brazil) (ensuring the arrested person assistance by his family and a lawyer, 
ensuring state-funded counsel for indigent defendants); U.S. Dep’t. of State, 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, 2004 Human Rights Report: Italy 
(Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41688.htm. 
169. Legal Aid Act, 1988 ch. 34, § 21 (U.K.) (providing free legal assistance 
to a criminal defendant when “it appears to the competent authority that his 
financial resources are such as, under regulations, make him eligible for 
representation.”); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 68 (U.K.) (stating with regard to 
legal aid for bail-related hearings that, if “on a question of granting a person free 
legal aid under this section there is a doubt . . . the doubt shall be resolved in 
favour of granting him free legal aid.”). 
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represent detainees.170 In all respects, there is no difference in any of 
these countries between the access to counsel afforded terrorist 
suspects held in preventive detention and the access to counsel 
provided for all other criminal suspects. In France and Spain, a 
detainee’s alleged status may, however, affect his access to counsel. 
In Spain, if an incommunicado order is issued, a duty solicitor is 
appointed to represent the detainee in proceedings, rather than a 
lawyer of the detainee’s choice, and the lawyer appointed is not 
permitted to meet with the detainee in private, thereby severely 
limiting the lawyer’s ability to construct an effective defense of their 
client.171 However, once the incommunicado period has expired, the 
detainee is free to contact the lawyer of his choice.172 In France, 
terrorist suspects are treated slightly differently from criminals in 
that individuals detained by the police on the suspicion of committing 
terrorist offenses are only entitled to consult lawyers after seventy-
two hours of detention, rather than twenty hours, which is the case 
for detainees suspected of committing all other crimes.173 In Turkey, 
terrorist suspect detainees are permitted immediate access to one 
(and only one) attorney, and have the right to meet with that 
attorney at any time, but, at prosecutorial discretion, the detaining 
authority may impose a twenty-four hour incommunicado period.174 
Moreover, if a lawyer is suspected of acting as a “liaison” between the 
detainee and a terrorist organization, a judge may order an officer to 
be present during meetings.175 
(vi) Right to a fair and public hearing: The right to a fair 
hearing is enshrined in most of the legislation and jurisprudence 
 
170. Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], April 7, 
1987, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] I 1074 as amended, § 117 (4) (providing that an 
attorney shall be appointed if remand detention has lasted for longer than three 
months), § 140 (1)(2) and (1)(7) (providing representation at trial if the defendant 
is “charged with a serious offense” or if “proceedings for preventive detention are 
conducted”). 
171. See Human Rights Watch, Setting An Example? Counter-Terrorism 
Measures in Spain, Jan. 26, 2005, available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/spain0105/ (claiming that this practice “seriously 
undermines the detainee’s right to counsel and significantly heightens his or her 
susceptibility to unlawful pressure”). 
172. See id. 
173. Code de procédure pénale [C. Pr. Pén.] art. 63-64 (Fr.). 
174. Law No. 5532 of 2006, arts. 10(b) and (c), amending Law on the Fight 
Against Terror, Act No. 3713 of 1991 (Turk.) (stating, however, that the suspect 
may not be questioned during the incommunicado period). 
175. Law No. 5532 of 2006, art. 10(e), amending Law on the Fight Against 
Terror, Act No. 3713 of 1991 (Turk.). 
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relating to terrorist suspects being held in “preventive detention” in 
the pre-trial detention framework countries. In Norway, Denmark, 
and Germany, terrorist suspects held in pre-trial detention are also 
guaranteed a “public” hearing in the regular criminal courts.176 In 
Greece, terrorism suspects are brought to trial in the regular Court of 
Appeal, before a three-member panel composed of senior jurists.177 In 
terrorism cases, as in other felony cases in Greece, no jury is 
impaneled.178 In Turkey, court hearings are ordinarily open to the 
public, however in terrorism trials proceedings may be closed for 
“reasons of public morality or public security.”179 In the United 
Kingdom, special provisions exist that are only applied in terrorism-
related cases, allowing for in camera hearings, security-cleared 
judges, and special, security-cleared prosecution and defense 
counsel.180 In Colombia, terrorism cases are heard exclusively by the 
criminal judges of the Specialized Circuit (los jueces penales de 
circuito especializados), but all defendants, including terrorist 
suspects, enjoy the constitutional right to a “fair and public 
hearing.”181 Similarly, both France and Spain impose limits upon 
which courts are competent to review terrorism-related cases, and 
Spanish law also permits evidence gathered during ongoing 
proceedings to be “sealed” from public scrutiny.182 
In France, the major difference between terrorism cases and 
other criminal cases is that all terrorism cases are heard in Paris 
 
176. Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], April 7, 
1987, BGBL. I, 1074, as amended, § 117 (Ger.); Constitution of Denmark, s. 65; 
The Criminal Procedure Act (Strafeprosessloven), Act 25 of May 22, 1981, as 
amended by Act 53 of June 30, 2006, ch. 14 § 183 (Nor.). 
177. See United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Counter-
Terrorism Legislation and Practice: An Overview of Selected Countries 16, Oct. 
2005, available at www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/4175218/counter-terrorism-
Oct05. 
178. See id. 
179. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Madde 19 (Constitution  
of the Republic of Turkey) art. 141, available at 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/sayfa.aspx?Id=78. 
180. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, sched. 8 (Eng.). 
181. Constitution of Colombia, art. 29 (“Everyone criminally charged is 
entitled to . . . a fair and public hearing without undue delay; to present evidence 
and to examine witnesses for the prosecution; to challenge the conviction; and not 
to be subject to double jeopardy for the same act.”). 
182. Code de procédure pénale [C. Pr. Pén.] art. 706-23 (Fr.); Human 
Rights Watch, Setting An Example? Counter-Terrorism Measures in Spain 35, 46, 
Jan. 26, 2005, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/spain0105/ (describing 
several Spanish cases where records were sealed). 
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rather than in local courts. The French Code of Criminal Procedure 
stipulates that the procureur de la Republique, the juge d’instruction, 
the Tribunal correctionnel, and the Parisian Cour d’assises may hear 
cases involving terrorist acts, thus tending to preclude local 
prosecutors, magistrates, and courts from doing so.183 As opposed to 
ordinary trials, the jury criminel in the Cour d’assises is comprised 
entirely of professional judges when alleged perpetrators of acts of 
terrorism are tried.184 The justification for this alteration to the 
regular lay jury system is that the complexity of terrorist charges 
makes it difficult for ordinary citizens to judge.185 Scholars disagree 
as to whether this departure from regular procedure impacts upon a 
detainee’s right to a fair hearing.186 
In Spain, as in France, all terrorist cases are heard centrally, 
by professional jurists at the National High Court (Audiencia 
Nacional).187 As in France, there is an ongoing scholarly debate about 
the extent to which this centralization compromises detainees’ rights 
to fair and public hearings.188 The doctrine of “secrecy of the 
investigation” (secreto de sumario), which permits the sealing of the 
examining magistrate’s files until the conclusion of a terrorist 
investigation, may prevent defense counsel from undertaking a 
 
183. Code de procédure pénale [C. Pr. Pén.] art. 706-17 (Fr.) (conferring 
concurrent jurisdiction on these bodies); see Dagron, supra note 136, at 292–93 
(“The necessity for specialisation of the magistrates in charge is based on the 
need to have access in one place to all relevant information on the matter and to 
permit the magistrates to exercise competence over the whole territory of 
France.”). 
184. Law No. 86-1020 of Sept. 9, 1986, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Sept. 10, 1986, p. 10956. The website 
of the French Ministry of Justice also discusses the cour d’assises speciale, at 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/index.php?rubrique=10030&article=13837. 
185. See Dagron, supra note 136, at 295–96 (noting the fact that 
individuals can be excused from jury service compounds this difficulty). 
186. See Julien Cantegreil, A French Perspective on Preventive Detention 18 
(2008) (discussing differing attitudes towards the centralization of power and 
influence among an elite cadre of advocates and jurists) (on file with author). 
187. Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal [L.E. Crim.] (B.O.E. 1982 app. 19); 
Real Decreto, Sobre Competencia Jurisdiccional en Materia de Terrorismo [Royal 
Decree, Law 3/1977, January 4 Regarding Jurisdictional Competency in Matter of 
Terrorism] (B.O.E. 1977, 4) (corrected in (B.O.E. 1977, 26)). 
188. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Setting An Example? Counter-
Terrorism Measures in Spain, Jan. 26, 2005, available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/spain0105/ (expressing concern that Spain’s anti-
terrorism laws run contrary to the decisions and guidance of United Nations 
human rights bodies). 
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vigorous challenge to the detainee’s continued detention and may 
warrant an assault upon the notion of a fair and public hearing.189 
(vii) Judicial review: The availability of periodic, ongoing 
judicial review is another hallmark of the pre-trial detention 
framework. In each pre-trial detention framework country, pre-trial 
detainees have the right to appeal their detention through the 
regular criminal justice system, up to the highest court in the land. 
In Denmark, after the Lower City Court has ruled that an individual 
should be detained, it must review the detention order every four 
weeks by law, and detainees have the right of appeal to the High 
Court.190 In Germany, as discussed supra, all arrested defendants 
must be brought before a magistrate who will decide on the issue of 
bail, or some alternative treatment of a defendant pending trial, by 
the “end of the day following the arrest.”191 If a prosecutor wishes to 
prolong detention beyond this forty-eight hour period, he must make 
a compelling case to a local court magistrate’s court (Amtsgericht).192 
A detainee has the right to appeal this decision to the local district 
court (Landgericht) and then to the area’s highest regional court 
(Oberlandesgerecht). At each stage of review or appeal, the presiding 
judge undertakes a substantive review of the merits of the case and 
allows the detainee to present new evidence, thus offering the 
detainee the opportunity for a fair and public hearing that mirrors 
procedure in other criminal cases.193 In Greece, detainees may appeal 
their detention to the Council of the Court of Misdemeanors; pre-trial 
detention of longer than a year must be approved by the Council of 
the Court of Appeals.194 In Ireland, detained terrorist suspects have 
the right of appeal to the High Court, including a right to habeas 
corpus.195 In Brazil, terrorist suspect detainees, like all criminal 
detainees, are “ensured of the adversary system and of full 
 
189. Id. 
190. Retsplejeloven [Administration of Justice Act], art. 767 (1), (2) (Den.). 
191. See Richard S. Frase & Thomas Wiegend, German Criminal Justice 
As A Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions, 18 B.C. 
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 317, 327 (1995) (citing Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of 
Criminal Procedure], Apr. 7, 1987, § 128). 
192. Id. 
193. Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], Apr. 7, 
1987, §§ 112-128. 
194. See United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Counter-
Terrorism Legislation and Practice: An Overview of Selected Countries 16, Oct. 
2005, available at www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/4175218/counter-terrorism-
Oct05. 
195. Ir. Const., 1937, art. 40.4. 
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defense”196 including the resort to habeas corpus.197 This is also the 
case in Spain where, even in instances in which an incommunicado 
order has been issued, the right to habeas corpus still exists.198 In 
Colombia, terrorism cases are heard exclusively by the criminal 
judges of the Specialized Circuit (los jueces penales de circuito 
especializados), and accused individuals have the right of appeal and 
the right to habeas corpus.199 In the United Kingdom, individuals 
detained on terrorism charges have a right to challenge extensions of 
their pre-trial detention in the Court of Appeals and, ultimately, the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.200 
(viii) Rules regarding interrogation: The pre-trial detention 
framework countries have adopted a similar approach to 
interrogation and detentive questioning. Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, the Republic of Ireland, Norway, Spain, Italy, and 
the United Kingdom are all signatories to the European Convention 
on Human Rights201 and the European Convention for the Prevention 
of Torture.202 Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment,”203 and the European 
 
196. Constituição Federal art. 5, ss. LV (Brazil). 
197. Constituição Federal art. 5, ss. LXXIV (Brazil). 
198. Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal [L.E. Crim.], art. 520 bis (2), art. 509. 
For an overview of incommunicado detention in Spain, see Human Rights Watch, 
Setting An Example? Counter-Terrorism Measures in Spain 24–26 (Jan. 2005), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/spain0105/spain0105.pdf. Ley 
Orgánica 6, Reguladora del Procedimiento de Habeas Corpus [Regulation of the 
Procedure for Habeas Corpus] (B.O.E. 1984, 126). Human Rights Watch, 
however, has expressed concern that the habeas provision is “effectively 
meaningless.” Human Rights Watch, Setting An Example?, supra at 38. 
199. Decreto 2001, Sept. 9, 2002, [2002] Diario Official 44.930 (Colom.); 
Constitution of Colombia, art. 28, 30, 31. 
200. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, 
sched. 8 (Eng.). The newly inaugurated Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
recently assumed jurisdiction over “all civil law cases in the UK and all criminal 
cases in England and Wales and Northern Ireland.” Parliament UK, From House 
of Lords to the Supreme Court, 23 July 2009, 
http://news.parliament.uk/2009/07/from-house-of-lords-to-supreme-court/. See 
also note 206 infra. 
201. ECHR, supra note 55. The list of signatories can be found at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=7&DF=
06/10/2009&CL=ENG. 
202. European Torture Convention, supra note 113. The list of signatories 
can be found at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp? 
NT=126&CM=7&DF=06/10/2009&CL=ENG. 
203. ECHR, supra note 55, art. 3. 
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Convention for the Prevention of Torture establishes that a European 
Committee will have unfettered access to all party signatories’ places 
of detention to ensure that no inhumane or degrading treatment or 
torture is being carried out.204 No distinction is made, under the 
terms of either Convention, between the protections afforded 
detainees held in preventive detention and detainees held in post-
conviction detention. Moreover, no distinction is made under the 
terms of either Convention between individuals accused of 
committing terrorist offenses and individuals accused of committing 
other criminal offenses. The three non-European pre-trial detention 
nations—Brazil, Colombia, and Turkey—share the European nations’ 
de jure commitments to humane treatment of detainees, although 
some commentators have criticized the reported de facto use of 
torture and other forms of detentive questioning.205 
In the United Kingdom, the highest judicial authority has 
also considered whether or not information obtained overseas during 
the course of inhumane detentive questioning should be admissible 
in domestic courts.206 A seven-member panel of the House of Lords 
was convened in 2005207 to consider the admissibility of evidence 
obtained through “torture” during interrogations conducted at 
 
204. European Torture Convention, supra note 113, art. 8. 
205. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & 
Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Brazil (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119150.htm (noting that “excessive 
force, beatings, abuse, and torture of detainees and inmates by police and prison 
security forces” were reported); U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights & Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Colombia (Feb. 25, 2009), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119153.htm (noting 
“allegations that some prison guards routinely used excessive force and treated 
inmates brutally”); U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & 
Labor, 2007 Human Rights Report: Turkey (Mar. 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100589.htm (observing that “prosecutors 
in some instances failed to pursue torture allegations” and “[i]n practice a trial 
based on a confession allegedly coerced under torture could proceed, and even 
conclude, before the court had examined the merits of the torture allegations.”). 
206. The highest judicial authority in the United Kingdom was previously 
the House of Lords.  The final judgment of the House of Lords took place 
from July 27 to July 30, 2009. On October 1, 2009 the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom assumed jurisdiction “all civil law cases in the 
UK and all criminal cases in England and Wales and Northern Ireland.” 
Parliament UK, From House of Lords to the Supreme Court, 23 July 2009, 
http://news.parliament.uk/2009/07/from-house-of-lords-to-supreme-court/. 
207. At that point, the detention of the Belmarsh detainees was under 
review by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. See discussion infra 
Part III.C. 
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Guantánamo Bay to establish criminal liability or eligibility for 
deportation of individuals who were held in “preventive detention.” 
The panel declared that “irrespective of where, or by whom, or on 
whose authority the torture was inflicted,” any evidence gathered via 
torture would be inadmissible in courts in the United Kingdom and 
abhorrent to the British system of justice.208 There are therefore 
strict and binding prohibitions in all of the pre-trial detention 
framework countries against torturing or inhumanely treating 
detainees in their charge, or using any information collected by 
overseas allies who use such techniques. 
B. Similarities and Differences between Pre-trial Detention 
Framework Countries 
The above discussion of the detention regimes of Colombia, 
Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, 
Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom demonstrates the similar 
ways in which these nations have adopted a pre-trial detention 
framework approach to preventive detention. Underlying this shared 
approach to preventive detention are many identifiable similarities 
between these eight countries. The first and most obvious point of 
commonality between many of the pre-trial detention framework 
countries is geo-political. Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom are all stable 
European democracies with well-developed multi-party political 
systems.209 Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom are members of the European Union 
(EU). Norway is not an EU member, but is a member of the 
European Economic Area (EEA).210 Turkey, while not a full member 
 
208. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (No. 2), [2006] 2 A.C. 221, 246, 
275 (appeal taken from Eng.). Lord Bingham’s lead opinion declared: “[T]he 
English common law has regarded torture and its fruits with abhorrence for over 
500 years, and that abhorrence is now shared by over 140 countries which have 
acceded to the Torture Convention.” Id. at 269. 
209. For a critical examination of Europe’s democracies, see Fritz W. 
Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? 27–28 (1999) 
(questioning the effectiveness and legitimacy of multi-party European 
democracies in the context of the expanding capitalist economy and moves toward 
regional integration). 
210. The European Union is an economic and political partnership between 
27 European nations. The three major organs of the EU are: the European 
Parliament, composed of 785 elected MEPs (Members of the European 
Parliament) representing the citizens of Europe; the Council of the European 
Union (formerly the Council of Ministers of the European Union), composed of 
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of the EU, is seeking accession and has been an associate member of 
the Union (and its predecessors) for decades.211 All of these countries 
are, without exception, members of the Council of Europe and 
signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights.212 The 
European Union and the Council of Europe have implemented 
procedures designed to monitor member states’ treatment of terrorist 
suspect detainees to ensure that they are proportionate and 
congruent with the institutions’ commitments to human rights and 
the rule of law.213 The two remaining pre-trial detention framework 
nations, Colombia and Brazil, are both constitutional democracies 
with multi-party political systems (albeit with less stable political 
 
ministers of EU nation states whose principal responsibilities are foreign policy, 
security policy and justice and freedom issues; and the European Commission, 
composed of 27 independent Commissioners (one from each member state) and 
approximately 24,000 civil servants charged with drafting proposals for new 
European laws, which it presents to the European Parliament and the Council, 
and managing the day-to-day business of implementing EU policies and spending 
EU funds. See generally Europa, The EU at a Glance, 
http://europa.eu/abc/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2009). 
211. See Euractiv, European Information on Enlargement & Neighbours, 
EU-Turkey relations (Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/ 
eu-turkey-relations/article-129678. 
212. The Council of Europe, which was founded in 1949, seeks to develop 
throughout Europe common and democratic principles based on the European 
Convention on Human Rights and other reference texts on the protection of 
individuals. The Council has 47 member states, one applicant state (Belarus) and 
five observers, the Holy See, Canada, the United States, Japan, and Mexico. The 
main component parts of the Council of Europe are: the Committee of Ministers, 
the Organisation’s decision-making body, composed of the 47 Foreign Ministers of 
the member states or their Strasbourg-based deputies (ambassadors/permanent 
representatives); the Parliamentary Assembly, comprised of 636 members (318 
representatives and 318 substitutes) from the 47 national parliaments: the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities composed of a Chamber of Local 
Authorities and a Chamber of Regions; and the Secretariat, headed by a 
Secretary General, elected by the Parliamentary Assembly. The Council of 
Europe should not be confused with the European Union (EU), although all of the 
member states of the EU are also members of the Council of  
Europe. See The Council of Europe, Who We Are,  
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en. 
213. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Synthesis of the 
Replies from the Member States to the Questionnaire on Criminal Law, 
Administrative Law/Procedural Law and Fundamental Rights in the Fight 
Against Terrorism 27–34, Working Document No. 225 (final) (Feb. 19, 2009), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/sec 
_2009_225_en.pdf (assessing member states’ treatment of terrorist suspect 
detainees and the protection of fundament rights of such detainees). 
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histories and less developed human rights records than the European 
Union full member states).214 
A second point of commonality between the countries is that 
many of them have longstanding experience combating terrorism. In 
each instance—particularly in those countries in which traditional 
criminal procedures and substantive law have been adapted 
somewhat for cases involving terrorist suspects—the country’s 
treatment of terrorist suspect detainees reflects particular 
experiences of domestic or international terrorism. The rejection by 
the UK and Ireland, for example, of the national security framework 
of “preventive” detention of terrorist suspects was heavily informed 
by the failure of British policies during the Troubles in Northern 
Ireland.215 France, similarly, rejected the national security model of 
preventive detention following its experiences during the Algerian 
War of Independence during the 1950s and early 1960s.216 In these 
countries, as in the other pre-trial detention framework nations, laws 
designed to govern the detention of terrorist suspects were not 
promulgated overnight, but rather evolved over decades. Then, in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001, each nation broadened the 
definition of terrorism that they employed to encompass 
international as well as domestically active groups, but did not 
fundamentally alter their procedural frameworks for pre-trial 
detention. 
In Italy, for example, the approach to the investigation of 
terrorist offenses and detention of terrorist suspects evolved in 
reaction to extreme leftist terrorist organizations, such as the Red 
 
214. See generally U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights & Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Brazil (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119150.htm (describing Brazil’s 
human rights record); U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights & Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Colombia (Feb. 25, 2009), available 
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119153.htm (noting that, though 
the government’s respect for human rights was improving, there were still 
numerous human rights violations in Colombia in 2008). 
215. See generally Eric Metcalfe, The Future of Counter-Terrorism and 
Human Rights, JUSTICE Future Series (Sept. 2007) (providing an account of the 
continued impact of the Northern Irish experience on British policy). 
216. See Antoine Garapon, The Oak and the Reed: Counter-terrorism 
mechanisms in France and the United States of America, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 
2041, 2049 (2006) (describing the reorientation of French policies following the 
war of independence). For background on the war of independence, see generally 
Martin Windrow, The Algerian War 1954-62 (1997). 
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Brigades (Brigate Rosse) that were active during the 1970s.217 As a 
result, Italian legislators developed a responsive approach to 
terrorist incidents. In 2001, reflecting Italian reactions to 9/11 and 
the “global war on terror,” sections 270 bis of the codice penale were 
expanded and revised to include crimes relating to “international 
terrorism.”218 In 2005, in the aftermath of the London bombings, the 
so-called “Pisanu Decree” introduced further amendments to the 
criminal procedure code, prolonging the permissible period of pretrial 
detention of terrorist suspects and the period of time they could be 
denied access to counsel.219 The same process occurred in Greece, a 
country with considerable experience combating left-wing terrorist 
groups such as the Marxist group November 17 (Επαναστατική 
Οργάνωση 17 Νοέµβρη).220 In 2002, in reaction to 9/11, portions of the 
Greek Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure were amended 
by Law 2928/01.221 Penal Code Article 187 now states that the 
establishment of, or participation in, criminal organizations, 
including international terrorist organizations, will be punished as a 
felony.222 
France’s development of a criminal justice system-centered 
approach to the investigation of alleged terrorist offenses and 
 
217. For a general history of the Red Brigades, see Robert C. Meade, Jr., 
Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism (1990); Brigate Rosse, Fatti, 
Documenti i Personaggi, www.brigaterosse.org. (an online archive of Italian 
language press materials relating to the Red Brigade attacks). 
218. Codice penale [C.p.] art. 270, as amended by Law 438 of 2001 (Italy). 
219. Decree-Law No. 144 of July 27, 2005, Gazz. Uff. No. 173, July 27, 
2005, converted into law by Legge di Conversione No. 155, of July 31, 2005, Gazz. 
Uff. 177, Aug. 1, 2005. For a description of the impact of the Pisanu 
Decree, see Committee Against Torture, Follow up to Concluding Observations of 
the U.N. Committee Against Torture: Italy, Inter-Ministerial Committee for 
Human Rights, at 2, CAT/C/ITA/CO/4/Add.1 (May 7, 2008); Angela Napoli, 
Speech, Combatting International Terrorism, Istanbul, Jan. 30, 2009, at  
3–4, available at http://www.apm.org.mt/documents/pdfs/Napoli%20terrorism 
%20EN.pdf. 
220. For background information on N17, see George Kassimeris, Fighting 
for revolution? The life and death of Greece's revolutionary organization 17 
November, 1975-2002, 6 J. of Southern Eur. and the Balkans 259 (2004) 
(discussing the development, ideology, and eventual collapse of Greece’s Marxist 
revolutionary group, 17N, as well as the Greek government’s attempts to combat 
the group’s activities). 
221. See Interpol Report, National Laws and Measures: Counter- 
Terrorism Regulation of Biology: Greece 88–89, 2003, available at 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/NationalLaws/Greece.pdf (discussing 
the 2002 amendment to the Greek Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure). 
222. Id. 
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preventive detention of terrorist subjects is also undoubtedly a 
product of France’s long experience combating terrorism.223 Laws 
were passed in 1986, 1991, and 1996, principally in reaction to the 
activities of terrorist groups, including: the Groupe islamique armé224 
and other international terrorist groups relating to France’s past and 
present relationships with North Africa; separatist terrorist 
movements, such as the Basque group Iparretarak or the Front de 
Liberation Nationale de la Corse; and radical left-wing groups such 
as Action Directe.225 At each juncture, the public’s reaction to both the 
terrorist attacks and the government’s response to those attacks 
influenced the laws that were promulgated.226 In France, in common 
with the other pre-trial detention framework countries discussed in 
this Part (and in contrast to other countries studied in Parts III and 
IV of this survey), the response of the government and the legislature 
was to make consistent efforts to develop new legislation to 
accommodate the investigation of terrorist acts within the criminal 
justice system. This has been achieved through regular introduction 
to the criminal code of new terrorism-related crimes, such as the 
introduction in 1986 of the new offense of “criminal conspiracy in 
relation to a terrorist undertaking” (association de malfaiteurs en 
relation avec une entreprise terroriste),227 or the enactment in 2001 
and 2003 of new laws in response to U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1373228 that focus more heavily on improving terrorism 
 
223. See Cantegreil, supra note 186. 
224. For background and history of the GIA, see generally Habib Souaïdia, 
Le procès de “La sale guerre” (2002) (providing transcripts of trials of several GIA 
members). 
225. See W. Jason Fisher, Militant Islamicist Terrorism in Europe: Are 
France and the UK Legally Prepared for the Challenge?, 6 Wash. U. Global Stud. 
L. Rev. 255, 275–76 (2007) (discussing the evolution of French laws in response to 
encouters with these groups). For background and history of Action Directe, see 
generally Michael Y. Dartnell, Action Directe: Ultra-Left Terrorism in France, 
1979-1987, at 165–80 (1995) (describing conditions and procedures for detaining 
and trying Action Directe members). 
226. The Groupe islamique arme (“GIA”) metro bombing campaign of 1995-
1996, for example, prompted a public outcry for reform of the anti-terrorism laws, 
especially the laws relating to extradition. See Daniel McGrory, Terror Suspect  
Extradited After 10 Years, TimesOnline, Dec. 2, 2005, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,13509-1900234,00.html. 
227. Law No. 86-1020 of Sept. 9, 1986, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France],  Sept. 10, 1986, p. 10956, art. 1; Law 
No. 96-647 of July 22, 1996, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], July 23, 1996, p. 11105, arts. 3, 8. 
228. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2(e), UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (calling on 
states to “[e]nsure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, 
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prevention measures as well as the detention of terrorist suspects.229 
As a result, although there are specialized provisions governing the 
detention of terrorist suspects,230 the French approach to preventive 
detention of terrorist suspects remains firmly rooted in the regular 
criminal law. 
In Spain, as in France, the Penal Code and Law of Criminal 
Procedure govern the pre-trial detention of terrorist suspects.231 In 
Spain, as in France, anti-terrorist legislation developed as a response 
to longstanding experience combating terrorism—particularly 
terrorist acts perpetrated by the Basque separatist movement ETA 
(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, “Basque Homeland and Freedom”) and its 
right-wing Spanish nationalist opponents.232 More recently, the 
effectiveness of Spanish anti-terrorist legislation and practices were 
challenged by the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004, which 
lead to repeated calls by different parliamentary factions and media 
outlets for increased scrutiny of the system.233 The law governing the 
apprehension and detention of terrorist suspects is outlined in both 
the Penal Code and the Spanish Constitution. Section II of the 
Spanish Penal Code describes terrorism as an offense against the 
“public order.”234 Article 571 identifies what Professor Fernández 
Sánchez of the University of Salamanca describes as “the objective 
elements of the crimes of terrorism, including arson and destruction,” 
 
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is 
brought to justice and ensure that . . . such terrorist acts are established as 
serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations . . . .”). 
229. See Kevin A. O’Brien, France, in Europe Confronts Terrorism 19, 20–
25 (Karin von Hippel ed., 2005) (discussing the development of French anti-
terrorism legislation and its focus on prevention). 
230. Discussed in more detail infra. 
231. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tourón, Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Spain, Judicial Response to Terrorism: National Venues-The Spanish Model, 
Remarks at the 10th Int’l Jud. Conf. (May 23, 2002) (transcript available at 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Ministerial-Conferences/2002-judicial/Panel1_ 
CándidoCondePumpidoTourón.asp#TopOfPage) (explaining that Spain views 
terrorism as a criminal matter whereby terrorists are to be tried in courts of law 
established in accordance with the Spanish Penal Code). 
232. See generally Enric Martinez-Herrera, National Extremism and the 
Outcomes of State Policies in the Basque Country, 1979-2001, 4 Int’l J. on 
Multicultural Stud. 1, 20–21 (2002) (arguing that Basque insurgent nationalist 
extremism can be mitigated through a combination of “public order and 
responsive policies,” instead of an exclusive choice of only one of them). 
233. Economist, Popular Peevishness: Spain’s Bickering Opposition, 
December 7, 2006, at 42. 
234. Código Penal [C.P.] ch. 5, tit. 22, art. 571-574 (Spain). 
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which are considered crimes of terrorism when the perpetrator of the 
criminal act “belong[s] to, act[s] in the name of, or collaborate[s] with 
armed bands, organizations or groups whose goal is to disturb the 
constitutional order or the public peace.”235 This definition is 
broadened by Article 572, which expressly penalizes any individual 
who acts against the life, health, or freedom of any person when the 
author of the crime is linked with an armed or terrorist organization, 
and Article 574, which penalizes any crime that is not described 
expressly in the Penal Code but which has the same conditions and 
the same goals as the rest of the crimes of terrorism.236 In addition to 
the Penal Code provisions, Article 55(2) of the Spanish Constitution 
provides that certain rights, including the length of preventive 
detention, can be “suspended for specific persons in connection with 
investigations of the activities of armed bands or terrorist groups.”237 
However, in practice the rights available to terrorist suspects are not 
suspended entirely, but rather curtailed—allowing, as discussed 
supra, for longer periods in pre-trial detention, or for a longer period 
of incommunicado detention following arrest—and the procedure 
which is used is grounded in the regular criminal law. 
Turkey, however, provides an interesting counterpoint to the 
argument that 9/11 marks a universally crucial turning point. 
Turkey has longstanding experience combating diverse domestic 
terrorist groups, ranging from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 
to the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front, to Turkish 
Hizbullah.238 Turkey previously adopted a rights-violative national 
security detention scheme to hold terrorist suspects, but reformed its 
detention system, not because of 9/11, but rather in its bid for EU 
accession.239 The 1991 counterterrorism law called for offenses under 
the law to be tried in state security courts, presided over by military 
judges.240 These courts, however, were abolished in 2004 through a 
 
235. María Teresa Fernández Sánchez, World Law: Spain, JURIST (Feb. 
15, 2001), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/spaincor3.htm. 
236. Id. 
237. Constitución [C.E.] art. 55(2) (Spain). 
238. See U.S. State Dep’t, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 
Country Reports on Terrorism 2007: Turkey, April 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82732.htm. 
239. See Staley, supra note 124 (“Turkey has implemented a revised penal 
code in satisfaction of one of two pre-conditions for its eventual accession to the 
European Union.”). 
240. See U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Working Group, Report of 
the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Mission to Turkey, Addendum, UN 
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series of constitutional and legislative revisions following heavy 
criticism by international human rights bodies and the European 
Court of Human Rights.241 Even in Turkey’s case, it is thus possible 
to conclude that the length of experience of combating terrorism, 
combined with the public reactions (at home and abroad) to the 
methods used, led to the adoption of a more rights-respecting, pre-
trial detention model. 
The third (and perhaps less salient) point of similarity 
between seven of these nine countries relates to their legal systems. 
Colombia, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, 
and Turkey are all civil law nations. As Maria Angel noted in 1989, 
the European civil law systems that developed during the nineteenth 
century were often deeply interconnected: “The Italian and Greek 
[legal] systems find their origins in the French Code d’Instruction 
Criminelle of 1808—Greece by way of Germany.”242 It is undoubtedly 
true that many of the European civil law countries’ legal systems 
have much in common, but it would be a mistake to overestimate the 
influence this has on which countries fall within the pre-trial 
detention framework, and which fall within other frameworks of 
preventive detention. To the contrary, the strong pre-trial detention 
system in the United Kingdom and Ireland demonstrates that such a 
system is wholly commensurate with adversarial common-law 
notions of justice. 
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Pre-Trial Detention 
Framework 
At first glance, there seem to be many advantages to the pre-
trial detention framework of preventive detention. Terrorist acts 
almost invariably involve violations of the criminal law, so treating 
terrorists in a manner similar to the way others who violate the law 
are treated is not obviously illogical. Using the criminal justice 
 
Doc. A/HRC/4/40/Add.5, Feb. 7, 2007, at ¶ 62 (describing the earlier provisions 
and subsequent changes to procedure for trying terrorist offenses). 
241. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Turkey - Amnesty International 
Report 2007, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/turkey/report-2007 
(discussing the problems associated with the courts and the 2004 changes); 
Council of Europe Committee of Experts on Terrorism, Profiles on  
Counter-Terrorist Capacity - Turkey 4, June 2006, available at 
http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/37/a7/9e17fc18ff122bf6c899a88
2d366.pdf (describing the evolution of Turkey’s counter-terrorism laws). 
242. Marina Angel, Foreword, Modern Criminal Procedure: A Comparative 
Law Symposium, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 1087, 1089 (1989) (italics not in original). 
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system to try suspected terrorists enables experienced and qualified 
individuals to investigate, prosecute, and (if appropriate) convict 
suspected terrorists of their crimes. Conducting terrorist trials 
within the regular court system, and granting members of the 
judiciary oversight of pre-trial “preventive detention” also confers 
considerable legitimacy on the process. In all of the pre-trial 
detention framework countries, as in the United States, the judiciary 
is independent of the executive. The independence and impartiality 
of the judge ordering the initial period of preventive detention, 
combined with a detainees’ right of appeal to a higher tribunal of 
independent jurists, guarantees a certain degree of fairness in 
proceedings. The fact that this apparent fairness in proceedings 
exists and, also importantly, is perceived to exist, is crucial, and 
compares favorably to the criticisms of illegitimacy that have been 
leveled against the opaque, executive-controlled U.S. national 
security detention regime in operation on Guantánamo.243 The final 
(and in many ways most compelling) argument in favor of the pre-
trial detention framework is that it appears to work. It appears to 
have worked in France, where the 1995 Paris metro bombers were 
brought to trial in 1999.244 It also appears to have worked in Spain, 
where the authorities have arrested, interrogated, and brought to 
trial a number of individuals involved in the Madrid train 
bombings.245 
Critics of the pre-trial detention framework of “preventive 
detention” argue, however, that there are difficulties in using the 
criminal law as an anti-terrorism tool, and the criminal law system 
to determine who should be preventively detained. Such critics 
suggest that effective counter-terrorism measures prevent a terrorist 
act from taking place at all, and this prospective orientation is 
fundamentally “at odds with the criminal law’s primarily 
retrospective focus on punishing individuals’ past acts.”246 This may 
 
243. See, e.g., Ari D. MacKinnon, Note, Counterterrorism and Checks and 
Balances: The Spanish and American Examples, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 602, 636 
(2007) (arguing that the U.S. counterterrorism model does not reflect the 
principle of checks and balances). 
244. See, e.g., Bomb Suspects on Trial in France, BBC News, June 1, 1999, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/357808.stm. 
245. See John Ward Anderson & Pamela Rolfe, Spain Bitterly Divided as 
Terror Trial Begins in ‘04 Train Bombings, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 2007, at A12; 
Train Bomb Trial Starts in Madrid, BBC News, Feb. 15, 2007, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6363149.stm (discussing the 2004 Madrid train 
bombings and the subsequent trials of the suspects). 
246. Ip, supra note 32, at 808–09. 
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be an accurate description of the primary focus of the criminal justice 
system generally, but it is far from the whole story in the terrorism 
context. The criminal justice system can, in fact, play a prospective 
and preventive role—including, for example, the criminalization of 
inchoate acts such as conspiracy to commit terrorism and material 
support of terrorism, crimes which carry heavy sentences in many 
pre-trial detention framework countries.247 The French system, in 
particular, provides an extremely broad definition of “conspiracy to 
commit terrorism,” and has a particularly prospective approach to 
counter-terrorism within a criminal justice framework.248 
Some critics of the pre-trial detention framework also argue 
that it would be foolhardy to rely entirely upon a pre-trial detention 
scheme because of the evidentiary and procedural challenges to 
building and presenting a case against terrorist suspects. In answer 
to such concerns, advocates of the pre-trial detention framework 
point to the successful use of the criminal justice system to try and 
convict terrorists.249 Other critics of the pre-trial detention 
framework express concerns about the need to meet the high 
standard of proof applicable in ordinary criminal proceedings. These 
commentators argue, for example, that statements made by certain 
high-level al Qaeda detainees during interrogations would almost 
certainly be inadmissible under standard rules of evidence; as such 
statements may have been procured through torture or coercion.250 
Many proponents of the criminal law system of preventive detention 
would, of course, argue that these last points—the inadmissibility of 
statements extracted through inhumane treatment and the necessity 
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—are precisely their 
arguments in favor of the pre-trial detention framework of detention. 
A more fundamental criticism of the pre-trial detention 
framework is one that has been advanced by some civil rights 
advocates—namely, that by relying on the criminal justice system 
alone to prevent terrorist attacks, the pre-trial detention framework 
 
247. See notes accompanying discussion supra Part II.B. 
248. See notes accompanying discussion supra Part II.A and II.B. 
249. See, e.g., Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 12, at 17–20, 26 (highlighting 
several cases in the United States where prosecuters successfully convicted 
terrorism suspects under existing law and indicating that over 90% of 160 
defendants whose charges have been resolved between September 12, 2001 and 
December 31, 2007 in the United States received criminal convictions). 
250. Id. at 107–111 (arguing that while critics have expressed concern 
about the negative impact of the rules of evidence in terrorism trials, this concern 
is unfounded). 
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countries risk distorting the criminal justice system’s purpose. One 
frequently cited example of this proposition is that by creating overly 
broad definitions of “criminal” acts to control speech, “free” speech 
that would ordinarily be protected becomes subject to sanction. This 
is a criticism that has been leveled against anti-hate speech 
legislation in both the United Kingdom and France.251 A parallel 
argument says that adapting the criminal justice system to make it 
suitable for use in terrorism cases might involve lowering evidentiary 
standards, which would “infect and change the standards in ordinary 
[criminal] cases.”252 The most straightforward response to this 
argument is that terrorism trials already take place within the 
criminal justice system, without perverting the course of justice or 
diluting the protections for defendants in “regular” criminal cases.253 
A further argument against the pre-trial detention 
framework is specific to its current implementation by the pre-trial 
detention framework nations surveyed: the long period of time that 
many terrorist suspects actually spend in detention awaiting trial. 
Suspects held in preventive detention pending trial in France, for 
example, are detained according to (almost) the standards applied in 
regular criminal cases, and are eventually brought up on charges in 
(almost) the same way as all other criminal defendants, but this is no 
guarantee that their period of preventive detention will be short—
under the French penal system, an investigating magistrate can 
detain a suspect for two consecutive four-month periods on quite 
general charges, and a major human rights association has observed 
that the length of pre-trial detention in terrorism cases is frequently 
longer than the norm.254 
The pre-trial detention framework is clearly not perfect—
particularly when viewed from the perspectives of governments 
 
251. See New Efforts to Ban Religious Hate, BBC News, June 11, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4075442.stm (describing the proposed 
Racial and Religious Hatred Bill); Mark Rice-Oxley, Free Speech in Europe: 
Mixed Rules, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 8, 2006, at 1 (describing the debate over 
free speech and tolerance in France). 
252. Michael Mukasey, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 
2007, at A15. 
253. See Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 12, at 129 (concluding that the 
criminal justice system can handle terrorism cases “without sacrificing national 
security interests or rigorous standards of fairness and due process”). 
254. France: Paving the Way for Arbitrary Justice, Int’l Fed’n of Hum. Rts. 
Leagues (FIDH), No. 271-2, at 24–30, Mar. 1999 (describing several cases of 
extensive detention of suspects in France). 
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engaged in prospective efforts to thwart potential terrorist attacks. 
The response of three countries—Canada, New Zealand, and South 
Africa—has been to adopt a more “flexible” approach to preventive 
detention, by applying pre-existing immigration law practices and 
procedures to the detention of terrorist suspects. 
III. THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION FRAMEWORK 
Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa are all countries 
whose preventive detention regimes, in their most rights-stripping 
iteration, fall within the immigration detention framework. Each of 
these nations, as discussed in more detail infra, have provisions 
within their criminal justice systems for the investigation of terrorist 
acts and the incarceration of terrorist suspects. Yet, each of these 
nations has made frequent (and, importantly, more rights-stripping) 
use of immigration law provisions to hold non-national suspects in 
preventive detention. (In common with these nations, the United 
Kingdom initially employed an immigration detention framework, 
but subsequently rejected that framework when the House of Lords 
ruled that using immigration-based detention impermissibly violated 
individual detainees’ rights.) Part III begins by exploring in more 
detail the attributes of the different preventive detention regimes 
employed by Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, measured 
against each of the individual units of analysis in the taxonomy of 
preventive detention. This Part continues by considering the 
Commonwealth and common law traditions that all of these 
countries share—and how those shared traditions have deeply 
influenced the preventive detention regimes that exist in each of 
these countries today. Part III then turns to discuss how and why the 
United Kingdom rejected the immigration detention framework, 
before concluding with a discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the immigration detention framework. 
A. Key Characteristics of Immigration Detention Framework 
Countries 
Unlike the pre-trial detention framework of preventive 
detention, the immigration detention framework is not grounded in 
the criminal law and penal codes, but rather in administrative 
immigration law. In immigration detention framework countries, 
“preventive detention” is not, therefore, predicated upon a detainee’s 
past conduct, but rather upon his status as a non-citizen or 
naturalized immigrant. Immigration detention framework countries 
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use the strictures laid down in immigration legislation to legitimize 
the detention of terrorist suspects without affording the detainees 
the full panoply of procedural protections characteristic of criminal 
law.255 In these two respects, the immigration detention framework is 
somewhat akin to the executive-dominated national security 
detention framework of preventive detention. Yet, the approach of 
the immigration detention framework countries also shares some 
practices and procedures (although not all) with the pre-trial 
detention framework nations—most notably with respect to judicial 
review of the grounds for ongoing detention.256 The immigration 
detention framework thus sits uneasily between the most rights-
stripping national security detention regimes and the more rights-
inhering pre-trial detention regimes. This section of the Article will 
examine the eight key characteristics of the immigration detention 
framework countries’ “preventive detention” regimes. Through this 
exploration, the limitations on the rights of terrorist suspect 
detainees will quickly become apparent, hinting at why the United 
Kingdom ultimately rejected the immigration detention regime in 
favor of the more rights-inhering pre-trial detention model. 
(i) Legal basis for detention: In each of the immigration 
detention framework countries, the legal basis for detention is found 
in a combination of immigration and terrorism-specific statutes. In 
each country, high profile cases have been brought seeking to 
challenge the use of immigration detention to hold suspected 
terrorists. In the United Kingdom, the outcome of such a legal 
challenge was the wholesale rejection of the immigration detention 
framework of preventive detention. In other countries, the outcome 
has been more mixed. 
The intersection of counter-terrorism measures and 
immigration law is readily apparent in New Zealand’s terrorism-
related statutes and case law. In New Zealand, as in the other 
countries discussed in this Article, the government enacted 
comprehensive legislation in the wake of 9/11, laying out a clear 
statutory scheme for crimes of terrorism and appropriate measures 
 
255. See Ip, supra note 32, at 823–24 (describing the use of immigration 
detention in the United States). 
256. As in the pre-trial detention framework countries, in the immigration 
detention framework countries, a judge is responsible for deciding whether or not 
an individual will continue to be held in preventive detention, and all decisions 
that judge makes about detention may be appealed through the judicial system, 
to the highest court in the land. 
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to pursue, detain, and bring to trial terrorist suspects within the 
regular criminal justice system.257 Yet, only one terrorist suspect has 
ever been held in preventive detention in New Zealand—Ahmed 
Zaoui258—and Mr. Zaoui, who has since been released,259 was held for 
two years under a pre-existing amendment to the Immigration Act of 
1987.260 This Act grants the Director of the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service (NZSIS) the power to issue a “security risk 
certificate” in the name of individuals suspected of involvement with 
terrorist activities. The “security risk certificate” states that there 
are “reasonable grounds” to suppose that a foreign national poses “a 
threat to national security.”261 The Director of NZSIS, under the 
terms of the Act, is then required to forward this certificate to the 
New Zealand Minister of Immigration.262 The Minister must then 
make a preliminary decision about the certificate’s reliability.263 If 
the Minister is satisfied that the intelligence underlying the 
certificate is inherently reliable, the individual in whose name the 
certificate has been issued may be detained or removed from the 
country.264 The Immigration Act of 1987 grants the subject of the 
certificate the right to appeal the Minister of Immigration’s 
decision.265 Review of this decision is not, however, undertaken by a 
court of law, but rather by the appointed Inspector General of 
Intelligence and Security.266 The Inspector General is a retired High 
Court Judge, and his task is to confirm whether or not the security 
 
257. The Terrorism Suppression Act of 2002 (N.Z.). 
258. John Ip explains that Ahmed Zaoui was formerly a political leader in 
Algeria, who fled the country following a military coup d’état, and lived in France, 
Belgium, Switzerland and Malaysia before relocating to New Zealand in 2002. Ip, 
supra note 32, at 805.  For a detailed account of Mr. Zaoui’s movements and 
encounters with immigration and law enforcement in each of these countries, see 
id. at 805-08. I am very indebted to Professor Ip for his comments and assistance 
with this section of the Article. 
259. See Ip, supra note 32, at 805–08. See also Zaoui: I Never Lost my Faith 
in New Zealand Justice, N.Z. Herald (Auckland), Sep. 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10463340&pnum
=0. 
260. Immigration Act of 1987 (N.Z.) (as amended in 1999 and 2002). 
261. Immigration Act of 1987, § 114C(2)(b). (N.Z.). 
262. See Ip, supra note 32 at 805. 
263. Id. 
264. Ip supra note 32 at 805; Immigration Act of 1987, § 114A(f) (N.Z.) 
(noting that individuals posing a security risk . . . can “be effectively and quickly 
detained and removed or deported from New Zealand”). 
265. Ip supra note 32 at 805, 807; Immigration Act of 1987, § 114I(2) 
(N.Z.). 
266. Immigration Act of 1987, § 114I(3) No. 74 (N.Z.). 
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risk certificate has been issued properly and appropriately and to 
advise the Minister of Immigration accordingly before a final decision 
is made.267 
Mr. Zaoui’s lawyers brought several challenges to the 
provisions of the Immigration Act that constituted the legal basis of 
Mr. Zaoui’s detention: Mr. Zaoui first sought and won a ruling from 
the New Zealand Supreme Court that the courts had inherent 
jurisdiction, despite the outstanding security risk certificate, to grant 
Mr. Zaoui’s release on bail.268 Mr. Zaoui then sought review of the 
Inspector General’s risk assessment.269 In this instance, the Court 
favored the government by holding that the Inspector-General need 
only determine whether the statutory security criteria were satisfied, 
rather than consider all of the risks Mr. Zaoui might face if New 
Zealand were to deport him.270 Nonetheless, it curtailed the 
government’s ability to deport Mr. Zaoui, implying that the 
government had an obligation to abide by human rights provisions 
enshrined in New Zealand and international law that prohibit the 
deportation of individuals to countries where they are at risk of 
persecution, torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.271 
In South Africa, while the Constitution expressly prohibits 
the use of “preventive detention” for citizens,272 non-citizens may be 
held in “preventive detention” outside of the regular criminal justice 
system.273 Concern for human rights and human dignity plays an 
enormous role in determining the legal parameters of domestic 
legislation governing the detention of suspected terrorists in South 
Africa in part because of the legacy of oppressive legislation enacted 
 
267.  Ip, supra note 32 at 805, 807; Immigration Act of 1987, § 114I(4)(a–c) 
(N.Z.); see also Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act of 1996, § 5(3) 
(N.Z.) (“No person shall be appointed as the Inspector-General unless that person 
has previously held office as a Judge of the High Court of New Zealand.”). 
268. Zaoui v. Attorney-General, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 577, 643–653 (S.C.). The 
Supreme Court of New Zealand granted Zaoui’s bail application, which is a highly 
unusual step for the highest court to take. Zaoui v. Attorney-General, [2005] 1 
N.Z.L.R. 577, 662–665 (S.C.) (Judgment of the Court (No. 2). 
269. Zaoui v. Attorney-General (No. 2), [2006] 1 N.Z.L.R. 289 (S.C.). 
270. Id. at 317–318. 
271. Id. at 322. 
272. S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 12 (b). 
273. See, e.g., The Refugees Act of 1998, art. 29 (permitting detention of 
refugees and asylum seekers for up to 30 days without judicial review, and in 30-
day increments thereafter, subject to judicial review at the expiration of each 30-
day period). 
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under Apartheid.274 The Preamble to South Africa’s Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities 
Act of 2004275 distinguishes the legislation from its Apartheid era 
predecessors, such as the Terrorism Act of 1967276 and the Internal 
Security Act of 1982.277 A first draft of the Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy bill, containing a provision for detention 
without trial, was rejected as reminiscent of the Apartheid era and 
incompatible with Section 12 of the South African Constitution.278 
These decisions by the legislature were commensurate with the 
South African Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, which stressed 
that the words “detention without trial” should never be “viewed 
apart from [South Africa’s] ugly history of political repression.”279 In 
December 2007, the South African Human Rights Commission 
 
274. The Apartheid era government introduced a range of problematic 
legislation in the 1950s and 1960s, providing for detention without trial. See SA 
Law Commission Project 105 Review of Security Legislation (August 2002) 16–17, 
available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj105_2002aug.pdf (critiquing 
draft proposals for a bill to prosecute and noting parallels to laws under 
Apartheid, including: General Laws Amendment Act 37 of 1963 s. 21 (providing 
for detention during interrogation); Criminal Procedures Act 56 of 1965 
(providing for detention of state witnesses); General Law Amendment Act 62 of 
1966 s. 22 (providing for short-term detention); Terrorism Act 83 of 1967 s. 6(5) 
(prohibiting any court of law from pronouncing on the validity of the detention or 
ordering the release of an individual detained under the act); Internal Security 
Act 74 of 1982 s. 28–29, 31, 50 (providing for detention for interrogation and 
preventive detention)). 
275. Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act 33 of 2004, pmbl. 
276. Terrorism Act 83 of 1967 s. 6 (authorizing detention for interrogation 
and preventive detention). 
277. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 s. 29, 54 (providing for indefinite 
detention). 
278. See Annette Hubschle, South Africa’s Anti-Terror Law: Among the 
Least Restrictive?, 14 Afr. Sec. R. 105, 106 (Summer 2005). Section 16 of the draft 
bill provided that a judge of the high court could issue a warrant for the detention 
of any person who, on the grounds of information submitted under oath by a 
Director of Public Prosecutions, appeared to be withholding information 
regarding any offense under the Act. See SA Law Commission Project 105 Review 
of Security Legislation (August 2002) 16–17, 1035, available at 
http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj105_2002aug.pdf (criticizing the draft bill 
for this provision). Section 12 of the South African Constitution provides that 
everyone has the right to freedom and security of their person, which includes the 
right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause, not to be 
detained without trial, and not to be tortured in any way. S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 
12(1)(a), (b), and (d). 
279. De Lange v. Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) at 99 (S. Afr.). 
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commended the government’s “decision to handle for the most part 
terrorism cases within the same criminal procedure framework as all 
other criminal cases.”280 However, at the same time, the Commission 
highlighted the plight of one class of suspects who are held outside 
the criminal justice system: non-nationals held in immigration 
detention.281 Under the auspices of the Refugees Act, therefore, non-
national terrorist suspects could be held in immigration detention, in 
potentially abusive circumstances, even if there was insufficient 
proof to make out a criminal case against them.282 Under the auspices 
of the Refugees Act, this “loophole” in the immigration law has led to 
non-national terrorist suspects being detained in the absence of 
concrete proof sufficient to make a criminal case.283 
In Canada, as in South Africa, legislators formulating anti-
terror legislation in the wake of 9/11 were deeply concerned with 
human rights and individual liberties,284 and in Canada, as in South 
Africa, and New Zealand, a line was drawn between the rights of 
citizens and non-nationals. The Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2001285 (hereinafter ATA) established a new set of “terrorist offences” 
over which the state has specially-created prosecutorial and 
 
280. Nat’l Human Rights Inst. (NHRI), Statement to the Human Rights 
Council by The South African Human Rights Commission, Dec. 12,  
2007, available at http://www.nhri.net/2008/Statement_NHRI_South_Africa_on_ 
Mission_to_South_Africa.pdf. 
281. Id. 
282. Refugees Act 130 of 1998, s. 29(1). 
283. Nat’l Human Rights Inst. (NHRI), Statement to the Human Rights 
Council by The South African Human Rights Commission, Dec. 12,  
2007, available at http://www.nhri.net/2008/Statement_NHRI_South_Africa_on_ 
Mission_to_South_Africa.pdf (“The Commission believes that the potential for 
abuse of non-nationals in detention is particularly high due to systemic issues 
relating to the delays in processing of immigration applications and asylum 
claims.”). See M. Cowling, The Return of Detention without Trial? 13 S. Afr. J. 
Crim. Just. 344, 348 (2000) for a scholarly account anticipating this development. 
284. For an analysis of the similarities between South Africa and Canada, 
see Kent Roach, A Comparison of South African and Canadian Anti-Terrorism 
Legislation, 2 S. Afr. J. of Crim. Just. 127, 129 (2005) (“While the South African 
law is significantly narrower in scope than the Canadian law, it has a broader 
definition of terrorist activities and employs objective or culpa forms of fault that 
were deliberately not included in the Canadian anti-terrorism law. In addition, 
the South African law has a broader duty to report offense and provides for some 
investigative powers without the restraints of prior judicial authorization and a 
presumption of public hearings.”). 
285. Anti-Terrorism Act, 2001 R.S.C., ch. 41 (Can.) [hereinafter ATA]. The 
full text is available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/ 
bills/government/C-36/C-36_1/C-36_cover-E.html. 
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investigative powers, including preventive detention.286 Under 
Canada’s Criminal Code, as amended by the ATA, police officers are 
empowered to arrest and detain a suspect without an arrest warrant 
if the officer suspects on “reasonable grounds” that it is “necessary to 
do so in order to prevent a terrorist activity.”287 When it was 
originally introduced, the ATA provided that the individual could be 
preventively detained for up to seventy-two hours, but this particular 
provision was allowed to sunset in March 2007, following an outcry 
from human rights activists.288 In common with New Zealand, 
Canada also has a certification procedure that permits preventive 
detention of non-citizens under the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act (hereinafter IRPA) for extended periods of time.289 
Once again, the key determinant for the treatment of terrorist 
suspect detainees is not the crime of which they stand accused 
(although that is obviously significant), but rather the identity of the 
suspect—with two different standards being applied for those who 
are considered “insiders” and those who are considered “outsiders.” 
In 2007, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld Canada’s practice of 
holding terrorist suspects for several years “pending deportation.”290 
The court held that such detention was permissible, provided 
detainees were given prompt and full notice of grounds for their 
detention and were permitted meaningful judicial review.291 
(ii) Notification of charges: The immigration detention 
framework countries adopt a very similar approach to notifying 
terrorist suspects of the charges that they face. In Canada, a terrorist 
suspect who is arrested and detained, or an individual whose 
immigration status is revoked leading to his detention is entitled to 
be informed of the allegations against him within forty-eight hours.292 
 
286. These offenses included those found in §§ 83.01–83.04, 83.18–83.23 of 
the Criminal Code, as amended by the ATA. 2001 R.S.C., ch. 41 (Can.). 
287. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch C-46, § 83.3(7)(b)(ii). 
288. See The Council of Canadians, Vote Against “Preventive Arrests” and 
“Investigative Hearings,” http://www.canadians.org/action/2007/12-Feb-07.html 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2009) (“On Tuesday February 27, the House of Commons 
voted 159 to 124 against extending the preventive arrests and investigative 
hearings provisions of C-36, Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act. As of Thursday March 
1, these two provisions expired and are no longer the law in Canada.”). 
289. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 77-85. 
290. See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 
S.C.R. 350 (allowing prolonged detention on the condition of periodic judicial 
review). 
291. Id. at 387–90. 
292. Id. 
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In New Zealand, detained individuals are entitled to “be informed at 
the time of the arrest or detention of the reason for it.”293  In South 
Africa, individuals are entitled to be informed of “the reason for the 
detention” at the “first court appearance after being arrested” which 
must either occur forty-eight hours after arrest or “at the end of the 
first court day after the expiry of the [forty-eight] hours, if the [forty-
eight] hours expire outside ordinary court hours or on a day which is 
not an ordinary court day.”294 
(iii) Initial appearance/review: The immigration detention 
framework countries’ provisions for initial review before a specified 
authority mirror the provisions in their laws for the timeframe for 
notification of charges. In each instance, initial review must be 
undertaken within a twenty-four to forty-eight-hour window. In 
Canada, where a separate system of immigration detention exists, 
the timeframe for initial review is also forty-eight hours. Under the 
Canadian IRPA, a federal court must review the reasonableness of 
the certificate permitting the detention of the immigrant within 
forty-eight hours of that individual’s initial arrest.295 In New Zealand, 
the Immigration Act imposes a forty-eight-hour limit for initial 
review of detention of criminal offenders.296  In South Africa, detained 
individuals must be “brought before a court as soon as reasonably 
possible” and “not later than” forty-eight hours after arrest or “at the 
end of the first court day after the expiry of the [forty-eight] hours, if 
the [forty-eight] hours expire outside ordinary court hours or on a 
day which is not an ordinary court day.”297  Individuals held in 
immigration detention on suspicion of having committed or 
conspiring to commit terrorist offenses have their cases reviewed by a 
judge in chambers at this time, rather than in open court.298 
(iv) Period of detention without charge or trial: The area in 
which there is the most divergence between the otherwise relatively 
homogenous immigration detention framework countries is the 
maximum period during which an individual may be held in 
 
293. See Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 23(1)(a) (N.Z.). 
294. S. Afr. Const. 1996 §35(1)(d)-(e). 
295. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 77-85. 
296. Immigration Act 1987, § 99 (N.Z.). 
    297. S. Afr. Const. 1996 §35(1)(d). 
298. This in camera review was criticized by the South African Human 
Rights Commission. Nat’l Human Rights Inst. (NHRI), Statement to the Human 
Rights Council by The South African Human Rights Commission, Dec. 12,  
2007, available at http://www.nhri.net/2008/Statement_NHRI_South_Africa_on_ 
Mission_to_South_Africa.pdf. 
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immigration detention. In New Zealand, criminal offenders held 
under the Immigration Act of 1987 may be detained for up to twenty-
eight days without review, and thereafter their detention must be 
reviewed by a district judge every seven days, but in theory (if not in 
practice) individuals could be detained indefinitely.299 In contrast, in 
Canada there is no provision for indefinite administrative detention, 
and an individual held in immigration detention who is not deported 
within one hundred and twenty days may apply for release from 
detention.300 In South Africa, individuals held in immigration 
detention may not be detained for a longer period than is “reasonable 
and justifiable,” and any detention over thirty days is automatically 
reviewed by the High Court.301 In common with the initial review of 
detention in South Africa, these periodic automatic reviews take 
place in camera, rather than in open court.302 
(v)  Access to counsel: Each of the immigration detention 
framework countries has a robust provision for access to counsel, 
although in certain circumstances the anti-terrorism legislation 
limits that counsel’s freedom to discuss the details of the case, and in 
other cases legal aid is not available for the detainees. In Canada, 
there is a right to counsel in both criminal and immigration-related 
proceedings.303 In South Africa, this is also the case, but government-
funded legal aid is limited, and does not extend to immigration 
proceedings.304 In New Zealand there is a right to counsel in 
immigration-related cases, but government-funded legal aid is not 
available.305 
(vi) Right to fair and public hearing: In each of the 
immigration detention framework countries, individuals held in 
 
299. Immigration Act of 1987, § 100(2)–(3). 
300. Canada, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 
77-85 (Can.). 
301. Refugees Act 130 of 1998 s. 29(1) (S. Afr.). 
302. See Nat’l Human Rights Inst. (NHRI), Statement to the Human 
Rights Council by The South African Human Rights Commission, Dec. 12,  
2007, available at http://www.nhri.net/2008/Statement_NHRI_South_Africa_on_ 
Mission_to_South_Africa.pdf (criticizing this practice as rights-violative). 
303. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch C-46, § 83.28 (right to counsel) 
(“(11) A person has the right to retain and instruct counsel at any stage of the 
proceedings.”); Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 
167(1) (Can.). 
304. See Legal Aid South Africa, Legal Aid Guide 2009, available at 
http://www.legal-aid.co.za/images/legal-services/Guide/laguide.pdf. 
305. Immigration Act of 1987, § 140(4) (N.Z.) (noting right to counsel, but 
no provision for government-funded legal aid). 
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immigration detention have the right to a hearing in front of a 
member of the regular judiciary, but the shape and attributes of that 
hearing differ from country to country. Canadian law provides for a 
“hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.”306 In New 
Zealand, criminal offenders held subject to an order of commitment 
under the Immigration Act of 1987 for a period of more than twenty-
eight days have a right to review of their detention by a district judge 
every seven days.307 
(vii) Judicial review: The availability of judicial review is a 
keynote of the immigration detention framework countries’ systems 
of preventive detention. As noted above, the shape and attributes of 
the initial judicial review differ by country, but in each instance the 
review is carried out by a member of the judiciary. In each of the 
immigration detention framework countries, the initial review by a 
judge or magistrate is then subject to review by the regular court 
system. In Canada, proceedings may be brought in federal court, 
where the government has to meet the usual burden of proof—i.e., 
“beyond a reasonable doubt”—to demonstrate that the detainee has 
engaged in or may engage in activities that justify that detainee’s 
continued incarceration.308 In New Zealand, as the Zaoui case 
demonstrates, detainees have the right to appeal their cases all the 
way to the Supreme Court.309 
(viii) Rules of interrogation: Each of the immigration 
detention framework countries has a strong statutory and/or 
constitutional and jurisprudential commitment to protecting 
detainees from torture or ill treatment. South Africa, in particular, 
because of the history of the nation’s struggle against Apartheid, has 
integrated stringent international human rights standards into its 
post-Apartheid constitution.310 The South African Constitution 
forbids torture, and South African courts have underscored that any 
evidence obtained as a fruit of torture or inhumane treatment will be 
inadmissible in court—as was most recently demonstrated in 2008 in 
 
306. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
307. Immigration Act of 1987, § 100(2)–(3) (N.Z.). 
308. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch C-46. 
309. See discussion supra Part A. 
310. S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 39 (“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court . . . must consider international law; and may consider foreign law.”). 
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the Bongani Mthembu case.311 New Zealand and Canada have both 
also condemned torture and inhuman treatment of detainees.312 
Furthermore, in each of the immigration detention framework 
countries, the laws governing the treatment of terrorist suspects also 
specifically prohibit the deportation of individuals to countries where 
they may be subjected to torture or inhumane treatment.313 
B. Similarities and Differences between Immigration 
Detention Framework Countries 
The above discussion of the immigration detention regimes of 
South Africa, New Zealand, and Canada demonstrates the great 
extent to which these countries have adopted similar approaches to 
preventive detention. Underlying this shared approach to preventive 
detention are many other easily identifiable similarities. The first 
(and most obvious) similarity is political: as is the case in the pre-
trial detention nations, the immigration detention countries are 
parliamentary democracies. Each country has a well-established and 
independent judiciary, and each country has a longstanding 
commitment to human rights, and a longstanding engagement with 
international instruments designed to protect those rights and 
uphold the rule of law. 
Moreover, each of the immigration detention framework 
countries is a member of the Commonwealth. They are former 
British colonies, and, as a result, they have similar legal systems, 
shared histories, a shared language—English—and overlapping 
(although far from identical) cultures and traditions. South Africa is, 
perhaps, an outlier within this group because of its mixture of many 
different languages, cultures, and traditions that were subjugated 
during the colonial and Apartheid eras.314 Despite its distinct 
 
311. See Ernest Mabuza, South Africa: Landmark Court Ruling On 
Torture, Business Day, 11 April 2008, available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200804110027.html. 
312. Both Canada and New Zealand are, for example, signatories to the 
ICCPR. 
313. See, e.g., Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 105.33 (Austl.); Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), at § 7. 
314. See Sally Frankental & Owen Sichone, South Africa’s Diverse Peoples: 
A Reference Sourcebook (Ethnic Diversity Within Nations) 29–59, 123–162 (2005) 
(detailing the process by which South Africa became culturally diverse as it was 
colonized by Britain and the subsequent effect on this diversity as a result of 
Apartheid policies). 
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national identity, however, it shares many legal traditions with New 
Zealand and Canada. Shared legal traditions may play a crucial role 
in the development of an immigration detention framework approach 
to the detention of terrorist suspects. Various incarnations of 
“preventive detention” have, for good or for ill, a long history within 
the English common law.315 While it would be extremely simplistic to 
 
315. The origins of preventive detention under the common law stretch 
back over 400 years to the use of prerogative detention by the Tudor and Stuart 
monarchs of England. One of the most well known (and well documented) early 
instances of royal prerogative detention is Darnel’s Case (also known as The Five 
Knights’ Case) of 1627. 3 How. St. Tr. 1, 59 (K.B. 1627). In March 1627, Sir 
Thomas Darnel, Sir John Corbet, Sir Walter Earl, Sir Edmund Hampden, and Sir 
John Hevingham were imprisoned by Charles I for refusing to pay the Ships’ Tax 
(used to raise troops and arms for the war in support of Frederick, Elector of 
Palatine). They were imprisoned solely at the royal prerogative—“per speciale 
mandatum domini regis.” The earliest common law jurisdiction statute 
permitting preventive detention appeared 162 years later when the House of 
Lords passed Pitt’s India Act of 1784, which contained provisions intended to 
preserve order and restrict political subversion in Bengal. See Faqir Hussain, 
Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention 3–90 (1989) (discussing the use of 
preventive detention over the course of British history as a means of ensuring 
security for communities). However, it was a World War II case that provided the 
most infamous justification of administrative detention within the common law 
and commonwealth tradition. See Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from K.B.). In Liversidge, a plaintiff detained under wartime 
Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations of 1939 brought a false 
imprisonment action against the Secretary of State. Id. See also Harding & 
Hatchard, supra note 7, at 32. The relevant regulations stated “If the Secretary of 
State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or 
associations or to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public 
safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts 
and by that reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him, he may 
make an order against that person directing that he be detained.” See id.; A.W. 
Brian Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention Without Trial in 
Wartime Britain 424 (1992). The House of Lords interpreted Regulation 18B as 
insulating detention decisions made by the Secretary of State from judicial 
review, provided that the Secretary was acting in good faith and had “reasonable 
cause” to believe that the detention was justified. Liversidge, [1942] AC at 222–
223; see also Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7, at 32 (describing how the House 
of Lords construed the statute as meaning that courts could not enquire into the 
grounds of detention underlying a detention order “unless the plaintiff could 
demonstrate that the Secretary of State had acted in bad faith.”). Lord Atkin, in 
dissent famously argued that the words “reasonable cause” indicated that, even 
during war time a decision made by the executive to detain individuals should be 
subject to judicial scrutiny, as courts could, and should, be able to review 
independently whether or not the detention was justifiable. See Simpson, at 363 
(noting that Lord Atkin’s impassioned dissent appeared to stem from a desire for 
greater deference by the Home Office to the judiciary); Harding & Hatchard, 
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argue that the immigration detention framework countries’ approach 
to preventive detention of terrorist suspects is a natural consequence 
of this common law tradition—indeed, given the fact that the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, also common law countries, have eschewed 
this approach, it would be foolish to make such an argument—there 
is some merit in the claim that the shared legal tradition of 
immigration detention framework countries informs the statutory 
and jurisprudential approaches taken in each nation in response to 
terrorism. 
A related reason for the convergence of the immigration 
detention framework countries’ respective approaches to preventive 
detention of terror suspects is the extent to which the legislators and 
jurists in these three nations are engaged in dialogue with one 
another.316 It is surely no accident that countries that share the same 
parliamentary and legal traditions, whose jurists and legislators 
refer to the decisions and policies of one another, each developed 
methods for detaining terrorist suspects involving their immigration 
systems. 
However, despite these similarities between the immigration 
detention framework countries, it would be a mistake to assume that 
these similarities are preconditions that ultimately lead to an 
immigration framework approach to preventive detention. Australia 
is a nation that has much in common with its antipodean neighbor 
New Zealand, and yet it has not adopted an immigration detention 
framework. Ireland and the United Kingdom are both 
Commonwealth countries with parliamentary democracies and 
independent judiciaries, and they have adopted a pre-trial detention 
approach to preventive detention. Common law traditions do not, 
therefore, inevitably lead to the immigration detention framework—
just as civil law systems do not inevitably lead to the pre-trial 
detention framework of “preventive detention.” The most vivid 
illustration of this point is the United Kingdom’s experience of 
 
supra note 7, at 32. The Liversidge decision created an “impenetrable wall of 
secrecy” around executive decisions to detain. Id. at 362. 
316. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication,” Speech at the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa (February 7, 2006) (transcript  
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07b-06. 
html) (underscoring why the United States can, and should, learn from foreign 
jurisdictions). 
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shifting from an immigration detention to a pre-trial detention 
regime. 
C. The United Kingdom’s Rejection of the Immigration 
Detention Framework 
The United Kingdom is unique among the countries surveyed 
in this Article in its shift between “preventive detention” frameworks 
in the post-9/11 period. In the aftermath of 9/11, the United Kingdom 
developed a scheme for the detention of terrorist suspects that, when 
measured against the criteria in this Article’s taxonomy, firmly 
placed it within the immigration detention framework; it 
subsequently rejected this regime as too violative of detainees’ rights. 
The current regime for the preventive detention of terrorist suspects 
in the United Kingdom is intended to be more rights respecting and 
locates the United Kingdom within the pre-trial detention 
framework. The circumstances and legislative history of the United 
Kingdom’s move away from immigration detention to pre-trial 
detention illustrate the fundamental problems inherent in using the 
immigration detention framework to detain terrorist suspects.317 The 
Terrorism Act of 2006318 was enacted to amend the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act of 2001319 (hereinafter ATCSA), the 
legislation that previously governed the “preventive detention” of 
suspected terrorists in the United Kingdom. The ATCSA extended 
police powers to combat terrorism, previously enumerated in the 
Terrorism Act of 2000320 and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999,321 and, alongside 
a host of other measures,322 granted the Home Secretary the power to 
 
317. For a detailed analysis of the history of the bill, see generally 
Sangeeta Shah, The UK’s Anti-Terror Legislation and the House of Lords: The 
First Skirmish, 5 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 403 (2005) (discussing constitutional 
arguments raised in a challenge to the bill adjudicated by the House of Lords). 
318. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.). 
319. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.). 
320. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.). 
321. Adopted by G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999). 
322. See Shah, supra note 317 at 404 (explaining that the measures 
created include “the crime of inciting religious hatred; extending controls over 
‘weapons of mass destruction’; safeguarding the control of pathogens and toxins 
and security in the nuclear industry; mandating improvements in aviation 
security” and implementing so-called “criminal co-operation measures” under the 
Third Pillar of the EU). Id. at n.7, citing Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 September?, 65 Mod. 
L. Rev. 724, 725–27 (2002) (arguing that the Act amounts to a disproportional 
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“certify” foreign nationals who were terrorist suspects.323 Once an 
individual had been certified, that individual could be repatriated. If, 
however, the individual’s home country conditions were such that 
upon repatriation the individual might face torture or other forms of 
ill treatment, that individual could be detained until such conditions 
changed—i.e. potentially indefinitely—or until another country 
indicated that it was willing to receive the suspected individual.324 
This provision of the ATCSA allowing for indefinite detention of 
foreign nationals was intended to address the United Kingdom’s 
responsibilities under Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which has been interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights to prohibit the extradition of individuals to countries 
in which they would face a real risk of torture, the death penalty, or 
any other “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”325 
However, in its attempt to conform with its responsibilities under 
Article 3, the United Kingdom risked violating Article 5(1) of the 
European Convention, as well as Article 9 of the ICCPR, both of 
which prohibit arbitrary detention. As a result, the United Kingdom 
entered derogations from both instruments.326 
 
response to terrorism); Adam Tomkins, Legislating Against the Terror: the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 2002 Pub. L. 205 passim (presenting an 
outline of the entire Act and its history and discussing in more detail its most 
controversial provisions). 
323. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 21 (Eng.). The 
text of § 21(1) reads: “The Secretary of State may issue a certificate under this 
section in respect of a person if the Secretary of State reasonably—(a) believes 
that the person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national security, 
and (b) suspects that the person is a terrorist.” 
324. Id. § 23 (Eng.). The text of § 23(1) reads: “A suspected international 
terrorist may be detained under a provision specified in subsection (2) [relevant 
provisions of the Immigration Act 1971] despite the fact that his removal or 
departure from the United Kingdom is prevented (whether temporarily or 
indefinitely) by—(a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an 
international agreement, or (b) a practical consideration.” Lord Nicholls argued 
preventive detention under the ATCSA was thus less absolute, describing it as “a 
prison . . . [with] only three walls,” but also acknowledged that “this freedom is 
more theoretical than real . . . most of those detained . . . prefer to stay in prison 
rather than face the prospect of ill treatment in any country willing to admit 
them.” A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 128. 
325. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, ¶ 80 (1997); 
Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989); see also Shah, supra 
note 317 at 405. 
326. Shah, supra note 317 at 405. As Shah points out, the text of both 
derogations, communicated to the relevant authorities on December 18, 2001, is 
almost identical.  Id. at n. 14.  See UK Derogation from the ECHR at: 
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The British government made use of the certification 
procedures permitted under the ATCSA to detain foreign nationals 
suspected of terrorist connections. In the three years following the 
passage of the ATCSA, a total of seventeen individuals were certified, 
sixteen of whom were detained.327 The detainees vigorously 
challenged the lawfulness of their detention, arguing that it was 
illegal under Article 5 of the European Convention for foreign 
national terrorist suspects to be treated differently than UK 
nationals, and a 8-1 majority of the House of Lords agreed, holding 
that section 23 of the ATCSA was incompatible with Article 5 of the 
European Convention on this ground.328 The government’s response 
 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CV=0
&NA=&PO=999&CN=999&VL=1&CM=9&CL=ENG; “Notifications under Article 
4 (3) of the Covenant (Derogations)” at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View 
Details.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en. 
Both derogations were withdrawn on March 15, 2005. For further background on 
the United Kingdom’s derogation from these two instruments, see Stuart 
McDonald, Essay, The Unbalanced Imagery of Antiterrorism Policy, 18 Cornell 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 519, 525 and n. 35, citing Tom Hickman, Between Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law: Indefinite Detention and the Derogation Model of 
Constitutionalism, 68 Mod. L. Rev. 655 (2005) (discussing the merits of 
derogation as a way to legally accommodate emergency actions as compared to 
assuming that extra-legal actions will be taken in emergencies); Stephen Tierney, 
Determining the State of Exception: What Role for Parliament and the Courts?, 68 
Mod. L. Rev. 668 (2005) (discussing the proper roles of legislature, executive, and 
courts in determining the existence of an emergency); David Dyzenhaus, An 
Unfortunate Outburst of Anglo-Saxon Parochialism, 68 Mod. L. Rev. 673 (2005) 
(objecting to the emphasis placed by the House of Lords on traditional common 
law as opposed to international human rights law in evaluating derogation). The 
substantive provisions of the European Convention have also been incorporated 
into UK domestic law as part of the Human Rights Act 1998; as such, the Home 
Secretary also made a Designated Derogation Order with regard to Article 5(1). 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001/3644 
(U.K.). 
327.  Media accounts of the detainees, the allegations they faced, and the 
proceedings against them can be found online, including Who are the Terror 
Detainees, BBC News, Mar. 11, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/1/hi/uk/4101751.stm; Vikram Dodd, The 11 Belmarsh Detainees  
Likely to be Freed, Guardian, Mar. 11, 2005, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/mar/11/terrorism.september111; Philippe 
Naughton, Judge Grants Bail to Belmarsh Terror Detainees, Times Online, Mar. 
10, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article423891.ece. 
328.  A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 127. See 
Shah, supra note 317 at 413, describing how, in finding the detention of the 
Belmarsh suspects violated the ECHR, Lord Bingham, the author of the majority 
opinion, relied upon the test set forth in R (S) v. Chief Constable of the 
South Yorkshire Police, [2004] UKHL 39, ¶ 42, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 2196, 
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to the Lords’ ruling was to repeal Part 4 of the ATCSA and introduce 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 2005, providing for “control 
orders” to be used to proscribe the movements of “undeportable” 
terror suspects.329 Against this legislative backdrop, and in the 
aftermath of the July 7, 2005 bombings, the Terrorism Act of 2006 
was enacted. The Terrorism Act of 2006 provides that UK authorities 
may detain, without charge, persons suspected of involvement in 
terrorist or terrorism-related activities for an initial period of forty-
eight hours, and, with judicial authorization, may detain those 
persons for an additional period of up to, but not exceeding, twenty-
eight days.330 The basis for detaining an individual may not, however, 
 
2212 (“(1) Do the facts fall within the ambit of one or more of the [ECHR] rights? 
(2) Was there a difference in treatment in respect of that right between the 
complainant and others put forward for comparison? (3) If so, was the difference 
in treatment on one or more of the proscribed grounds under article 14 [including 
nationality or immigration status]? (4) Were those others in an analogous 
situation? (5) Was the difference in treatment objectively justifiable in the 
sense that it had a legitimate aim and bore a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality to that aim?”). For a detailed discussion of the Belmarsh case, see 
John Ip, The Rise and Spread of the Special Advocate, 2008 Pub. L. 717, 723–24 
(discussing the Belmarsh case as an example of the use of a security-cleared 
special advocate to challenge in a closed session evidence that the state refuses on 
security grounds to show to a defendant or defense counsel). 
329. Paragraph 13 of the Explanatory Notes to the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.), states that control orders may be imposed on individuals of 
any national origin who are suspected of being involved with terrorism and are 
considered to be a threat to public safety. As Shah explains, two types of control 
order were envisaged by the Act: (1) derogating control orders—i.e. control orders 
requiring a derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR, which were to be used only for 
those individuals who are considered to pose a high risk to public safety 
and security, in instances where such risk is associated with a public 
emergency; and (2) non-derogating control orders—i.e. control orders that the 
Home Secretary could request, requiring a preliminary hearing (potentially ex 
parte) in the High Court, at which a judge of that court would ascertain whether 
there “is a prima facie case for the order to be made” by the Home Secretary.  If 
so, the High Court would authorize the order and order a full inter parties 
hearing, at which the court would either revoke the order or confirm its 
continuance for a period of up to six months. Thereafter, the Home Secretary 
would be required to renew the application for the control order, otherwise it 
would lapse.  Shah, supra note 317 at 418. 
330. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, 
sched. 8 (Eng.). In 2008 Prime Minister Gordon Brown attempted to raise the 
period of pre-charge detention from 28 to 42 days. The bill passed in the House of 
Commons by a slight margin, but was defeated in the House of Lords. See 
Nicholas Watt, Brown Abandons 42-Day Detention After Lords Defeat, Guardian, 
Oct. 14, 2008, at 1. The 28 day period of detention is supposed to be investigative, 
rather than punitive—in practice, many individuals who are detained under this 
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take into account an individual’s immigration status. During the 
initial reading of the bill, the government proposed an amendment to 
the bill allowing for the detention, without charge, of a terrorist 
suspect for a period of up to ninety days—with judicial review of the 
detention every seven days by a High Court judge, sitting in 
camera—an increase of seventy-six days to the existing term of 
fourteen days permitted by the Terrorism Act of 2000.331 The House 
of Commons rejected this amendment, eventually passing an 
amendment permitting the period of pre-charge detention to be 
extended up to twenty-eight days, subject to stringent judicial 
review.332 
The House of Lords rejected the immigration detention 
framework of preventive detention because it was incompatible with 
the United Kingdom’s pre-existing human rights commitments under 
the Article 5(1) of the European Convention, as well as Article 9 of 
the ICCPR.333 The provisions expressly prohibit arbitrary detention, 
and the Lords interpreted immigration detention without charge, 
trial, or opportunity for repatriation as “arbitrary” within the terms 
of both treaties.334 This interpretation of the United Kingdom’s treaty 
commitments seems equally applicable to other state parties to both 
the Convention and the ICCPR, demonstrating just one (of many) of 
the potential pitfalls of the immigration detention framework of 
preventive detention. 
 
provision are released without charge. See Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Thirteenth Report): Counter-
Terrorism Bill, 2007-8, H.L. 172, H.C. 1077, at 11–13 (noting that detention for 
more than 14 days had not been used within the last year, had “only ever been 
used in a handful of cases,” and resulted in release without charge in three 
cases). See also Brice Dickson, The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain, 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 927, 952 (2009) 
331. See Ben Russell & Nigel Morris, Blair Renews Battle for 90-Day 
Detention of Terror Suspects, Independent, Nov. 17, 2006, at 22. 
332. The 28-day limit, proposed by David Winnick, MP, went into force on 
July 25, 2006. See Matthew Tempest, Blair Defeated on Terror Bill, Guardian, 
Nov. 9, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/nov/09/uksecurity.terrorism 
(reporting the defeat of the 90-day proposed limit and the renewal of Winnick’s 
proposal); The Terrorism Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order, 2006, S.I. 
2006/1936 c. 64 (U.K.) (setting July 25, 2006 as the date for entry into force of the 
new detention limit). 
333. See A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 124–28. 
334. Id. 
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D. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Immigration 
Detention Framework 
It would be tempting to see the the approach of countries 
found within the immigration detention framework as occupying the 
middle ground between the pre-trial detention framework countries’ 
“business as usual” approach to detaining terrorist suspects, and the 
extreme deference to the executive’s power to detain suspected 
terrorists found within the national security detention framework 
countries. After all, the immigration detention framework approach, 
incorporates some fundamental protections of detainees’ rights—such 
as prompt notification of charges,335meaningful judicial review,336and 
unfettered access to counsel337—and as such may satisfy many 
concerns about granting terrorist suspects due process of law, while 
simultaneously acknowledging that terrorist suspects are “different” 
and as such require different practices and procedures. Thus, the 
“middle ground” occupied by the Canadian, South African, and New 
Zealand systems of immigration detention for terrorist suspects, 
might be seen as a “realistic” or “flexible” approach detaining 
terrorist suspects without charge or trial. However, such an 
argument ignores the fundamental point that the immigration 
detention framework is not simply a middle ground between the pre-
trial detention framework and the national security detention 
framework—it is not in the middle, but rather is orthogonal, based in 
an entirely separate source of law.338 The immigration detention 
framework does not represent an attempt by the nations who have 
adopted it to moderate between two extremes of detainee treatment, 
but rather represents their choice to locate their authority to detain 
 
335. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
336. Id. 
337. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
338. In each of the countries surveyed in this Article, immigration law is a 
specialized field of administrative law, distinct from the criminal justice system, 
as well as from the systems of martial law or the state of emergency powers that 
may be deployed in the interests of national security.  In most nations surveyed, 
the immigration system is governed by distinct statutory provisions, which are 
separate and apart from the penal code.  The immigration system thus operates 
parallel to the regular criminal justice system, with a cadre of specialized 
immigration judges or adjudicators whose powers are different from those of the 
judiciary who preside in regular courts, and in whose courtrooms or tribunals 
different procedures are employed and different rights of confrontation and 
appeal are available. For a comprehensive overview of the key differences 
between the sources of immigration law and criminal law in the United States, 
see Ira J. Kurzban, Kurzban’s Immigration Law Sourcebook 1–20 (11th ed. 2005). 
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terrorist suspects in a wholly different source of legal authority: 
immigration law.339 To advocate for the United States to adopt an 
immigration detention framework approach would be to disregard 
the views taken by scholars, advocates, and jurists within existing 
immigration detention framework countries, as well as the overriding 
lesson from the United Kingdom’s experience. 
Some American scholars approvingly point to the fact that 
the cornerstone of the immigration framework countries’ systems is 
the role played by the judiciary.340 As discussed supra, in each of the 
immigration framework countries, professional jurists are the 
ultimate arbiters of the fate of individuals held in detention.341 
Judges and magistrates, either sitting in camera or in open court, 
make the first determination about the validity of an individual’s 
detention, conducting regular subsequent review, and the decisions 
that they make may be appealed up to the highest court in the 
land.342 The involvement of the judiciary in the process of preventive 
detention within the immigration detention framework nations is 
thoroughgoing, and some U.S. scholars perceive that involvement as 
conferring a considerable degree of legitimacy on the proceedings.343 
However, while the central role played by the independent judiciaries 
of the immigration detention framework countries has led external 
commentators to praise their systems of preventive detention, the 
jurists within the systems have often been their own harshest critics. 
The position taken by the New Zealand Supreme Court in the Zaoui 
case demonstrates the degree to which the very jurists charged with 
perpetuating the immigration detention framework system question 
 
339. It is nonetheless worth noting that, in many of the countries surveyed 
in this Article, in the wake of 9/11, the boundaries between these three 
theoretically distinct areas of law are beginning to blur, with the criminalization 
of certain immigration offenses or the use of immigration law itself to attain 
national-security related goals. For a discussion of this phenomenon in the 
Canadian context, see Anna Pratt, Securing Borders: Detention and Deportation 
in Canada 196–199 (2005). 
340. See Guiora, supra note 16, at 833 (cataloging the ways in which courts 
interact with detained terrorists in the United States, Israel, Russia, India, and 
Spain, and describing the United States’ enemy combatant paradigm as, initially 
at least, a “clear policy failure” for failing to bring accused terrorists before an 
independent court). 
341. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
342. Id. 
343. Cf., e.g., Ip, supra note 32, at 869 (criticizing detention regimes based 
on immigration status, but noting with approval the availability of judicial 
review). 
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the wisdom of using immigration detention as a “tool” in the war on 
terror.344 The House of Lords spoke even more clearly in the 
Belmarsh cases, when it ruled in an 8-1 decision that treatment of 
terrorist suspects should be predicated neither on their immigration 
status nor their identity as citizens or non-nationals.345 
The current statutory regime in the United Kingdom 
suggests that, in the future, “preventive detention” in the current 
immigration detention framework countries may trend towards 
convergences with the “penal code plus” models of France and Spain. 
Highlighting the many points of departure between their nations’ 
treatment of regular criminal suspects and terrorist suspects, 
domestic critics of the immigration detention framework of 
preventive detention argue that this convergence should occur 
immediately. 
IV. THE NATIONAL SECURITY DETENTION FRAMEWORK 
The remaining approach to the detention of terrorist suspects 
adopted by the countries surveyed in this Article is the “national 
security detention framework,” so called because terrorist suspects 
are held pursuant to constitutional provisions, executive decrees, or 
statutes passed in the name of national security in response to the 
existence of a state of national emergency. This framework contains 
the largest and most divergent group of countries, encompassing 
nations with a wide variety of legal, cultural, linguistic, and social 
traditions. Yet, for all their differences, when each of these countries 
is measured against the taxonomy developed here, common threads 
emerge in their approach to the detention of terrorist suspects, 
securing them a place in this category. Kenya, India,346 Mozambique, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, and Zambia are all 
 
344. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
345. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 69. 
346. The inclusion of India within this framework is based upon the 
attributes of the Indian preventive detention regime when measured against the 
taxonomy. This is, however, by no means an uncontroversial interpretation of the 
shape of the Indian preventive detention regime. Derek Jinks, for example, 
expressly rejects the thesis that India’s preventive detention laws are emergency-
based. See Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency: 
Preventative Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 Mich. J. Int’l L. 311, 
340–50 (2001). 
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countries whose detention of terrorist suspects fit unequivocally into 
the national security detention framework. 
Two countries—Australia and Israel—prove more difficult to 
classify within a single detention framework. This is perhaps 
inevitable, as the three categories of pre-trial detention framework, 
immigration detention framework, and national security detention 
framework are, as discussed supra, somewhat artificially bounded; 
countries in one group may share many characteristics with 
countries in another, and no single criterion should be regarded as a 
definitive category determinant. Australia and Israel demonstrate 
this point clearly: both countries mandate a number of the 
procedural protections for terrorist suspect detainees that are 
available in the pre-trial detention countries, but both countries also 
employ a version of national security detention that is extremely 
rights-violative. In Israel’s case this is further complicated by the fact 
that the state runs two separate schemes of detention for terrorist 
suspects—one in Israel proper, and the other in the Occupied 
Territories—and applies two different standards for detainees—one 
for Israeli citizens and the other for non-citizens.347 Much of the 
Israeli system is therefore identity-based, and thus also shares some 
characteristics of the detention scheme in operation in the 
immigration detention framework nations; yet, the system used by 
Israel in the Occupied Territories is predicated upon an occupation 
under the laws of war, a legal basis that warrants Israel’s inclusion 
in the national security detention framework.348 In line with the 
methodology outlined in Part I of this Article, Australia and Israel 
have been classified according to the most rights-violative approach 
that each country adopts to the detention of terrorist suspects, and 
have therefore been classified as falling within a special “mixed” 
subset of the national security detention framework. 349 As such, 
 
347. Israel applies a two-track approach to Palestinians suspected of 
having committed acts of terrorism. Following the June 1967 Six-Day War, the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) established military courts in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip for the purpose of trying Palestinians residing in either area 
suspected of having committed acts of terrorism. 
348. See Guiora, supra note 16 at 817–18 (“Israel applies a two-track 
approach to Palestinians suspected of having committed acts of terrorism. 
Following the June 1967 Six-Day War, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
established military courts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for the purpose 
of trying Palestinians residing in either area.”) 
349. I use the term national security detention framework (“mixed”). This 
designation is reflected in the grayscale-coding in both Table I and Map I found 
within the Appendix. 
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Australia and Israel will be discussed in Part IV alongside the other, 
more rights violative national security detention framework 
countries. 
A. Key Characteristics of the National Security Detention 
Framework Countries 
This section of the Article will examine the eight key 
characteristics of the national security detention framework 
countries’ “preventive detention” regimes. 
(i) Legal basis for detention: In many, but not all, national 
security detention framework nations, the original authorization for 
the detention of terrorist suspects without charge or trial can be 
traced to the nation’s founding documents. India, Pakistan, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Mozambique, Kenya, and Trinidad & Tobago 
all have constitutions containing some kind of express provision for 
preventive detention.350 In some countries, such as Trinidad & 
Tobago, the constitution grants wide latitude to the executive to 
“make provision for the detention of persons” at times of national 
emergency.351  In other countries, the legislature is required to make 
this determination—for example, article 64 of the Constitution of 
Mozambique states that preventative detention (prisão preventiva) 
“shall be permitted only in  cases provided for by the law, which shall 
determine the duration of such imprisonment.”352 This language 
confers a broad degree of latitude on the legislature to define “the 
law” including “determin[ing] the duration of such imprisonment.”353 
In other nations, constitutions authorize the legislature to enact 
“preventive detention” legislation in more tightly defined 
circumstances, albeit while retaining exceptions for detention by the 
executive, if the executive declares a state of emergency. Article 149 
of the Singapore constitution, for example, states that any such 
statute must contain an explanation of the ways in which the 
 
350. See, e.g., India Const. art. 246; Constitution of the Republic of 
Mozambique art. 64; Constitution of Kenya § 83; Constitution of Malaysia art. 
151; and Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago § 7. 
351. Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago § 7 (2) (“Without 
prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) regulations made under that 
subsection may, subject to section 11, make provision for the detention of 
persons”). 
352. Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique art. 64; Open Society 
Initiative for Southern Africa, Mozambique: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law 
29, 104–105 (2006). 
353. Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique art. 64. 
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security of Singapore has been prejudiced or that violence, the 
excitement of disaffection towards the President or the government, 
the promotion of racial or class tensions, or an alteration to the law 
by unlawful means has occurred or been threatened.354 
In other national security detention framework countries, 
there is no constitutional grant allowing the executive to detain 
suspects in preventive detention, but legislation conferring powers of 
administrative detention was passed during the 1960s, 1970s, and 
early 1980s—in many instances during periods of post-colonial era 
political unrest—and neither the courts nor the executive have 
disavowed these statutes. Thus, in Zambia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, 
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Swaziland, a body of laws has developed 
permitting detention without charge or trial.355 A typical example of 
this trend is Sri Lanka, where section 9 of the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1979 stipulates that the 
Minister in charge of the Act may order detention where he has 
“reason to believe or suspect that any person is connected with or 
concerned in any unlawful activity.”356 
In some instances the statutes conferring the power to hold 
individuals in “preventive detention” were drafted with a particular, 
narrow range of offenses in mind, in other cases “preventive 
detention” statutes have been construed broadly. Hence, in Tanzania, 
“preventive detention,” which was initially authorized in 1962 in the 
interests of the preservation of national security,357 has reportedly 
been used to detain suspects alleged to have been involved in “illegal 
 
354. Constitution of the Republic of Singapore art. 149–151. The 
constitution of Malaysia uses almost identical phraseology. Constitution of 
Malaysia art. 151 
355. See, e.g., Preservation of Public Security Act of 1960, sec. 3(3), 2 L. 
Rep. of Zambia Ch. 106 (Zambia); Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 48 (1979) ch. 
30, s. 9(1) (Sri Lanka); Special Powers Act 1974, sec. 3 (Bangl.), reprinted in 
A.N.M. Khaled Chowdhury, Law on Women With Special Powers Act 111 (1987); 
State Security (Detention of Persons) Act, (1983) Cap. 414, s. 1 (Nig.); 
Preventative Detention Act, 1962, No. 60, s. 2–4, available at 
http://www.parliament.go.tz/Polis/PAMS/Docs/60-1962.pdf (Tanzania); Detention 
Order, No. 1 of 1978, § 2(1) (Swaziland). 
356. Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 48 (1979) ch. 30, s. 9 (Sri Lanka). 
357. The Preventive Detention Act, 1961, No. 60, available at 
http://www.parliament.go.tz/Polis/PAMS/Docs/60-1962.pdf (Tanzania). Preventive 
detention is also permissible in Tanzania for individuals held pending 
deportation or removal. Deportation Ordinance, (1921) Cap. 38, s. 5; Expulsion of 
Undesirables Ordinance, (1930) Cap. 39, s. 7. 
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brewing” or “cattle rustling,”358 and in Nigeria, “preventive 
detention,” which, under the State Security Act of 1984, may be used 
to detain individuals who have “contributed to the economic 
adversity of the nation,” has apparently been deemed to cover those 
suspected of involvement in “currency-trafficking, armed robbery, 
forgery, stealing, conspiracy, obtaining money under pretence, and 
receiving stolen goods.”359 Detention without charge or trial is also 
frequently permitted for those suspected of smuggling goods or 
currency, perhaps reflecting yet another overlap between 
immigration status or suspected violations of border crossing and 
immigration law and administrative detention.360 In other national 
security detention framework countries, the legislative grant is more 
generalized, as in Kenya, where the Preservation of Public Security 
Act authorizes the use of “preventive detention” when the 
government deems it may be needed for the “preservation of public 
security.”361 In Russia, the constitution contains specific provisions 
for permitting suspension of individual rights during the imposition 
of a state of emergency,362 which have been built upon and broadened 
in successive anti-terrorism legislation passed in 1998 and 2006. 363 
The judiciary in some national security detention framework 
countries also plays a role in the creation or validation of provisions 
permitting detention without charge or trial. In Zambia, the nation’s 
Supreme Court expanded the definition of “threats to national 
security” that justify “preventive detention” to economic crimes, such 
as illegal trafficking in and smuggling of semi-precious stones, 
elephant tusks, rhino horns, and mandrax, as well as the illegal 
export of foreign exchange and thefts of copper cathodes, cobalt, and 
spare parts from mining companies.364 In Sri Lanka, the Supreme 
 
358. Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7, at 28. 
359. See Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7, at 28; State Security 
(Detention of Persons) Act, (1983) Cap. 414, s. 1 (Nig.). 
360. See, e.g., Indian Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of 
Smuggling Act, No. 52 of 1974; India A.I.R. Manual (1974), v. 7, (enabling central 
and state governments to detain a person for the purpose of preventing 
smuggling or conduct prejudicial to conservation of foreign exchange). 
361. Preservation of Public Security Act, (1960), Cap. 57, s. 4 (Kenya). 
362. Constitution of Russia, art. 56 (“individual restrictions of rights and 
liberties with identification of the extent and of their duration may be instituted 
in conformity with the federal constitutional law under conditions of the state of 
emergency”). 
363.  Federal Law on Counteracting Terrorism 2006; Federal Law on 
Combating Terrorism 1998. 
364. See Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7, at 282–83 (discussing the 
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Court also has a longstanding practice of authorizing the broad use of 
“preventive detention” as a tool of law enforcement and terrorism 
prevention. In the early 1990s, the Court held that, during periods of 
crisis preventive detention is not a per se violation of basic 
constitutional liberties, provided that the government is able to 
demonstrate that it is not employing preventive detention in an 
arbitrary or oppressive manner.365 
The legal basis for “preventive detention” in each of the 
national security detention framework countries is therefore slightly 
different, varying according to the branch of government involved 
and the specificity of the constitutional, statutory, or common law 
grant. The powers granted the executive, and the checks and 
balances upon the executive’s exercise of such powers range widely. 
Under the “straight” national security detention country of 
Swaziland, with the King’s approval, the Prime Minister has the 
power to detain any person without further review if “he deems it 
necessary in the public interest.”366 Additionally, in 2008, a new law 
was passed in Swaziland authorizing members of the judiciary to 
issue preventive detention orders for suspected terrorists.367  Under 
the “mixed” national security detention country of Israel,368 the legal 
basis for administrative detention of terror suspects is found in the 
Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945369 and the Emergency 
Powers (Detention) Law of 1979.370 Detention orders are initially 
 
Zambian case Rao v. Attorney General, S.C. Judgment No. 30 (1987) 
(unreported)). 
365. See Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7, at 27 (discussing Saman 
Wicremabandu v. Herath and Others, [1990] 2 SRI L.R. 348, 349 (Sri Lanka)). 
366. Detention Order of 1978 s. 2(1) (Swaziland). 
367. Suppression of Terrorism Act (Bill No. 5 of 2008) (April 11, 2008) art. 
23 (Swaziland). 
368. See, e.g., Guiora, supra note 16, at 819–824 (describing Israel’s two-
track detention system that allows a suspected terrorist either to be tried before a 
military court if the act is “evidence-based” or be “administratively detained” 
based on “intelligence information”). 
369. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, Palestine Gazette No. 1442 
(Sept. 27, 1945). Because international law does not permit an occupying power 
to eliminate existing laws, Israel inherited the laws introduced under the British 
Mandate (1917-1948) when it occupied the West Bank in 1967. See Guiora, supra 
note 16, at 819 n.76. 
370. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5738-1979, 33 LSI 89 (1978-79) 
(Isr.). 
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reviewed by military judges, whose decisions can be appealed up to 
the High Court of Justice.371 
In Australia, the Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2) of 2005 
introduced two new divisions into the Criminal Code allowing 
Control Orders and Preventive Detention Orders (hereinafter PDOs) 
to be issued against individuals for the purpose of preventing 
terrorist activity.372 These orders are not predicated on immigration 
status, nor are they issued pursuant to an ongoing investigation 
leading to trial; they are solely determined by national security 
concerns. Senior members of the Australian Federal Police 
(hereinafter AFP) are permitted to issue an initial PDO ordering the 
detention of a suspect for up to twenty-four hours,373 and to issue 
continued PDOs, which may last for a further period of up to forty-
eight hours from the time when the suspect was first detained.374 
Australian state and territorial governments have also enacted 
similar provisions to permit “preventive detention” and control 
orders.375 These so-called “preventive procedures,” and the limited 
 
371. Guiora, supra note 16, at 821 (noting, however, that neither the 
detainee nor his attorney have the right to examine the information on which the 
detention order is based). See also HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander  
in the West Bank [2002-2003] IsrLR 173, 206, available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/390/032/A04/02032390.a04.pdf (holding that 
initial judicial review should occur as quickly as possible after a decision to  
detain is made); HCJ 5784/03 Salama v. IDF Commander in Judea &  
Samaria [2002-2003] IsrLR 289, 295, available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/03/840/057/a05/03057840.a05.pdf (holding that 
decisions to order administrative detention or to extend an administrative 
detention require judicial review); see also Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7 at 
28. 
372. Criminal Code Act, 1995, c. 5, div. 104, 105, as amended by Act No. 
144, 2005. The control order regime is found in Division 104 of the Code, and the 
regime for PDOs is in Division 105. 
373. Id. § 105.8. 
374. Id. § 105.14. 
375. See, e.g., Terrorism (Police Powers) Act, 2002, pt. 2A, div. 2, sec. 26D 
(1)(a–c) (N.S.W.); Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act, 2005, pt. 2, div. 1 sec. 
8(3)(a–c), (Queensl.) (using the same language as the New South Wales statute); 
Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act, 2005, pt. 2 sec. 6 (1)(3)(a–c) (S. Austr.); 
Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act, 2005, pt. 2, sec. 5 (1)(a–b) (Tas.); 
Terrorism (Community Protection Act), 2003, pt. 2A, div. 1, sec. 13E(1)(a–b) 
(Vict.); Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act, 2006, pt. 2, sec. 13(1)(a–b) (W. 
Austr.); Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary Powers) Act, 2006, pt. 2, div. 2.3 
sec. 18 (1)(a–d) (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act, 2003, pt. 
2B, div. 2, sec. 21G(1)(a–b) (N. Terr.) (all of which allow preventive detention for 
up to 14 days if a court finds reasonable grounds that a subject is planning to 
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rights available to individuals detained pursuant to PDOs, ensure 
that Australia’s regime fits within the national security detention 
framework, although the limited period of time during which an 
individual may be detained separates Australia from almost every 
other national security detention nation. 
(ii) Notification of charges: Within the national security 
detention framework countries, there is, as their vastly divergent 
legal bases for “preventive detention” suggest, considerable variance 
in the methods used to inform detainees of the reasons they are being 
held, and the time period that elapses before that notification is 
given. In both Malaysia and Singapore, there is no specified 
timeframe within which a detainee held in “preventive detention” 
must be informed of the factual allegations relating to his 
detention—the guidelines simply state “as soon as possible.”376 In 
Russia, under the 2004 amendments to the criminal code, a terrorist 
suspect may be held in a pre-trial detention center (SIZO) for up to 
thirty days without charges being brought.377  In Swaziland, there is 
no official time limit by which a detainee must be told of the grounds 
for his detention under either the 1978 or 2008 laws, although under 
the 1978 law the grounds for detention were required to be published 
in the Government Gazette.378  In Nigeria, a detainee is entitled to be 
 
commit a terrorist act within 14 days, or if detention will substantially assist in 
preventing a terrorist act). For a comprehensive overview of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act (No. 2) of 2005, Control Orders, and Preventive Detention Orders, see Paul 
Fairell & Wendy Lacey, Preventative Detention and Control Orders Under Federal 
Law: The Case for a Bill of Rights, 31 Melb. U. L. Rev. 1072 (2007). 
376. Internal Security Act of 1960, ch. II s. 8(16) (Malay.), available at 
http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/INTERNAL_SECURITY_ACT_1960.pdf. See also Drew R. 
Atkins, Customary International Humanitarian Law and Multinational Military 
Operations in Malaysia, 16 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol’y J. 79, 97 (2007) (noting that the 
provisions allow the government to withhold the facts underlying the alleged 
necessity of detention). Internal Security Act, cap. 143, s. 9, available at 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?&actno=Reved-143& 
date=latest&method=part (Sing.). See also Michael Hor, Terrorism and the 
Criminal Law: Singapore’s Solution, 2002 Sing. J. Legal Stud. 30, 43 (2002). 
377. See Lev Levinson, Governance as a Counter-Terrorist Operation: Notes 
on the Russian Legislation Against Terrorism 7-8, available at 
http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/Levinson.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2009). See also U.S. 
Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, 2008 Human 
Rights Report: Russia (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2008/ /eur/119101.htm (describing how 
“defendants are provided a copy of their indictment, which describes the charges 
in detail” before trial). 
378. See Fairell & Lacey, supra note 375 at 1075 n.15, citing Detention 
Order of 1978 s. 2(1) (Swaziland). 
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informed within twenty-four hours of the “facts and grounds” for his 
detention.379  In Kenya, an individual may be held for five days 
without notification of the charges that he faces;380 in Zambia, this 
period extends to fourteen days, and, in Tanzania, India, 
Bangladesh, and Pakistan, the maximum period is fifteen days.381 
In Mozambique, an individual held in preventive detention is 
entitled to be informed “promptly” of the reason for his detention, but 
an exact time period is not specified.382 In Australia, a detainee held 
under an initial or continued detention order is entitled to be 
informed of the reasons for his detention “as soon as [is] 
practicable.”383 In Israel proper, a detainee is entitled to be told the 
general reasons for his detention during the first forty-eight hours he 
is in custody, although the specific basis of an accusation may only be 
given to a presiding judge who reviews his detention order; inside the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, the initial review period before an 
individual may be told of the accusations he faces extends up to eight 
days.384 
 
379. Constitution, art. 35(3) (Nigeria). 
380. Constitution, art. 83(2)(a) (Kenya). 
381. Zambia Const. (Constitution Act 1991) art. 26(1)(a); Preventative 
Detention Act, 1962, No. 60, s. 6, as amended by Act No. 2 of 1985, s. 7 
(Tanzania); Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, art. 33(5); 
Special Powers Act, 1974, § 8 (Bangl.); Constitution of Pakistan, (1973) art. 10; 
National Security Act, 1980, No. 65 of 1980, India Code, art. 3(4) (1980). In India, 
although the maximum period for notification of the grounds of detention is 
fifteen days, the Constitution stipulates that: “When any person is detained in 
pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, 
the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such 
person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the 
earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.”  India Const. 
art. 22(5).  India provides an interesting case study within the state of emergency 
framework. In 2004 the Indian parliament repealed the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act (POTA), which was often used to justify the incarceration without charge or 
trial of terrorist suspects for up to 180 days.  In the aftermath of the repeal, the 
President of India promulgated an ordinance to amend the Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act of 1967, and this more moderate instrument is still in force.  See 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act Amendment Ordinance, 2004. Human rights 
abuses under POTA were well documented and attracted near-universal 
condemnation. Yet, in the years since POTA’s repeal, individuals are still 
administratively detained under the terms of pre-existing legislation. See 
generally Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005, at 280 (Jan. 2005) available 
at http://www.hrw.org/ legacy/wr2k5 /wr2005.pdf. 
382. Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique art. 64. 
383. Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005 (Cth), pt. 5.3 div. 105, subdiv. B, sec. 105.28.  
384. See Stephanie Cooper Blum, Preventive Detention in the War on 
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(iii) Initial appearance / (iv) Period of detention without 
charge: A key characteristic of the national security detention 
framework nations is the period during which individuals may be 
held in preventive detention. In almost every country surveyed, it is 
theoretically possible to hold terrorist suspects indefinitely, and in 
many it is possible to do so without independent judicial review. 
Different criteria have to be fulfilled so that detention can continue 
in different countries, but in all cases, once these conditions are met, 
the detention may continue. In India, an individual may be held in 
preventive detention for three months without any charges being 
brought before any review is undertaken by an administrative 
Advisory Board.385 In Malaysia a detainee “shall be given the 
opportunity of making representations” against a detention order “as 
soon as possible” and those representations must be considered by an 
advisory board “within three months” of receipt “or within such 
longer period as the [head of state] may allow.”386  In Swaziland, 
under the 1978 order, an individual was entitled to administrative 
review of detention within sixty days, renewable every sixty days.387  
Under the 2008 Act, an individual may be held for up to seven 
days.388 In Nigeria, review is undertaken within six weeks, and every 
six weeks thereafter by a “Detention of Persons Review Panel” 
headed by the Attorney General.389  In Kenya, an administrative 
tribunal presided over by a person “qualified to be appointed as a 
judge of the high court” reviews the grounds for a detainee’s 
detention “not more than one month after the commencement 
of . . . detention,” with such review continuing “at intervals of not 
 
Terror: A Comparison of How the United States, Britain, and Israel Detain and 
Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects, IV Homeland Security Affairs (Oct. 2008), at 6 
(citing Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5738-1979, 33 LSI 89, §§ 4(a), 6(c), 
8(a) (1978-79) (Isr.); B’Tselem, Administrative Detention in Occupied Territories, 
The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, ¶2 (May  
2007), available at www.btselem.org/english/Administrative_Detention/Index.asp 
(noting that, although detainees may appeal the detention, neither they nor their 
attorneys are allowed to see the evidence); Matti Friedman, Not an Alternative to 
Criminal Justice, Jerusalem Post, November 14, 2005, at 96 (describing the 
practice and procedures of administrative detention). 
385. India Const. art. 22(4). 
386. Malaysia Const. art. 151 (1). 
387. Detention Order of 1978 s. 2(1) (Swaziland). 
388. Suppression of Terrorism Act (Bill No. 5 of 2008) (April 11, 2008) art. 
23 (4) (Swaziland). 
389. See State Security (Detention of Persons) Act, (1983) Cap. 414, s. 1 
(Nig.); State Security (Detention of Persons) Amended Decree no. 14 (1994). 
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more than six months.390 In Kenya, as in Bangladesh, indefinite 
detention is permissible with ministerial authorization.391 In Sri 
Lanka, the same is true, although a minister must renew the 
detention order on a monthly basis.392 In Trinidad & Tobago, the 
minister of national security may authorize indefinite preventive 
detention in the interests of national security; during that period the 
detainee may request review by “an independent and impartial 
tribunal” composed of “persons entitled to practice in Trinidad & 
Tobago as barristers and solicitors” but the detaining authority “shall 
not be obliged to act in accordance” with any recommendations made 
by the tribunal concerning “the necessity or expediency” of the 
detainee’s continued detention.393 In Singapore, a detainee may be 
held for up to two years when his detention is authorized by the 
President, and the authorization may be renewed every two years 
thereafter.394 The same is true in Malaysia, where detention is 
indefinitely extendable in two-year increments, even when the only 
justification is that contained in the initial order.395 Similarly, in the 
Occupied Territories, the initial detention order is valid for six 
months and is renewable every six months thereafter; as in 
Malaysia, there is no statutory time limit on the number of times the 
order may be renewed, and renewal may be predicated on the 
information contained in the original complaint.396 In Mozambique, 
detainees must be brought before a criminal investigative judge (juiz 
 
390. Constitution, art. 83(2)(c) (Kenya). 
391. Special Powers Act (1974), s. 3(2), in Law on Women With Special 
Powers Act, 113 (1987) (Bangl.); Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, No. 2 
(1960) s. 4 (Kenya). 
392. See GL Peiris, Chapter 13: Sri Lanka, in Harding & Hatchard, supra 
note 7, at 232. 
393. Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago § 11.  See also 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Trinidad & 
Tobago (2008). 
394. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & 
Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Singapore (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119056.htm. In contrast, there is a 
30-day limit on police-authorized detentions, and a Minister must receive a report 
after 14 days. Id. 
395. Internal Security Act of 1960, ch. II s. 8(7) (Malay.), available at 
http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/INTERNAL_SECURITY_ACT_1960.pdf; see also Atkins, 
supra note 376, at 97 n.124. 
396. See Guiora, supra note 16, at 819–20 (“Renewability requires a 
showing that the detainee continues to present a viable security threat. In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the basis for extension of the initial detention 
order is the same intelligence information that had served as the basis for the 
military commander's initial decision.”). 
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da instrução criminal) within a time period fixed by law to establish 
the legality of their imprisonment.397 Individuals may be held for 
forty-eight hours before their detention is reviewed by a criminal 
investigative judge, and for a further ninety days after that review.398 
In Russia, a detainee must be brought before a judge within forty-
eight hours, may be held for three further days thereafter during the 
initial investigation, and a terrorist suspect detainee may remain in 
a detention center (SIZO) for up to thirty days before formal charges 
are brought.399 In Australia, judges and Federal Magistrates acting in 
their personal capacity, members of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal, or retired judges must review whether or not a PDO can be 
extended after forty-eight hours up to a maximum of fourteen days.400 
In Israel proper, a detainee will be brought before a presiding 
magistrate within forty-eight hours of being taken into custody, in 
the Occupied Territories, the initial review period extends to eight 
days. 401 
 
397. Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique art. 64; Open Society 
Initiative for Southern Africa, Mozambique: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law 
104–105 (2006). 
398. See Malawi Law Commission, Human Rights Under the Constitution 
of the Republic of Malawi 26 (2006) (stating that in Mozambique “the maximum 
preventive imprisonment period is 48 hours and during this time the detainee 
has the right to have his case reviewed by judicial authorities . . . Where the 
penalty for the offense is 8 years or more they may be held for up to 84 days 
without formal charge and may, with judicial approval, further be held for two 
consecutive custody periods.”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices: Mozambique (2007) (reporting that “more than 500 detainees in 
the Maputo Central Prison (Machava) had been held beyond the 90-day 
preventive detention period.”). 
399. See Liberty Study, supra note 46, at 54, citing articles 91 and 94 of the 
Russian Criminal Procedure Code; Lev Levinson, Governance as a Counter-
Terrorist Operation: Notes on the Russian Legislation Against Terrorism 7-8, 
available at http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/Levinson.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2009). 
400. See Fairell & Lacey, supra note 369 at 1076, and n. 26; Criminal Code 
Act, 1995, c. 5, §§ 105.12, 105.18(2) (Austl.). 
401. See Stephanie Cooper Blum, Preventive Detention in the War on 
Terror: A Comparison of How the United States, Britain, and Israel Detain and 
Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects, IV Homeland Security Affairs (Oct. 2008), at 6 
(citing Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5738-1979, 33 LSI 89, §§ 4(a), 6(c), 
8(a) (1978-79) (Isr.); B’Tselem, Administrative Detention in Occupied Territories, 
The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, ¶2 (May  
2007), available at www.btselem.org/english/Administrative_Detention/Index.asp 
(noting that, although detainees may appeal the detention, neither they nor their 
attorneys are allowed to see the evidence); Matti Friedman, Not an Alternative to 
Criminal Justice, Jerusalem Post, November 14, 2005, at 96 (describing the 
practice and procedures of administrative detention). 
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(v) Access to counsel: The national security detention 
countries do not all adopt a similar approach to access to counsel or, 
rather, lack of access to counsel for detainees held in preventive 
detention. In India, Pakistan, Russia, and Zambia, there is an 
affirmative right to counsel. 402 In Kenya a detainee must be “afforded 
reasonable facilities to consult a legal representative of his own 
choice” who will be permitted to review the detainee’s case and make 
representations on his behalf to the administrative tribunal.403  In 
Swaziland, there is no right to counsel under the 1978 order, but a 
right to counsel during detentive questioning under the 2008 Act.404 
There is, however, no right to legal aid or government-funded counsel 
for detainees.405  In other national security detention framework 
countries, such as Malaysia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Tanzania, and Trinidad & Tobago, while there is a right to 
counsel for those accused of serious crimes within the regular 
criminal justice system, it is less clear whether that right extends to 
individuals held in preventive detention. 406 There is also a right to 
 
402.  The Indian Constitution, for example, provides for access to a lawyer. 
India Const. art. 22(4).  Those held in preventive detention, however, are 
frequently denied this right. See U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights & Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: India (Feb. 25, 2009), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2008/sca/119134.htm (“the law 
provides arrested persons the right to released on bail and prompt access to a 
lawyer; however, those arrested under special security legislation often received 
neither.”)  See also U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & 
Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Russia (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2008/ /eur/119101.htm (describing how “Prior 
to the interrogation, the detainee has the right to meet with an attorney for two 
hours” and how “the law provides for the appointment of a lawyer free of charge if 
a suspect cannot afford one; however, this provision was often ignored in 
practice.”) 
403. Constitution, art. 83(2)(d) (Kenya). 
404. Suppression of Terrorism Act (Bill No. 5 of 2008) (April 11, 2008) art. 
24 (10) (Swaziland). 
405. Constitution, art. 83(4) (Kenya) (“nothing . . . shall be construed as 
entitling a person to legal representation at public expense”). 
406.  See Malaysia Const. art. 5 (3) (guaranteeing right to counsel in 
regular criminal cases); Mozambique Const. art 100 (guaranteeing “the right to a 
defense and the right to legal assistance and aid”); Singapore Const. art. 9 (3) 
(“Where a person is arrested he . . . shall be allowed to consult and be defended by 
a legal practitioner of his choice.”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices: Nigeria (2008) (describing the right of suspects to “the 
opportunity to engage counsel”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices: Sri Lanka (2008) (“in all cases suspects ha[ve] the right to legal 
representation”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices: Tanzania (2008) (describing how “the law gives accused persons the 
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counsel in the two “mixed” framework countries, Australia and 
Israel; however, in Israel, there are severe limits on the access to 
that counsel.407 In Australia, individuals detained subject to PDOs 
are entitled to access to counsel,408 but the procedure for the issuance 
and continuance of PDOs is made ex parte by the detaining police 
officer.409 Neither the suspect nor his legal representative is entitled 
to challenge the initial issuance of the PDO, though there is an 
opportunity to be heard later in the application process.410 
(vi) Right to fair and public hearing: In the national security 
detention framework nations, there is no right to what Americans 
would recognize as a “fair and public hearing.” All administrative 
detention hearings in the national security detention framework 
countries are held in camera and often hearings or reviews are done 
purely on the paper record with neither the detainee nor his counsel 
present. Israel has the most transparent process of all of the national 
security detention nations. In Israel, a judge of the High Court 
conducts the hearing, the detainee has a right to be present, the 
detainee’s lawyer is entitled to argue, and the detainee himself is 
entitled to speak about the conditions of his confinement.411 This 
system has, nonetheless, been consistently criticized by Israeli 
human rights activists because of the restrictions on the detainee’s 
ability to confront his accuser and the attendant burden this places 
on defense counsel to use the hearing, which should be dedicated to 
presenting a case, to instead conduct a “fishing expedition” to 
 
right to contact a lawyer” although in practice the authorities denied this right at 
times); U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Trinidad 
& Tobago (2008) (describing right to counsel in regular criminal cases). 
407. Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings: The Implementation of Due Process 
Rights in the Military Courts in the Occupied Territories (Dec. 2007), 
http://www.yesh-din.org/site/images/BackyardProceedingsENG.pdf. 
408. Criminal Code Act, 1995, c. 5, § 105.37 (Austl.). See also Fairell & 
Lacey, supra note 375 at 1078. 
409. Criminal Code Act, 1995, c. 5, §§ 105.7, 105.11 (Austl.). See also 
Fairell & Lacey, supra note 375 at 1078. 
410. Criminal Code Act, 1995, c. 5, § 105.28 (Austl.) (excluding the right to 
challenge the initial issuance of a PDO from the list of rights of which a detained 
person must be informed). See also Fairell & Lacey, supra note 375 at 
1078. 
411. See B’Tselem, Absolute Prohibition: The Torture and Ill-Treatment of 
Palestinian Detainees, The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories 80 (May 2007) available at http://www.btselem.org/english/ 
Publications/Summaries/200705_Utterly_Forbidden.asp; Yesh Din, supra note 
407 passim. 
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establish the facts of the case against her client.412 In each of the 
other national security nations, however, terrorist suspect detainees 
enjoy even fewer procedural protections. In Russia, for example, 
although terrorist detainees held under the criminal code are granted 
a court hearing, the detainee may be tried and convicted in 
abstentia.413 
In each of the national security detention nations, save Israel 
and Russia, terrorist suspect detainees are not entitled to a court 
hearing. In most national security detention framework nations, 
administrative review boards are responsible for reviewing the basis 
and circumstances of terrorist suspects’ detention. In some countries, 
the boards are composed of lawyers and jurists, and in others the 
boards are composed of politicians, police officers, or other 
dignitaries.414 These boards meet in private and follow their own 
procedures; no rules of procedure are printed, and there is no 
consistent record of the extent to which due process is observed.415 
Some countries, such as Tanzania, permit board members to meet 
and interview detainees at their place of detention.416 Other nations, 
such as India, allow detainees to appear in person and call 
witnesses,417 but detainees who seek to do so may be cross-examined 
by the board, and may not be entitled to cross-examine the 
government’s witnesses.418 The greatest flaw of the board system, 
however, is not the lack of transparency, lack of due process, or the 
risk of self-incrimination without redress. Rather, the greatest flaw 
is the powerlessness of the boards. With the exception of Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, in each of the national security detention framework 
 
412. Guiora, supra note 16, at 820. 
413. See Federal Law on Counteracting Terrorism 2006, amending 
Criminal Procedure Code art. 247 (permitting in abstentia prosecutions); see also 
Lev Levinson, Governance as a Counter-Terrorist Operation: Notes on the Russian 
Legislation Against Terrorism, available at http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/Levinson.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2009).  The same act that provided for in abstentia trial and 
conviction also removed terrorism proceedings from the jurisdiction of jury trials.  
See U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, 2008 
Human Rights Report: Russia (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008//eur/119101.htm (describing how 
“supporters of the legislation justified it as an allegedly necessary measure in the 
war on terror.”) Individuals held under the administrative code (for example in 
immigration detention) are not entitled to a court hearing.  Id. 
414. Greer, supra note 47, at 29. 
415. Id. at 29–30. 
416. Id. at 30. 
417. Id. 
418. Id. 
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countries in which administrative review boards operate the 
detaining authorities are under no obligation to comply with the 
board’s decisions.419 Even if a board recommends that a detainee be 
released, after finding that the evidence against him is contrived, or 
insufficient to warrant his continued detention, the detaining powers 
are free to ignore the board’s recommendations. 
(vii) Judicial review: Judicial review or oversight of 
“preventive detention” varies considerably amongst the countries of 
the national security detention framework. In Australia, judges and 
federal magistrates acting in their personal capacity, members of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, or retired judges conduct 
individual reviews of the continued utility and legality of PDOs.420 In 
Israel, in contrast, there is a more formal and public system of 
judicial review. Once a military commander within the Occupied 
Territories has determined that an individual should be held in 
administrative detention, the commander’s decision is subject to 
review by a military appeals court judge.421 In India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh, senior judges also review the records of individuals held 
in preventive detention in their capacity as members of 
administrative review boards, and the judiciary has established its 
jurisdiction to review constitutionality of “preventive detention” 
provisions.422  In Trinidad & Tobago and Zambia, courts have 
 
419. Id. 
420. Criminal Code Act, 1995, c. 5 (Austl.) §§ 105.12, 105.18(2) (specifying 
that Australian judges are deemed to be acting in their “personal capacity” when 
they issue authorities for continued PDOs because Australian PDOs are 
categorized as administrative orders). See also Fairell & Lacey, supra note 375 at 
1086 (suggesting that the involvement of federal judicial officers, albeit 
in a personal capacity, in the making of PDOs implicates important 
constitutional questions). 
421. See B’Tselem, The Legal Basis for Administrative Detention, The 
Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 
http://www.btselem.org/english/Administrative_Detention/Israeli_Law.asp. As 
B’Tselem notes, “Several safeguards which exist in the Israeli law are absent 
from the system of administrative detention in the Occupied Territories. For 
example, the Israeli law requires that the detainee be brought before a judge 
within 48 hours and for periodic review every three months by the president of a 
District Court.”  Id. See also Guiora, supra note 16 at 821. 
422. See Greer, supra note 47, at 29 (describing procedures in Pakistan); 
Anil Kalhan et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism, and Security 
Laws in India, 20 Colum. J. Asian L. 93, 134–35 (2006) (describing non-
emergency procedures in India); Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh art. 33(4) (“No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise 
the detention of a person for a period exceeding six months unless an Advisory 
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similarly instituted judicial review of the administrative board’s 
decisions,423 and in Bangladesh the administrative review board’s 
decision is ultimately subject to judicial review that assesses the 
board’s ruling using a “reasonable person” standard.424 In Malaysia, 
in contrast, judicial review of preventive detention orders is highly 
circumscribed, and in 2003 the Federal Court ruled that “Malaysian 
courts should not intervene in matters of national security and public 
order.”425  In Nigeria, the State Security (Detention of Persons) Act 
authorizing preventive detention precludes judicial review, leaving 
detainees with recourse only to the Detention of Persons Review 
Panel, a body whose recommendations are not binding on the 
executive.426 In Mozambique, judicial review is undertaken by a 
criminal investigative judge (juiz da instrução criminal), who may 
authorize preventive detention for up to ninety days.427 In other 
national security detention framework countries, while there are 
provisions for judicial review and several levels of appeal within the 
regular criminal justice system, it is less clear whether that right 
extends to terrorist detainees held in preventive detention whose 
only recourse is to administrative review boards whose members may 
or may not have judicial experience.  In Kenya, an administrative 
tribunal is convened, composed not of professional jurists, but rather 
of senior police officers and members of the State Counsel, presided 
over by an individual “qualified to be appointed as a judge of the 
 
Board consisting of three persons, of whom two shall be persons who are, or have 
been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of the Supreme Court and the 
other shall be a person who is a senior officer in the service of the Republic.”). 
423. See Greer, supra note 47, at 32 (describing how, Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan, Trinidad & Tobago, and Zambia have “successfully instituted strong 
judicial review of preventive detention.”). 
424. See Greer, supra note 47, at 33, citing Aruna Sen v. Gov’t of 
Bangladesh, 27 DLR (1975) HCD 122, 137; S. Malik, Bangladesh in Harding & 
Hatchard, supra note 7 at 50-51. 
425. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 
Malaysia (2008) (also describing how the 1988 amendments to the Internal 
Security Act limited judicial review of detentions under the act). 
426. See State Security (Detention of Persons) Act, (1983) Cap. 414, s. 1 
(Nig.); State Security (Detention of Persons) Amended Decree no. 14, s.2(4) 
(1994); see also M. A. Owoade, Some Aspects of Human Rights and the 
Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria, in The Protection of Human 
Rights in African Criminal Proceedings, 187, n. 30. (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ziyad 
Motala eds., 1995). 
427. Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique art. 64; Open Society 
Initiative for Southern Africa, Mozambique: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law 
104–05 (2006);  U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 
Mozambique (2007). 
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High Court.”428  Judicial review of the tribunal’s recommendations is 
very limited—there is no right to appeal the tribunal’s conclusions 
regarding the grounds for an individual’s detention, and it is only 
possible to appeal to High Court if a detainee’s constitutionally 
guaranteed conditions of confinement or due process have been 
contravened.429 In Swaziland, under the 1978 Detention Order, 
detainees and their families were permitted to petition the monarch, 
seeking his personal review of the detention order, although the 
process for doing so is opaque.430 
(viii) Rules of interrogation: Rules governing the 
interrogation or detentive questioning of suspects held in national 
security detention also vary widely among the countries surveyed. 
Australia and Israel are the national security detention framework 
countries with the most robust protection against the torture of 
terrorist suspect detainees.431 Under President Aharon Barak, the 
Israeli Supreme Court ruled that it was never lawful to use violence 
or torture while interrogating a terrorist—even in a “ticking bomb” 
situation. 
[It] is the fate of a democracy [that] not all means are 
acceptable to it . . . not all methods employed by its enemies 
are open to it. Sometimes, a democracy must fight with one 
hand tied behind its back. Nonetheless, it has the upper 
hand. Preserving the rule of law and recognition of 
individual liberties constitute an important component of [a 
democracy’s] understanding of security. At the end of the 
day, [those values support] its spirit and strength [and its 
capacity to] overcome [the] difficulties.432 
Yet, despite the unequivocal language of the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
ruling, there have been continued allegations that the Israeli security 
services have committed human rights violations, including the use 
 
428. Constitution, art. 83(2)(c) (Kenya). See also J.B. Ojwang, Kenya, in 
Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7, at 115 (describing the composition of review 
tribunals in Ooko v. Republic of Kenya, High Court, Nairobi, Civil Case No. 1159 
of 1966 (unreported)). 
429. Constitution, art. 84 (Kenya). 
430. See Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7 at 29. 
431. On May 23, 2009 Australia became a signatory to the United Nations 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture. See Cynthia Banham, 
Australia Says No To Torture, Sydney Morning Herald (May 23, 2009), 
http://www.smh.com.au/national/australia-says-no-to-torture-20090522-bial.html. 
432. HCJ 5100/94, Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General 
Security Service’s Interrogation Methods [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817. 
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of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and torture, in the 
Occupied Territories.433 
Of the remaining national security detention framework 
countries, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, and the 
Russian Federation are full signatories of the Torture Convention 
(UNCAT),434 and India and Pakistan have signed, but not ratified, 
the Convention.435 However, the extent to which each of these nations 
abides by the principles of the Convention remains unclear, 
according to the records of the United Nations and human rights 
organizations.436 In Russia, for example, the country’s UNCAT 
commitments and constitutional provisions prohibit torture, but 
there are widespread accusations of custodial abuse.437  In 
Bangladesh, there is no domestic prohibition on torture or custodial 
abuse,438 although in September 2009 a bill was pending before 
Parliament to outlaw torture and custodial abuse entitled “the 
Torture and Custodial Death (Prohibition) Bill, 2009.”439 In Pakistan, 
although the law prohibits torture, coerced confessions are 
admissible in “antiterrorism courts” and there are reports of 
 
433. See, e.g., B’Tselem, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 411, at 33–34, 
59–60, 69–70 (reporting the findings of a study on Israel’s treatment of detainees 
and finding that Israel’s actions amounted to ill-treatment and, in some cases, 
torture, under international law). 
434. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. 100-
20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force, June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture 
Convention]. 
435. A full list of signatories to the Convention is available on the website 
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,  
at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Viewdetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9& 
chapter=4&lang=en. 
436. See, e.g., Jay Goodliffe and Darren G. Hawkins, Explaining 
Commitment: States and the Convention against Torture, 68 J. of Pol. 358 (2006) 
(providing a statistical analysis of the factors affecting the extent of a country’s 
commitment to the Torture Convention). 
437. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 
Russia (2008) (noting that “there were credible reports that law enforcement 
personnel engaged in torture, abuse and violence to coerce confessions from 
suspects and allegations that the government did not hold officials accountable 
for such actions.”) 
438. See Amnesty International, Bangladesh: Death in custody and reports 
of torture, AI Index: ASA 13/005/2007, 10 May 2007, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA13/005/2007/en. 
439. See Asian Human Rights Commission, Bangladesh: Torture and 
Custodial Death (Prohibition) Bill, 2009 is placed before Parliament, available at 
http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2009statements/2221/. 
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custodial abuse by the security forces.440  In some national security 
detention framework countries, such as Singapore, where the law 
prohibits mistreatment of detainees, allegations of custodial abuse 
are rare. 441  In other national security detention framework 
countries, such as India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, and Zambia, despite legal 
prohibitions on torture or grievous harm to detainees there are 
numerous allegations of torture and abuse by prison authorities. 442 
 
440. See U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & 
Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Pakistan (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2008/sca/119139.htm. 
441. See U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & 
Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Singapore (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2008/eap/119056.htm. 
442. See U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & 
Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: India (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/sca/119134.htm (describing “beating; 
electric shock; denial of food and water; rape; stripping; pins under nails; chili 
pepper inserted in body cavities; denial of medical treatment; and threats to 
harm children”); See U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & 
Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Kenya (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119007.htm (noting that “The 
constitution and law prohibit such practices; however, police frequently used 
violence and torture during interrogations and as punishment of pretrial 
detainees and convicted prisoners.”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights & Labor 2008 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: 
Trinidad & Tobago (2008) (Feb. 25, 2009)  (describing “credible reports that 
police officers and prison guards mistreated individuals under arrest or in 
detention.”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 
Malaysia (2008) (describing claims of “physical and mental abuse” by police); U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mozambique (2008) 
(describing “reports of death resulting from police torture”); U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sri Lanka (2008) (describing how 
the law makes torture a punishable offense with a mandatory sentence of not less 
than seven years imprisonment, but nonetheless “torture is widely practiced”); 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Swaziland 
(2008) (noting that the provision prohibiting torture “is located in the ‘policy’ 
section of the constitution and is not enforceable in any court or tribunal” and 
“reports that government officials sometimes used torture during interrogation” ); 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tanzania (2008) 
(describing beatings “as the method most commonly used.”); U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zambia (2008) (describing Human 
Right Commission’s finding that “police officers continue to rely on torture as an 
interrogation technique.”). 
2009] RETHINKING “PREVENTIVE DETENTION” 199 
B. Similarities and Differences between National Security 
Detention Framework Countries 
The countries within the national security detention 
framework appear at first glance to be widely divergent by any 
number of measures—they are geographically, culturally and 
linguistically distinct, they have different political systems, they 
belong to different transnational alliances, and they enjoy differing 
levels of economic development. Yet, there is one feature that almost 
all443 of the national security detention framework nations 
share: The territory that they occupy was once colonized by the 
British Empire. Australia, Israel, Kenya, India, Mozambique, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, and Zambia have all inherited, to 
differing degrees, the same common law traditions and common law 
precedents that have influenced the jurisprudence of the immigration 
detention framework nations and two of the criminal framework 
countries, the United Kingdom and Ireland. Yet, Australia, Israel, 
Kenya, India, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, and Zambia have all 
developed an approach to “preventive detention” grounded, to 
differing degrees, in emergency powers and executive deference. An 
exploration of the similarities and differences of the national security 
detention framework nations must therefore begin with an attempt 
to ascertain what common set of circumstances led these countries to 
develop this particular approach to preventive detention. 
Some commentators argue that the English wartime case, 
Liversidge v. Anderson,444 played a crucial role in the national 
security detention framework nations’ conception of “preventive 
detention.”445 In that case, a plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim was 
not entertained by the House of Lords on the grounds that, if the 
relevant cabinet minister claimed to have reasonable cause to believe 
detention was justified, the courts could not enquire further into the 
adequacy of the plaintiff’s detention.446 Considered in light of the 
great deference accorded ministerial decisions within the numerous 
 
443. The two exceptions are the Russian Federation and Mozambique 
(which was colonized by Portugal). 
444. Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] AC 206. 
445. See Harding, supra note 77, at 200 (discussing the influence of the 
Liversidge case on South East Asian courts in finding unreviewable by courts the 
executive’s decision to detain in national security situations). 
446. Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] AC 206, 282. 
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statutory provisions of national security detention framework 
countries,447 this argument is persuasive to some extent. However, 
Liversidge cannot be the whole story, for, since the 1960s, courts in 
some national security detention framework nations have been 
gradually overturning the legacy of Liversidge and distinguishing 
modern iterations of “preventive detention” from that undertaken by 
the House of Lords in the 1940s.448 
The legacy of colonialism itself, rather than one particular 
case, appears to provide a more compelling explanation of the 
persistence of the state of emergency model of “preventive detention” 
in many countries, with the obvious exceptions of Russia, which is 
sui generis,449 and Australia, which enjoyed a remarkably peaceful 
transition from colonial possession to Commonwealth status and 
independence. The economic disadvantages and the political 
instability in the immediate aftermath of withdrawal of colonial rule 
undoubtedly influenced the insertion of “preventive detention” 
 
447. See discussion supra Part IV. 
448. See, e.g., Steven Greer, Preventive Detention and Public Security: Law 
and Practice in Comparative Perspective, 23 Int’l J. Sociology of Law 45, 51 (1995) 
citing Harding, supra note 76 at 200 and Ghulam Jilani v. Gov’t of West 
Pakistan, PLD 1967 SC 373, 390 (holding that “reasonable grounds” not satisfied 
by executive insistence that such grounds existed); Abdul Baqi Baluch v. Gov’t of 
West Pakistan, PLD 1968 SC 313, 314 (observing that Pakistan’s Constitution 
requires the High Court to examine the basis for detention and distinguishing 
this requirement from English law); Gov’t of West Pakistan v. Bux Jatoi, PLD 
1969 SC 210, 219 (noting that, when a detention is challenged, the Provincial 
Government and Board must make its decision based on information regarding 
the basis for that detention); Mohammed Yunus v. Govt of Sindh, PLD 173 
Karachi 694, 709–10 (reviewing Indian Supreme Court jurisprudence and finding 
that the Court has the power to examine the Government’s basis for the 
detention and determine the reasonableness of the Government’s actions); Aruna 
Sen v. Gov’t of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 27 DLR (1975) HCD 122, 137 
(finding that “the dictum of subjective satisfaction as laid down in the majority 
decision in Liversidge v. Anderon has been whittled down to a large extent by 
confining its application to exceptional condition [sic] prevailing during 
wartime”). The Bangladesh High Court Division followed up with Ranabir Das v. 
Ministry of Home Affairs, 28 DLR (1976) HCD 48, 53 (holding that, when a 
detention is challenged as without basis or illegally mala fide, the detaining 
authority bears the burden of proving the need for continued detention). 
449. Russia was, of course, never subject to rule by a colonial European 
power, but rather asserted considerable imperial sway in Europe, the Middle 
East, and the Far East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See Dietrich 
Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Foreign and Domestic Policy 65–
66, 99–100, 186 (Bruce Little trans., 1987) (1977) (describing Russia’s 
involvement in the Balkans and its commercial and imperial expansion into 
Central Asia and East Asia). 
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clauses into some new nations’ constitutions,450 and the genuine 
states of national emergency prompted statutes to be passed to deal 
with crisis situations.451 In periods of political and economic 
uncertainty, tensions between different branches of government may 
become manifest, and the statutes promulgated by legislatures in 
some national security detention framework nations that expressly 
limit the extent of judicial review over preventive detention, may 
reflect the extent to which that tension was thoroughgoing.452 
A further legacy of the colonial era in the national security 
detention framework nations may be the political culture of the 
judiciary itself. In many of the national security detention framework 
countries, the role of the judiciary is heavily proscribed, and the 
judiciary is regarded as the weakest branch of government.453 In 
some national security detention framework countries, the courts 
emphatically avoid confrontation with the executive on detention 
issues.454 In others, judges attempt to craft a more activist role in the 
review of detention cases, but are immediately rebuffed by either the 
executive or the legislature.455 Australia and Israel are obvious 
 
450. See generally Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7, at 2, 41, 63 
(describing post-colonial unrest that sometimes accompanied the passage of 
detention laws, but noting that most of these regimes had originally been 
“introduced by British colonial governments”). 
451. The Defense Emergency Powers regulations in Israel are just one 
example of this phenomenon. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, Palestine 
Gazette No. 1442 (Sept. 27, 1945) (passed in the context of Mandate-era unrest). 
452. For example, see the Emergency Powers legislation passed in 
Malaysia, Singapore, and India in the 1960s. Internal Security Act of 1960, 
(Malay.), available at http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/INTERNAL_SECURITY_ACT_1960 
.pdf.; Internal Security Act (Sing.) available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non 
_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?&actno=Reved-143&date=latest&method=part; 
Defence of India Act, No. 51 (1962). 
453. See, e.g., Ali Khan, Pakistan Elections and the Lawyers’ Movement, 
JURIST, Nov. 21, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/11/pakistan-
elections-and-lawyers-movement.php (discussing resistance by Pakistani lawyers 
to General Pervez Musharraf’s suspension of the Constitution and attempts to 
intimidate the judiciary). 
454. For example, in Tanzania, courts have “shied away from investigating 
cases . . . [of preventive detention] . . . preferring to avoid a direct confrontation 
with the executive.” Y. Ghai, The Rule of Law, Legitimacy and Governance, 14 
Int’l J. of the Soc. of Law 179, 194 (1986) (also discussing Kenya and Uganda). 
455.  See Greer, supra note 448 at 51, describing how,  in Malaysia in the 
1980s, courts attempted to develop an “objective” test to determine whether or 
not individuals should be held for extended periods of time without trial or 
charge, but “were immediately reversed by legislation.”  See also Karpal Singh v. 
Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia, [1988] 1 M.L.J. 468, 472 
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exceptions to this argument. With the exception, however, of these 
two “mixed” countries, the courts in the state of emergency countries 
appear to be heavily circumscribed in terms of the measures they are 
permitted to take to investigate and adjudicate the claims of 
individuals held in preventive detention. An interrelated point is the 
extent to which the national security detention framework nations 
have developed common approaches to the procedures governing 
preventive detention. Restrained from addressing the substance of 
the detention cases passed to them for review, jurists in Bangladesh, 
for example, have argued that the slightest technical flaw is 
sufficient to invalidate an individual’s incarceration under an 
administrative detention statute.456 In India, the Supreme Court has 
consistently interpreted article 22(5) of the Constitution to 
incorporate procedural guarantees, and, as a result, has developed a 
“collateral” process of judicial review, albeit via Court members 
sitting on administrative review boards.457 However, in each of these 
instances, the judiciary is hamstrung, demonstrating the vast 
differences between the legal circumstances in the majority of the 
 
(establishing three circumstances when individuals cannot legally be detained—
(1) if the grounds for detention are based on mala fides, (2) if the stated grounds 
of detention are outside the scope of the enabling legislation, and (3) if doing so 
would fail to comply with condition precedent); Yit Hon Kit v. Minister of Home 
Affairs, [1988] 2 M.L.J. 638, 647–648 (expressing the court’s preference for an 
objective approach); Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs, [1989] 1 M.L.J. 
69, 82 (Ct. of App.) (calling for the application of an objective standard, stating 
that “all power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts 
should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power”). Nicole Fritz & 
Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia’s Internal Security Act, 26 Fordham 
Int’l L.J. 1345, 1410–1413 (2003) (addressing the reversal of rulings where courts 
acted to protect a detainee’s individual liberties). 
456. See Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7, at 35 (describing how jurists 
throw out cases on pretenses such as failure to use an official seal, omissions of 
relevant dates, mistakes in the detainee’s name, or failure to publish notice of 
detention in official government gazette). See also Press Release, Amnesty 
International, One Year On: Human Rights in Bangladesh Under the State of 
Emergency, AI Index PRE01/009/2008 (Jan. 10, 2008) (noting the weakness of the 
judiciary and the need to separate the judiciary from the executive branch). 
457. See Harding & Hatchard, supra note 7, at 36; see, e.g., Kamla v. State 
of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 814, 816–17 (holding that the law of preventive 
detention requires that the protections afforded under Art. 22(5) of the 
Constitution are complied with and that the procedure is just and reasonable); 
Shalini Soni v. Union of India, (1980) 4 S.C.C. 544, 549–551 (stating that, 
because Article 22(5) of the Constitution imposes obligations on the detaining 
authority that establish the sole procedural safeguards for detainees, it must be 
strictly observed). 
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national security detention framework countries and nations like the 
United States that have a strong, independent judiciary. 
C. The Advantages and Disadvantages of the National 
Security Detention Framework 
The purported “advantages” of the national security 
detention framework approach to the detention of terrorist suspects 
have been discussed at length by politicians, military strategists, 
academics, and popular commentators.458 One argument advanced by 
those in favor of national security detention is that it is crucial to 
protect society from suspected terrorists, a uniquely threatening 
group of “bad men,” even if the proof that they have committed or 
intended to commit a crime is insufficient for a court to charge or 
convict them.459 Others argue that the sensitivity of intelligence 
sources and techniques would be compromised if terrorists were 
brought to trial within the regular criminal justice system, 
necessitating specialized procedures in closed court rooms with lower 
standards of proof and prophylactic detention.460 This Article has 
attempted to show, by pointing to comparative examples, that such 
suggestions are ultimately unavailing. Yet, such arguments have 
received a considerable amount of traction in the mainstream media. 
Meanwhile, the disadvantages of national security detention remain 
under-explored. This section therefore provides a brief overview of 
the profound and thoroughgoing disadvantages of the national 
security detention framework. 
For individuals steeped in the Anglo-American notion of the 
“rule of law” and its attendant legal traditions, perhaps the most 
glaring feature of the national security detention framework is the 
extent to which it deviates wildly from established norms of due 
process and fair treatment. Under the national security detention 
 
458. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text. 
459. Clive Stafford Smith critiques this description of terrorist suspects in 
the title (and contents) of his account of his representation of Guantánamo 
detainees. Clive Stafford Smith, Bad Men 164–5 (2007) (published in the United 
States under the title The Eight O’Clock Ferry to the Windward Side: Fighting 
the Lawless World of Guantánamo Bay). 
460. This argument has been convincingly undermined by two former 
federal prosecutors. See Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 12, at 77–129 
(emphasizing the capacity of federal courts to handle terrorism cases); see also 
Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 771, 
803 (2008) (discussing how public proceedings contribute to the functioning of 
democracies and equality before the law). 
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framework, individuals may never know the precise details of the 
offense of which they stand accused; they may languish in prison for 
extended periods of time, without notification of the charges against 
them and without access to counsel; they may not be granted the 
“due process” to which criminal prisoners in the same country are 
entitled; they may not appear before a judge, but rather before a 
review board; they may not have a right of confrontation with their 
accusers; they may not have the right to question witnesses or 
present evidence; they may not be entitled to meaningful judicial 
review of the grounds on which they are detained; they may be held 
indefinitely, without reprieve, on the same grounds that they were 
initially captured and imprisoned; and, perhaps most shockingly, 
they may be tortured. However, despite the dissonance between the 
national security framework and the Anglo-American legal tradition, 
this approach to the detention of terrorist suspects is not only 
employed by the governments of Swaziland, Pakistan, and Zambia—
to name but three of the national security detention framework 
countries—but was also employed at Guantánamo Bay by the United 
States government during the Bush administration. 
The regime at Guantánamo provides further illustration of 
many of the ways in which the national security detention 
framework fundamentally deviates from settled Anglo-American 
legal norms. “Unlawful enemy combatants”461 have been held in 
Guantánamo for seven years without meaningful judicial review of 
their detention.462 The United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on detainees indicates a growing belief that individuals held in 
Guantánamo should be entitled to adequate judicial review,463 but 
 
461. Defined in part, somewhat ambiguously, by the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 as “a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully 
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part 
of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces).” Military Commissions Act of 2006 
§ 3, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006). 
462. See Andy Worthington, Seven Years of Guantánamo, Seven Years of 
Torture and Lies, Huff. Post, Jan. 11, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-
worthington/seven-years-of-guantanamo_b_156903.html. 
463. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that 
an American citizen classified as an enemy combatant is entitled to “notice of the 
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision maker”); Rasul v. Bush, 
542 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2004) (finding that aliens classified as enemy combatants 
on Guantánamo have the right to file a habeas petition challenging that status); 
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the Court has hesitated to articulate a vision for that view, beyond 
describing the inadequacies of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005464 
and the Military Commissions Act of 2006.465 
Some commentators have argued that the fact that 
Guantánamo detainees are not apprised of the charges against them 
has led to farcical situations in which individuals who could clearly 
demonstrate their innocence languished in jail for years, and were 
only freed after prosecutors broke the rules and inadvertently 
mentioned the reasons some detainees were being held.466 Others 
have pointed out that the lack of habeas corpus set out in the 
Detainee Treatment Act for the Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
(CSRT) process467 irreparably damages detainees’ future opportunity 
of ever mounting a reasonable defense, irrespective of the detainees’ 
guilt or innocence.468 Perhaps the most shocking element of the 
national security detention framework style system of “preventive 
detention” employed by the U.S. government in Guantánamo is the 
“inhumane treatment” employed by investigators in an attempt to 
elicit confessions from the detainees.469 Former Assistant Attorney 
 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008) (holding that prisoners held in 
Guantánamo have a constitutionally guaranteed right to habeas). 
464. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2780 
(2005) [hereinafter DTA]. 
465. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 948a (2006). The Act was passed by Congress in response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (invalidating 
certain sections of the DTA). 
466. For some examples of problems detainees faced as a result of the 
CSRT constraints, see Transcript of Oral Argument, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 
S.Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1195), available at www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/ 
2007/2007_06_1195/argument/ (noting that one detainee without counsel was not 
provided the name of the so-called terrorist with whom he was accused of 
associating, while the lawyer for another detainee was able to examine the CSRT 
record filed by the government to learn the name of the alleged terrorist 
association, and thus able to prove his client’s innocence). 
467. DTA § 1005(a)(1)(A) (authorizing the Secretary of Defense to establish 
procedures for combatant status review). 
468. See Jonathan Hafetz, Torture, Judicial Review, and the Regulation of 
Custodial Interrogations, 62 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 433, 461–62 (2007). 
469. See id. at 1413 (identifying “inhumane treatment” of prisoners as one 
of the “constellation of tactics that form a core of the [Bush] administration’s new 
preventive paradigm”). See also Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations 
of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006) (expressing concern about the lack of 
adequate due process under the Bush administration); Paul Reynolds,  
Chorus Mounts Against Guantánamo, BBC News, May 19, 2006, 
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General (now Judge) Jay Bybee’s infamous “torture memo” suggested 
that waterboarding, mock executions, physical beatings, and painful 
stress positions might not be illegal per se.470 The stories of detainees 
being forced to bark like dogs, urinate in their clothes, climb into 
backpacks, and sit in close proximity to naked or semi-naked 
women471 seem to be the very epitome of “inhumane treatment” in 
violation of the Torture Convention to which the United States is a 
signatory.472 
The international community, human rights advocates, and 
legal scholars have roundly condemned the laws and practices of 
countries that operate within the national security detention 
framework—including the regime employed by the United States.473 
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4997458.stm (describing the U.N. Committee 
Against Torture’s call for the closure of Guantánamo after abuses came to light). 
470. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, U.S. Assistant Attorney Gen., to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in The 
Torture Papers 172, 214 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) 
(arguing that “there is a significant range of acts that though they might 
constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to 
the level of torture”). Timothy Flanigan, President Bush’s nominee to be Deputy 
Attorney General, suggested before the Senate Judiciary Committee that these 
acts might not be illegal “depend[ing] on all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances” of each particular case. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination 
of Timothy Elliott Flanigan to be Deputy Attorney General Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 108, 111–12, 137–38 (2005) (written responses of 
Timothy Flanigan). 
471. Id. 
472. See Torture Convention, supra note 434, art. 16. 
473. See, e.g., Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz & Melissa Castan, The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and 
Commentary 312–19 (2d ed. 2005) (recounting several cases of inappropriate 
detention by Australia and the Netherlands); Human Rights Comm., Concluding 
Observations: Israel, ¶21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998) 
(expressing concern over the detention of Palestinians by Israeli military forces); 
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003) (indicating concern that “Palestinians in the 
occupied territories who remain under the control of Israeli security forces do not 
enjoy the same rights and freedoms as Jewish settlers in those territories”); 
Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1324/2004: Australia, ¶ 7(2), U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004 (Nov. 13, 2006) (discussing claim against the 
Australian government for arbitrary and indefinite detention); Human Rights 
Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States 
of America, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006) (expressing 
concern that the Bush Administration “may not offer adequate safeguards of due 
process” to detainees). See also Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality and 
the Rule of Law, 25 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 303, 303–04 (2002) (asserting 
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One of the Law Lords in the United Kingdom has even declared 
Guantánamo a “legal black hole” because of this rights-violative 
regime.474 As President Obama’s multi-agency task force ponders the 
future direction of U.S. policy with respect to terrorist suspect 
detainees, the members of the task force would be well advised to 
remember these criticisms and to recall the human rights violations 
and statutory and jurisprudential limitations of the vast majority of 
the countries who have taken a national security based approach to 
the “preventive detention” of suspected terrorists. 
CONCLUSION 
President Obama’s multi-agency task force is currently 
considering policy proposals from scholars and advocates who argue 
that the U.S. government should look to the precedent of other 
nations to help answer the question of whether the United States 
should formalize a system of “preventive detention” for suspected 
terrorists in the United States.475 This is the wrong question. All of 
the thirty-two countries surveyed in this Article (including the 
 
that the United States has pursued “a highly problematic armed conflict 
alternative to the criminal law paradigm, which is readily available to combat 
terrorist acts and threats”); Avril McDonald, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and 
the Jus in Bello, in Terrorism and International Law: Challenges and Responses 
57, 62 (Michael N. Schmitt & Gian Luca Beruto eds., 2002) (“Al Qaeda and other 
terrorist organizations must be defeated for the most part by detection (good 
intelligence) and by prosecution . . . under domestic criminal legislation.”); David 
Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights 
Analysis, 19 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 123, 136 (2006) (arguing that the detention of 
non-battlefield terrorism suspects not formally convicted of a crime violates 
human rights law); Michael Ratner, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, July 15, 
2007, at A12 (“No domestic or international law permits preventative detention 
[in the fight against terrorism].”). 
474.  Lord Johan Steyn, Guantánamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 Int’l & 
Comp. L. 1, 6–15 (2004) (arguing that the regime in Guatánamo is rights-
violative because it infringes on human rights to a degree disproportionate to the 
crisis). 
475.  See, e.g., Roach, supra note 25, at 2188–2203 (comparing the policies 
of Canada and the United Kingdom to argue that conflicts between rights and 
security should be resolved through rigorous, rational, and logical application of 
proportionality principles); Warbrick, supra note 25, at 1007–15 (offering 
examples from the United Kingdom to argue for the application of the core 
standards of international humanitarian and human rights law to the “war on 
terrorism”); Schulman, supra note 25, at 547–48 (discussing the protection of 
fundamental rights in the context of a new national security court system by 
pointing to examples from the United Kingdom, Malaysia, and South Africa). 
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United States) employ some kind of system for detaining terrorist 
suspects, but when and how such detention occurs varies so 
significantly that it is both meaningless and misleading to assert 
that the Obama administration should employ “preventive detention” 
in the United States. Instead, the question facing American 
policymakers, including President Obama’s task force, who seek to 
learn from comparative international precedent is: “Which 
framework should we use to detain terrorist suspects—a pre-trial 
detention framework, an immigration detention framework, or a 
national security detention framework?” 
Reframing the question in these terms underscores the flaws 
in the arguments of those advocating for a “National Security Court” 
or a U.S. version of “preventive detention.” Scholars advocating for 
“preventive detention” in the United States often do so pointing to 
the precedent of America’s closest allies. These scholars argue that 
“preventive detention” should be an acceptable solution because the 
United Kingdom and France hold suspected terrorists in preventive 
detention.476 However, in making their arguments, these 
commentators erroneously conflate the different detention 
frameworks. Citing the experiences of the United Kingdom and 
France as favorable precedent suggesting that the United States 
should formalize “preventive detention” policies, these advocates 
then propose specific policies more consistent with a national 
security detention framework477—despite the fact that the United 
Kingdom and France are firmly ensconced within the pre-trial 
detention framework.478 If these scholars are wedded to their policy 
prescriptions, they should invoke more accurate comparative 
precedents for their position—the detention policies of Russia, 
Nigeria, or other countries that rely on the national security 
 
476.  See, e.g., Hakimi, supra note 32, at 401–08 (citing dissatisfaction with 
the ad hoc reactions of France and the United Kingdom to criminal and armed-
conflict models of detention to argue that a modified version of “administrative 
detention” is necessary). 
477.  See, e.g., Roach, supra note 25, at 2154–55, 2188–2203 (finding the 
actions of the United Kingdom and Canada instructive with respect to issues of 
national security confidentiality, non-citizen terrorists who cannot be deported 
due to safety concerns, and the preventive detention of suspected terrorists); 
Marc Perelman, How the French Fight Terror, Foreign Policy, Jan. 2006, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3353&print=1 (proposing 
an overhaul of U.S. counterterrorism policy based on the French judicial 
approach of “aggressive prosecution, specialized investigators, and intrusive  law 
enforcement”). 
478.  See discussion supra Part II. 
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framework.479 If, on the other hand, these scholars are wedded to the 
notion that the United States should follow the example set by the 
United Kingdom and France, they should reverse their policy 
prescriptions—eschewing national security detention in favor of a 
criminal justice-based pre-trial detention regime. 
This Article illustrates the importance of fully understanding 
the systems of detention in use in other nations before citing them as 
precedent. The first step to take when attempting any comparative 
analysis of different countries’ detention schemes is to identify 
whether or not the countries in question use pre-trial detention, 
immigration detention, or national security detention to hold 
terrorist suspects. As this Article has argued, the framework to 
which a country belongs often implicates that nation’s constitutional, 
historical, political, and social values and mores. As observed in the 
Introduction, the United States is a nation that happens to share 
many civic values, human rights standards, constitutional 
provisions, political traditions, national security concerns, and legal 
system tenets with the pre-trial detention framework countries. The 
governments of these countries have faced similar challenges and 
weighed similar human rights concerns, and so it is to these 
countries that the United States should now turn for the firmest 
precedent as it considers what system of detention it should use to 
hold terrorist suspects in future. 
The United States cannot and should not import wholesale 
another nation’s system—pre-trial detention or otherwise—for the 
detention of terrorist suspects. The United States, like all countries, 
has its own legal traditions and its own approach to legislation and 
jurisprudence. Unsurprisingly, then, not all of the pre-trial detention 
countries’ approaches to the detention of terrorist suspects are 
applicable in a U.S. context.480 The United States can, however, learn 
from the broad principles running through the pre-trial detention 
nations’ approaches to the detention of terrorist suspects, and use 
these systems as a point of departure for future discussion. This 
Article has endeavored to provide a roadmap for that process. By 
isolating the attributes of three alternative systems, and pointing to 
the nations and groups of nations that have adopted these three 
different frameworks, this Article hopes to demonstrate what might 
be possible and achievable in the United States. For, as Justice 
 
479.  See discussion supra Part IV. 
480.  For example, the Spanish system of in communicado detention, or the 
French centralization of proceedings. See discussion supra Part II. 
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Stevens observed in his dissent in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, “[a]t stake . . . 
is nothing less than the essence of a free society.”481 As the Obama 
administration’s multi-agency task force begins its work, it would do 
well to remember Justice Steven’s rejoinder in the same case that 
“[e]ven more important than the method of selecting the people’s 
rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints 
imposed . . . by the rule of law.”482 
 
 
481.  542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
482.  Id. 
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